The Circular 175 procedure is the U.S. State Department’s internal authorization process for negotiating and concluding every treaty and international agreement involving the United States. It is codified in the Foreign Affairs Manual at 11 FAM 720, and no federal agency may sit down at the negotiating table or sign a binding international commitment without first completing it.1U.S. Department of State Foreign Affairs Manual. 11 FAM 720 Negotiation and Conclusion The process exists to keep individual agencies from making conflicting international commitments without coordination, and it forces early decisions about the form the agreement will take, who has authority to approve it, and what obligations it creates for the United States.
Which Agreements Are Covered
The procedure reaches every proposed international agreement, bilateral or multilateral, where the parties intend to create a legally binding commitment governed by international law. If the document contains specific obligations, enforcement mechanisms, financial commitments, or jurisdictional provisions, it almost certainly falls within the regulatory framework. Purely political statements, non-binding memoranda of understanding without mandatory language, and informal arrangements with no legal force do not.1U.S. Department of State Foreign Affairs Manual. 11 FAM 720 Negotiation and Conclusion
New agreements are not the only trigger. Amendments, extensions, and terminations of existing treaties each require their own Circular 175 authorization. The label on the document does not control classification; what matters is the substance of the obligations. A “convention,” a “protocol,” a “memorandum,” or an “accord” can all qualify if the underlying commitments are binding.
Treaty or Executive Agreement
One of the first substantive decisions in a Circular 175 package is whether the proposed agreement should be a treaty requiring Senate advice and consent, or an executive agreement concluded on some other constitutional basis. The Constitution gives the President treaty-making power but requires the concurrence of two-thirds of the senators present for a treaty to move forward.2Legal Information Institute. U.S. Constitution Annotated – Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 – Overview of Presidents Treaty-Making Power Executive agreements rest on the President’s independent constitutional authority or on prior authorization from Congress and do not require a separate Senate vote.
Under 11 FAM 723.3, the Department weighs eight factors when classifying an agreement:1U.S. Department of State Foreign Affairs Manual. 11 FAM 720 Negotiation and Conclusion
- The national scope of the commitments, including the risks they create for the country as a whole.
- Whether the agreement is intended to alter or preempt the laws of individual states.
- Whether the agreement can take effect without new implementing legislation from Congress.
- How similar agreements have been handled in past U.S. practice.
- Any congressional preference for a particular form of agreement on the subject.
- The degree of formality appropriate to the subject matter.
- The duration of the agreement and any urgency in concluding it, which tends to favor the executive agreement route for short-term or routine arrangements.
- How other countries typically handle similar agreements.
In practice, major military alliances, human rights conventions, and agreements that permanently change domestic law tend to go the treaty route. Routine technical cooperation, short-term administrative arrangements, and agreements implementing authority Congress has already delegated tend to proceed as executive agreements. The legal memorandum accompanying every request must discuss these factors and recommend a form.
What the Request Package Contains
A Circular 175 request is built around two core documents: an Action Memorandum and a Legal Memorandum, addressed to the Secretary of State or another official with delegated authority.1U.S. Department of State Foreign Affairs Manual. 11 FAM 720 Negotiation and Conclusion
The Action Memorandum
The Action Memorandum lays out the principal features of the proposed agreement, explains why it serves U.S. foreign policy interests, identifies special problems the negotiators expect, and proposes solutions where possible. It includes the anticipated timeline and flags any domestic opposition that could complicate the process.
Three specific disclosures are required. If the agreement would commit the United States to provide funds, goods, or services beyond what is already in an approved budget, the memorandum must say so and describe arrangements for consulting the Office of Management and Budget. The Department will not authorize such a commitment unless the President’s budget already provides adequate funding or the President has decided to seek the necessary appropriation. If the agreement could require issuing a “significant regulatory action” as defined in Executive Order 12866, the memorandum must detail arrangements for timely OMB consultation on that front as well. And the memorandum must state whether the agreement will significantly affect the quality of the human environment.1U.S. Department of State Foreign Affairs Manual. 11 FAM 720 Negotiation and Conclusion
The Legal Memorandum and Draft Text
The Legal Memorandum is prepared by the Office of the Legal Adviser. It identifies the constitutional or statutory authority supporting the proposed agreement, works through the eight factors on treaty versus executive agreement form, and confirms that the proposal does not conflict with existing federal law.
The package must also include the full draft text of the proposed agreement, where available, or the final text to be signed along with any related exchange of notes, agreed minutes, or side documents. The draft text must be cleared by the Assistant Legal Adviser for Treaty Affairs before it moves forward.
