The cost-plus system is a government contracting method in which a contractor is reimbursed for the legitimate costs of doing the work and then paid a separate fee as profit. It rose to prominence during World War II, when the federal government needed private industry to start building tanks, aircraft, and munitions before anyone could reliably estimate what those items would cost to produce. By absorbing the financial risk, the government persuaded manufacturers to retool overnight for military production without facing bankruptcy if costs ran past initial projections.
How the Two Sides of the Payment Work
Every cost-plus agreement splits what the contractor receives into two pieces: reimbursable costs and a fee.
The reimbursable portion covers direct expenses tied to the specific contract, such as raw materials, labor, and facility overhead. Federal acquisition rules require these costs to be reasonable, properly allocated to the project, and backed by documentation like timesheets, purchase orders, and invoices.1Acquisition.GOV. Subpart 16.3 – Cost-Reimbursement Contracts A contractor claiming reimbursement for something it cannot trace to the contract’s objectives will not get paid for it.
The fee is the contractor’s profit. Its size and structure vary by contract type, but the purpose is the same: compensate the contractor for administrative effort and business risk that direct-cost reimbursement alone doesn’t cover. Government auditors review the fee to confirm it stays within the limits negotiated at the outset. Keeping actual costs and profit on separate ledgers creates a paper trail that lets the government see exactly where public money went.
Indirect Cost Rates
Beyond obvious line items like steel and wages, contractors also recover indirect costs, such as facility rent, utilities, and corporate administrative support that benefit multiple projects at once. These get bundled into overhead rates that the contractor and the government negotiate, often on a provisional basis at the start of a contract and finalized after the fiscal year closes. The negotiated indirect cost rate agreement is written into the contract and determines how much overhead the contractor can bill per dollar of direct cost.2eCFR. 48 CFR Part 742 Subpart 742.7 – Indirect Cost Rates Getting this rate wrong, or inflating it, is one of the fastest ways to trigger an audit.
Wage Floors on Direct Labor
Labor costs aren’t entirely at the contractor’s discretion. Federal law requires contractors on construction projects to pay locally prevailing wages under the Davis-Bacon Act, and contractors performing services must comply with the Service Contract Act’s wage and fringe benefit floors.3Worker.gov. Prevailing Wages on Federal Contracts These wage determinations set a minimum for what counts as a reasonable direct labor cost, so a contractor cannot underpay workers and pocket the difference between actual wages and market-rate reimbursement.
Why the Government Pays This Way
In the early 1940s, the military needed weapons that had never been mass-produced, including new aircraft engines, radar equipment, and advanced munitions. No company had historical production data to price these items accurately, which made traditional fixed-price bidding a gamble most manufacturers refused to take. A fixed bid that turned out too low could bankrupt the contractor before the first shipment left the factory floor.
The cost-plus approach shifted that financial risk from the contractor to the federal treasury. Manufacturers knew they would recover every legitimate expense plus a guaranteed profit, so they were willing to prioritize speed and innovation over cost control. That trade-off was deliberate. The government accepted the possibility of overpaying in exchange for the certainty that production lines would start running immediately. Within months, automobile plants were building aircraft and appliance factories were stamping out shell casings.
Types of Cost-Plus Contracts
Not all cost-plus arrangements handle profit the same way. The differences matter because each model creates a different incentive to control spending.
