Banks are against cryptocurrency because it exposes them to compliance risks that can cost billions, strips revenue from the payment and deposit services they rely on, and doesn’t fit the capital, consumer-protection, and accounting rules federal regulators impose on every chartered institution. A single misstep on anti-money laundering can draw a record-setting fine. Volatile assets can’t sit on the balance sheet the way Treasuries can. And the technology was built to let people move value without a bank in the middle, which is precisely what banks sell.
Anti-Money Laundering Exposure Is the Biggest Problem
The Bank Secrecy Act requires financial institutions to verify customer identities, monitor transactions, and file reports useful in criminal, tax, and counterterrorism investigations.1Office of the Law Revision Counsel. 31 USC 5311 – Declaration of Purpose Blockchain transactions run between pseudonymous wallet addresses that don’t inherently reveal a legal name or location. When crypto-derived funds land in a bank account, the institution often cannot trace who controlled the originating wallet or where the money came from.
The stakes are not theoretical. In October 2024, FinCEN assessed a $1.3 billion penalty against TD Bank for Bank Secrecy Act violations, the largest ever against a depository institution.2Financial Crimes Enforcement Network. FinCEN Assesses Record $1.3 Billion Penalty Against TD Bank Banks can lose their charters outright, and individual employees can be removed and barred from the industry.3Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC). FFIEC BSA/AML Manual Introduction A money laundering conviction carries up to 20 years in prison and a fine of up to $500,000 or twice the value of the transaction.4Office of the Law Revision Counsel. 18 USC 1956 – Laundering of Monetary Instruments
The burden falls entirely on the bank. If crypto flows turn out to be tied to a sanctioned entity or a criminal network, the institution owns the legal exposure. Monitoring on-chain activity requires specialized forensics software and trained staff. For most banks, those costs run higher than any revenue crypto services would produce.
Consumer Protection Rules Don’t Fit Irreversible Transactions
Federal Regulation E gives consumers the right to have errors investigated and unauthorized electronic transfers reversed within set timeframes.5eCFR. 12 CFR Part 1005 – Electronic Fund Transfers (Regulation E) A bank must investigate a reported error within 10 business days and provisionally credit the customer’s account if the investigation runs longer. If a card number is stolen, the bank is expected to fix it.
Blockchain transactions run the opposite way. Once the network confirms a transfer, it’s final. No central authority can reverse it. Send crypto to a scammer or mistype a wallet address and the funds are gone. A bank offering crypto services cannot promise Regulation E remedies on transactions that physically cannot be undone.
Custody makes it worse. If a bank loses the private cryptographic keys controlling a customer wallet, those assets are permanently inaccessible. Traditional assets have physical security protocols and centralized electronic backups. Crypto has neither.
Volatility Conflicts With Capital and Liquidity Rules
Banks must hold high-quality liquid assets sufficient to cover projected cash outflows over a 30-day stress period, a requirement called the liquidity coverage ratio.6eCFR. 12 CFR Part 50 – Liquidity Risk Measurement Standards Qualifying assets are things like Federal Reserve balances, Treasury securities, and sovereign debt with zero-percent risk weights. They qualify because their value stays predictable in a crisis.
Cryptocurrency doesn’t come close. Bitcoin has historically been three to four times as volatile as major equity indices and can lose 40% of its value in a matter of days, as it did in March 2020. An asset that may be worth half as much next week cannot serve as a liquidity buffer. A significant crypto position hit by a sudden crash could deplete a bank’s capital reserves and trigger regulatory intervention.
The FDIC’s deposit insurance assessments compound the pressure. Rates are set through risk-based models that factor in capital adequacy, asset quality, management, earnings, liquidity, and market-risk sensitivity.7FDIC. Risk-Based Assessments Weaker risk profiles pay higher premiums. Holding volatile digital assets pushes risk scores up and raises the cost of operating across every line of business, not just the crypto one.
Crypto Undercuts the Fees Banks Depend On
Banks make money sitting in the middle of transactions. Wire transfers, currency exchange markups, account maintenance fees, and the spread between deposit and lending rates all depend on people needing a bank to move money. Cryptocurrency lets users send value directly to each other without a bank clearing or validating anything. A cross-border crypto transfer collects no wire fee and no foreign exchange spread for any bank.
The numbers are stark. Domestic wire transfers typically cost $25 to $50, and international wires cost more. Crypto transfers can settle in minutes for a fraction of those fees. As adoption grows, particularly for international remittances, demand for traditional high-margin payment services shrinks.
