The United States policy on negotiating with terrorists is a no-concessions rule: no federal agency may pay ransom, release prisoners, change policy, or otherwise reward those holding Americans hostage. The rule is set by presidential directive, backed by criminal statutes that make material support to terrorist groups a felony, and reinforced by financial sanctions on hostage-takers. It does not mean the government walks away from captives. Federal law requires an active recovery effort through diplomacy, intelligence, and, when warranted, military action. And it does not, in practice, target families who pay ransoms to bring a relative home.
The No-Concessions Rule
The controlling policy is Presidential Policy Directive 30, issued in June 2015. PPD-30 states that “The United States Government will make no concessions to individuals or groups holding U.S. nationals hostage,” and it bars any federal agency from paying ransom, releasing prisoners, changing policy, or encouraging such concessions by private parties.1The White House: President Barack Obama. Presidential Policy Directive – Hostage Recovery Activities
The logic is deterrence. Paying ransoms or trading political favors creates a market for kidnappings and raises the value of every American abroad as a potential target. The directive replaced an earlier classified policy from 2002 and grew out of a series of hostage crises that exposed poor coordination inside the government.
Talking is not a concession. PPD-30 permits federal officials to communicate with hostage-takers and their intermediaries to gather intelligence and pursue recovery, so long as they do not offer the forbidden trades. The directive also stood up the Hostage Response Group, a senior interagency body that keeps State, Defense, Justice, FBI, Treasury, and the intelligence community aligned so no single department can undercut the policy with an independent promise.1The White House: President Barack Obama. Presidential Policy Directive – Hostage Recovery Activities
How the Rule Became Permanent Law
For five years, the framework lived only as a presidential directive that any future president could revoke. That changed in December 2020, when Congress passed the Robert Levinson Hostage Recovery and Hostage-Taking Accountability Act as part of that year’s consolidated appropriations package. The Levinson Act codified the core of PPD-30 into permanent federal law under Title 22, Chapter 23.2Office of the Law Revision Counsel. 22 USC Chapter 23, Subchapter II – Hostage Recovery and Hostage-Taking Accountability
The law requires the President to maintain the Hostage Recovery Fusion Cell, an interagency operational body housed at the FBI. The Fusion Cell tracks known hostage cases involving Americans, recommends recovery options, coordinates family support, and reports regularly to the President and Congress.3Office of the Law Revision Counsel. 22 USC 1741b – Hostage Recovery Fusion Cell
The Levinson Act also created the Special Presidential Envoy for Hostage Affairs, a Senate-confirmed position with the rank of ambassador who leads diplomatic recovery efforts. Separately, the law directs the Secretary of State to review all cases of Americans detained abroad and decide whether a detention is “wrongful.” A detention can be labeled wrongful when the person is held to extract political concessions from the United States, when the detaining country’s judiciary lacks independence, or when due process has been fundamentally impaired, among other factors.2Office of the Law Revision Counsel. 22 USC Chapter 23, Subchapter II – Hostage Recovery and Hostage-Taking Accountability That label matters because it triggers the full recovery apparatus and opens the door to sanctions against those responsible.
Why Paying or Helping Is a Crime
The no-concessions rule binds the government. Two federal statutes bind everyone else.
Under 18 U.S.C. § 2339A, it is a crime to provide material support knowing or intending it will be used to carry out specific listed offenses, including hostage-taking, use of weapons of mass destruction, and attacks on government officials. “Material support” is defined broadly to include money, lodging, training, expert advice, communications equipment, safe houses, false identification, weapons, and personnel. The maximum sentence is 15 years, or life if someone dies as a result.4Office of the Law Revision Counsel. 18 US Code 2339A – Providing Material Support to Terrorists
Under 18 U.S.C. § 2339B, the reach is wider. It is a crime to knowingly provide material support to a designated foreign terrorist organization, regardless of whether the support is tied to a specific violent act. Prosecutors only need to prove the defendant knew the group was designated or that it engages in terrorism. The maximum sentence is 20 years, or life if someone dies.5Office of the Law Revision Counsel. 18 USC 2339B – Providing Material Support or Resources to Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations Individual fines under both statutes can run to $250,000.6Office of the Law Revision Counsel. 18 US Code 3571 – Sentence of Fine
The practical difference: a § 2339A case requires proof the defendant knew or intended the support would fuel a specific crime, while a § 2339B case only requires proof the defendant knew they were helping a designated group. That is a much lower bar.