Cost-Plus-Fixed-Fee
Under a cost-plus-fixed-fee (CPFF) contract, the contractor’s profit is a set dollar amount negotiated before work begins. Spending more on the project does not increase the fee, and spending less does not reduce it. Federal law caps CPFF fees at 15 percent of estimated costs for research and development work, 6 percent for architectural or engineering services on public works, and 10 percent for everything else.4Office of the Law Revision Counsel. 10 USC 3322 – Cost Contracts
Cost-Plus-Percentage-of-Cost
The cost-plus-percentage-of-cost (CPPC) model calculates the fee as a fixed percentage of total expenses. A 10 percent fee on a $1 million project yields $100,000 in profit; the same fee on $2 million yields $200,000. The perverse incentive is obvious: contractors earn more by spending more. Congress eventually banned the model outright. Today, federal law prohibits CPPC contracting for both defense and civilian procurement.4Office of the Law Revision Counsel. 10 USC 3322 – Cost Contracts5Office of the Law Revision Counsel. 41 USC 3905 – Cost Contracts
Cost-Plus-Incentive-Fee
A cost-plus-incentive-fee (CPIF) contract starts with a target cost, a target fee, and a formula that adjusts the fee up or down depending on whether actual costs come in above or below target. If the contractor beats the target, the fee increases; if costs overrun, the fee shrinks. The sharing formula puts both sides on the same side of the ledger when it comes to hunting for savings.6eCFR. 48 CFR 16.304 – Cost-Plus-Incentive-Fee Contracts
Cost-Plus-Award-Fee
A cost-plus-award-fee (CPAF) contract includes a base fee, sometimes zero, plus an award amount the government can grant based on a subjective evaluation of the contractor’s performance. The evaluation criteria typically focus on quality, timeliness, and technical achievement rather than pure cost control. A government panel grades the work and decides how much of the available award pool to pay out.7eCFR. 48 CFR 16.305 – Cost-Plus-Award-Fee Contracts The structure works best when the government wants to motivate performance in areas that are hard to reduce to a formula.
Costs the Government Will Not Reimburse
The “cost” in cost-plus does not mean every expense the contractor incurs. Federal acquisition regulations keep a detailed list of costs that are categorically unallowable, meaning the government will never reimburse them regardless of contract type. The major categories include:
- Alcoholic beverages and entertainment events.
- Lobbying and other spending aimed at influencing legislation or elections.
- Dues for social, dining, or country clubs.
- Fines and penalties assessed against the contractor.
- Branded souvenirs, imprinted clothing, and similar promotional giveaways.
Contractors who slip unallowable costs into their reimbursement claims, whether deliberately or through sloppy accounting, face serious consequences under the False Claims Act, which reaches conduct that amounts to deliberate ignorance or reckless disregard of the rules, not just outright fraud.
Where Cost-Plus Fits in Federal Contracting Today
Cost-plus contracts did not disappear after World War II, but the regulatory framework around them tightened considerably. A cost-reimbursement contract can only be awarded when several conditions are met: the contracting officer’s acquisition plan must be approved by a higher authority, the contractor must have an accounting system capable of tracking costs to the specific contract, and the government must have sufficient staff to supervise performance. Cost-reimbursement contracts are prohibited outright for purchases of commercial products and services.8Acquisition.GOV. 16.301-3 Limitations
Federal procurement policy explicitly favors firm-fixed-price contracts whenever risk can be reasonably predicted. Contracting officers are expected to move away from cost-reimbursement arrangements as a program matures and production data becomes available. Regulations warn against the “protracted use” of cost-reimbursement contracts once experience provides a basis for firmer pricing, and require contracting officers to document their plan for transitioning to fixed-price agreements.9eCFR. 48 CFR 16.103 – Negotiating Contract Type In practice, cost-plus work today clusters where it started: experimental research, novel weapons systems, and other projects where nobody can predict the final price tag with confidence.
Audits and Recordkeeping
Contractors on cost-reimbursement contracts face ongoing scrutiny from the Defense Contract Audit Agency and equivalent oversight bodies. Each contractor submits an annual incurred cost proposal within six months of its fiscal year end, detailing every dollar claimed across more than a dozen required schedules. A senior executive at the vice president or chief financial officer level must personally certify the accuracy of the submission’s final indirect cost figures.
After final payment on a contract, contractors must keep all supporting records, including accounting data, invoices, correspondence, and internal cost procedures, for at least three years.10eCFR. 48 CFR 4.703 – Policy If a specific contract clause requires a longer retention period, or the contractor keeps records longer for its own purposes, the longer period controls. Those records must be available to government auditors and the Comptroller General on request. Disposing of them early leaves a contractor unable to defend its cost claims during an audit, which in government contracting is functionally the same as admitting the costs were improper.