Stablecoins Threaten the Deposit Base
Stablecoins are a more targeted problem than volatile tokens. Because they’re pegged to the dollar, they can function as a substitute for a checking account. A Federal Reserve research paper published in late 2025 found that stablecoin adoption could “reduce, recycle, or restructure bank deposits rather than simply draining them,” with transaction accounts more vulnerable to substitution than savings accounts.8Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Banks in the Age of Stablecoins: Some Possible Implications for Deposits, Credit, and Financial Intermediation
The downstream effects ripple through the lending side of the business. As retail deposit funding erodes, banks shift toward wholesale borrowing and capital-market instruments, which cost more and swing with the market. The Fed’s analysis estimated that a $100 billion net deposit drain not recycled back to banks could translate into a $60 to $126 billion contraction in bank lending.8Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Banks in the Age of Stablecoins: Some Possible Implications for Deposits, Credit, and Financial Intermediation The liquidity coverage ratio compounds the squeeze by treating deposits from stablecoin issuers as wholesale or uninsured, which carry higher assumed runoff rates. Banks holding those deposits must maintain larger buffers of liquid assets, leaving less capital for lending. Over 60% of increases in bank funding costs get passed through to lending interest rates, which means stablecoin-driven deposit losses eventually raise borrowing costs for ordinary customers.
New Tax Reporting Adds Compliance Overhead
Starting with transactions in 2025, brokers, including banks that custody or facilitate digital asset trades, must report customer sales on the new IRS Form 1099-DA.9Internal Revenue Service. Frequently Asked Questions About Broker Reporting The obligation flows from changes to Internal Revenue Code Section 6045 enacted by the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, which expanded “broker” to cover anyone who regularly provides services effectuating digital asset transfers.10Office of the Law Revision Counsel. 26 USC 6045 – Returns of Brokers
For sales after 2025, brokers must report gross proceeds on every digital asset sale unless a narrow exception applies. Digital assets acquired after 2025 through a custodial account are treated as covered securities, so brokers must also report cost basis, acquisition date, and whether gain or loss is short-term or long-term.11Internal Revenue Service (IRS). 2026 Instructions for Form 1099-DA Digital Asset Proceeds From Broker Transactions (Draft) Penalties for incorrect or late payee statements run $250 per form up to $3 million per year, with higher caps and uncapped penalties for intentional disregard.12Office of the Law Revision Counsel. 26 USC 6722 – Failure to Furnish Correct Payee Statements For a large bank handling thousands of customer crypto transactions, building infrastructure to track cost basis across wallets and exchanges is a significant project, and the error exposure is real.
An Accounting Rule Froze Custody for Nearly Three Years
Until recently, one of the biggest practical barriers was an SEC accounting bulletin. Staff Accounting Bulletin 121, issued in March 2022, required any entity safeguarding crypto assets for customers to record both a liability and a corresponding asset on its balance sheet at fair value.13U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 121 Custodied assets normally sit off the balance sheet because the bank doesn’t own them. Forcing crypto custody on-balance-sheet inflated reported liabilities, distorted capital ratios, and made crypto custody dramatically more expensive than custody of any other asset class.
In January 2025, the SEC rescinded SAB 121 through SAB 122, removing the on-balance-sheet requirement. Banks can now evaluate crypto custody obligations under standard contingency accounting rules, which usually keeps the liability off the balance sheet unless a specific loss contingency exists. The barrier is gone, but it effectively froze bank participation in crypto custody for nearly three years.
Regulators Have Discouraged Involvement
Federal bank regulators have moved in coordination on crypto risk. In July 2025, the Federal Reserve, FDIC, and OCC issued a joint statement on risk-management considerations for crypto-asset safekeeping, reminding institutions that any crypto activity must comply with safety-and-soundness requirements.14FDIC. Agencies Issue Joint Statement on Risk-Management Considerations for Crypto-Asset Safekeeping Joint statements aren’t binding regulations, but banks treat them as mandatory. Ignoring one invites more frequent examinations, worse supervisory ratings, and potential restrictions on growth and acquisitions.
The chilling effect has gone beyond formal guidance. During the prior administration, federal regulators used informal channels, including offline conversations and threats of negative examination scores, to pressure banks into cutting ties with digital asset companies. Acting FDIC Chairman Travis Hill acknowledged in early 2025 that the agency’s approach “sent the message to banks that it would be extraordinarily difficult — if not impossible — to move forward,” and that “the vast majority of banks simply stopped trying.” The FDIC has promised to change course, though formal policy changes are still developing.
What’s Changing
The environment is shifting. In March 2025, the OCC issued Interpretive Letter 1183, reaffirming that national banks may provide crypto-asset custody, engage in distributed ledger activities, and participate in stablecoin transactions, provided they do so in a safe and sound manner consistent with applicable law.15Office of the Comptroller of the Currency. OCC Interpretive Letter 1183 Combined with the rescission of SAB 121, two of the largest practical obstacles are gone.
On the legislative side, Congress has been working toward a framework for digital assets, though no comprehensive law has been enacted. The GENIUS Act, introduced as Senate Bill 394 in the 119th Congress, would create a federal regulatory framework for payment stablecoins while letting issuers with under $10 billion in market capitalization opt for state-level regulation.16U.S. Congress. S.394 – GENIUS Act The bill remains pending. Broader legislation covering the classification and regulation of all digital assets has not reached the president’s desk.
The underlying tension hasn’t gone away. Banks operate within a framework built around identifiable counterparties, reversible transactions, and stable asset values. Cryptocurrency was built to bypass all three. Regulators are gradually opening paths for banks to engage with crypto under controlled conditions, but compliance costs, competitive threats, and unresolved legal questions still make most banks reluctant.