The Supreme Court tested the outer edge of § 2339B in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project in 2010. Plaintiffs wanted to give designated groups legal training and political advocacy assistance and argued the First Amendment protected peaceful aid. The Court rejected the argument, holding that § 2339B is constitutional even as applied to nonviolent forms of assistance because such aid frees up the group’s own resources and lends it legitimacy. The Court wrote that “Congress plainly spoke to the necessary mental state for a violation of § 2339B, and it chose knowledge about the organization’s connection to terrorism, not specific intent to further the organization’s terrorist activities.”7Justia. Holder v Humanitarian Law Project, 561 US 1 (2010) Humanitarian or peaceful intent is not a defense.
Who Counts as a Terrorist Group
The § 2339B prohibition turns on designation. Under Section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, the Secretary of State can designate an organization as a Foreign Terrorist Organization if it is foreign, engages in or retains the capability and intent for terrorism, and threatens U.S. nationals or national security. The Secretary coordinates with the Attorney General and the Secretary of the Treasury before designating a group, and Treasury can immediately freeze the group’s U.S.-held assets.8Office of the Law Revision Counsel. 8 US Code 1189 – Designation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations As of the most recent State Department count, 94 organizations carry the FTO designation.9Congressional Research Service. The Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) List The designation is what makes any dealing with the group, including a ransom payment, a potential federal crime.
Sanctions on Hostage-Takers
Financial sanctions add another layer. Executive Order 14078, signed in July 2022, authorizes the Secretary of State to block the U.S.-based property of any foreign person responsible for, complicit in, or who ordered the hostage-taking or wrongful detention of an American abroad, and extends to leaders of organizations whose members engaged in such conduct.10Government Publishing Office. Bolstering Efforts To Bring Hostages and Wrongfully Detained United States Nationals Home
The Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control enforces these blocks under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act. Willful violations of IEEPA-based sanctions can bring criminal penalties of up to $1,000,000 in fines and 20 years in prison.11eCFR. 31 CFR 560.701 – Penalties That reach captures banks, cryptocurrency exchanges, and money service businesses that might otherwise be used to move ransom funds. The Levinson Act adds a dedicated statutory authority on top of IEEPA, letting the President impose visa bans and property blocks specifically on those responsible for taking or wrongfully detaining Americans.2Office of the Law Revision Counsel. 22 USC Chapter 23, Subchapter II – Hostage Recovery and Hostage-Taking Accountability
What About Families Who Pay Ransoms
The material support statutes technically cover anyone who gives resources to a designated group, and ransom money qualifies. For years, families of hostages described feeling threatened by the government’s own laws while trying to save their relatives.
The 2015 policy review that produced PPD-30 addressed this. The Department of Justice publicly stated that it “has never used the material support statute to prosecute a hostage’s family or friends for paying a ransom for the safe return of their loved one” and that it “does not intend to add to families’ pain in such cases by suggesting that they could face criminal prosecution.” That is a formal exercise of prosecutorial discretion. The underlying law still prohibits the payment; the promise is that the government will not enforce it against desperate families.
Two caveats follow. First, the promise is a policy choice, not a legal exemption, and a future administration could take a different view. Second, the assurance does not extend to companies or third-party organizations that facilitate ransom payments; they face real prosecution risk, particularly where OFAC sanctions apply.
The Hostage Recovery Fusion Cell is the family’s point of contact. Its statutory mandate includes coordinating support so relatives get timely information and access to federal resources without having to work multiple agencies on their own.3Office of the Law Revision Counsel. 22 USC 1741b – Hostage Recovery Fusion Cell The government’s position, taken together, is that it will not pay ransoms, will not prosecute a family that pays one, and will work with the family to try to bring the hostage home by other means.