Clearance and Approval
Once assembled, the request package circulates through every office with a stake in the agreement. The required clearance chain includes the Office of the Legal Adviser, the Assistant Legal Adviser for Treaty Affairs, the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs, any regional or functional bureaus with relevant expertise, and any outside agency with primary responsibility or a substantial interest in the subject matter, such as the Department of Defense or Commerce.1U.S. Department of State Foreign Affairs Manual. 11 FAM 720 Negotiation and Conclusion The Bureau of Budget and Planning reviews financial projections and resource implications.3U.S. Department of State. 1 FAM 620 Bureau of Budget and Planning
Each office can raise objections, request changes, or add conditions. The action officer works toward a 20-day regulatory timeline for clearance, though interagency disputes or complex policy questions can push it beyond that window. If the process stalls, the action officer sends a status report to the originating agency and takes steps to resolve the conflict.4U.S. Department of State. Chapter 2 – Overview of the C-175 Process
Final authorization comes from an official with specifically delegated authority. Under a 2008 delegation order, that authority runs from the Secretary of State down through the Deputy Secretary and several Under Secretaries, including those for Political Affairs, Economic and Energy Affairs, and Arms Control and International Security.5Federal Register. Negotiation, Conclusion, and Termination of Treaties and Other International Agreements The Secretary or Deputy Secretary can always override and handle the decision personally.
What Authorization Does and Does Not Cover
Approval of a Circular 175 request to negotiate does not authorize the representative to sign the finished agreement. The FAM is explicit that authorization to negotiate is not advance approval of any text, nor permission to set a signing date or actually sign. A separate written request under 11 FAM 724.3 is needed to authorize conclusion once negotiations wrap up.1U.S. Department of State Foreign Affairs Manual. 11 FAM 720 Negotiation and Conclusion
During negotiations, the U.S. team must stay within its existing instructions. No position may be communicated to a foreign government that exceeds the original authorization, and no proposal may be agreed to beyond what was approved without going back for additional clearance. If the agreement includes a foreign-language text, a responsible language officer must certify that the foreign-language and English versions are in conformity before anyone signs.
For formal treaties, the Secretary of State (or occasionally the President) issues a document called a “full power,” which serves as formal evidence that the representative is authorized to sign for the United States. The Office of the Assistant Legal Adviser for Treaty Affairs prepares these documents. Holding a full power does not itself authorize signing; the Department must separately instruct the representative to proceed. If a full power is required, the representative must not sign until it is physically in hand unless the Department specifically says otherwise.6U.S. Department of State Foreign Affairs Manual. Guidelines for Concluding International Agreements Full powers are customary for treaties but not typically used for executive agreements.
Once signing takes place, the responsible officer must report it electronically to the Treaty Office within 24 hours, giving the title, parties, date, and place of signing.
Congressional Reporting Sits Outside the Procedure
The Circular 175 procedure is internal to the State Department. Congressional oversight of international agreements runs on a separate track under 1 U.S.C. ยง 112b, originally enacted as the Case-Zablocki Act and substantially expanded in recent years. That statute applies whether an agreement took the treaty route or the executive agreement route.
The Secretary of State must provide congressional leaders and the foreign affairs committees with a monthly written report listing every international agreement and qualifying non-binding instrument signed or concluded during the prior month, along with the full text of each and a detailed description of the legal authority relied upon.7Office of the Law Revision Counsel. 1 USC 112b – United States International Agreements and Non-Binding Instruments; Transparency Provisions If an agency relies on Article II of the Constitution as its authority, it must specifically explain the basis for that reliance.
Any department or agency that signs an international agreement must transmit the text to the Secretary of State within 15 days. The same 15-day clock applies to qualifying non-binding instruments. The Secretary must then make the text of international agreements publicly available on the State Department’s website within 120 days of the agreement entering into force. Even oral agreements are not exempt; their substance must be reduced to writing for reporting purposes. If the chair or ranking member of a relevant committee requests implementing arrangements related to a reported agreement, the Secretary must provide them within 30 days.
What Happens if an Agency Skips the Process
Federal law now flatly prohibits any agency from signing or concluding an international agreement without prior consultation with the Secretary of State.7Office of the Law Revision Counsel. 1 USC 112b – United States International Agreements and Non-Binding Instruments; Transparency Provisions Each agency that enters into international agreements must also designate a Chief International Agreements Officer responsible for department-wide compliance with reporting and transparency obligations.
Enforcement, however, leans on transparency rather than invalidation. Federal regulations state that failure to follow the prescribed procedures does not affect the legal validity of an agreement under U.S. or international law, does not give rise to a cause of action, and does not disturb any rights the agreement establishes.8Federal Register. Publication, Coordination, and Reporting of International Agreements – Amendments An unauthorized agreement is still legally binding if it otherwise meets the requirements of international law.
Non-compliance triggers institutional accountability instead. The Comptroller General must conduct periodic audits of executive-branch compliance with the transparency and reporting requirements, with the first audit due within three years of enactment and subsequent audits every three years during a nine-year window. The Secretary of State must also maintain an internal mechanism for Department personnel to report non-compliance. The practical risk for an agency that skips the process is not that its agreement vanishes but that it draws audit findings, congressional scrutiny, and a damaged working relationship with the State Department that makes future negotiations harder.