Third-party releases in bankruptcy are provisions in a Chapter 11 plan that shield people and companies who never filed for bankruptcy — corporate officers, parent companies, insurers, major shareholders — from lawsuits connected to the debtor’s conduct. After the Supreme Court’s June 2024 decision in Harrington v. Purdue Pharma L.P., these releases are only enforceable against creditors who actually consent. The one exception written into the Bankruptcy Code is the asbestos channeling injunction under 11 U.S.C. § 524(g). Everything else now turns on consent.
Who Gets Shielded and from What
The parties protected by a third-party release are not strangers to the bankruptcy. They are the people and entities closely tied to the debtor whose continued exposure to lawsuits would unravel the reorganization: officers, directors, major shareholders, insurers, and affiliated companies. The Bankruptcy Code treats an entity as an “affiliate” when it directly or indirectly owns or controls 20 percent or more of a debtor’s voting securities, and vice versa.1Office of the Law Revision Counsel. 11 USC 101 – Definitions
The claims released are typically those arising from the debtor’s business or the events that triggered the filing: negligence, product liability, breach of fiduciary duty. In mass tort cases, the logic is practical. If a parent company can still be sued for the same injuries the bankruptcy trust is paying for, the plan falls apart. Releases prevent that fragmentation and create what lawyers call a “global peace.” The force of that argument has not changed. What has changed is who gets to decide whether a particular creditor is bound by it.
Consensual Releases Versus Non-Consensual Releases
A consensual release functions like a settlement. The creditor agrees to give up claims against a non-debtor in exchange for a payout from the bankruptcy estate, usually by checking a box on the voting ballot or following specific instructions to decline. Consensual releases remain fully available after Purdue Pharma.
A non-consensual release binds every creditor regardless of how they voted or whether they voted at all. Before 2024, bankruptcy courts in several circuits approved these forced releases when a plan satisfied various multi-factor tests weighing contribution, necessity, creditor support, and the structure of the payment mechanism. That body of law is now largely beside the point. The Supreme Court held that no judicial balancing test can supply authority the Bankruptcy Code itself does not grant.2Supreme Court of the United States. Harrington v Purdue Pharma LP
Does an Opt-Out Count as Consent?
The hardest open question is whether silence can count as consent. Many plans use an opt-out mechanism: creditors who do not affirmatively check a box to decline the release are deemed to have accepted it. Courts have split.
In early 2026, the court in In re Pat McGrath Cosmetics LLC held that an opt-out mechanism can satisfy the consent requirement when creditors receive clear and conspicuous notice, understand what inaction means, and have a meaningful chance to decline. The same decision drew a line: creditors who voted to reject the plan, or who were deemed to reject it, cannot be bound without affirmative consent. Around the same time, the court in In re Diocese of Buffalo, N.Y. went the other way, treating opt-out releases as inherently non-consensual and therefore barred by Purdue Pharma. The validity of an opt-out release currently depends on where the case is filed, and the question is likely headed to appellate review.
What Purdue Pharma Actually Held
Harrington v. Purdue Pharma L.P. grew out of Purdue’s Chapter 11 plan, which would have released the Sackler family from opioid-related lawsuits in exchange for a multibillion-dollar contribution to a settlement trust. Tens of thousands of claimants who never agreed to release the Sacklers would have been bound anyway.
Justice Gorsuch, writing for a 5–4 majority joined by Justices Thomas, Alito, Barrett, and Jackson, held that the Bankruptcy Code does not authorize a release and injunction that effectively discharges claims against a non-debtor without the consent of the affected claimants.2Supreme Court of the United States. Harrington v Purdue Pharma LP The plan proponents had relied on 11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(6), the catchall allowing a plan to “include any other appropriate provision not inconsistent with the applicable provisions of this title.”3Office of the Law Revision Counsel. 11 USC 1123 – Contents of Plan Their argument was that because non-consensual releases are not expressly forbidden, the catchall permits them.
The Court rejected that reading. Because the Bankruptcy Code generally limits relief to the debtor and the debtor’s property, extending discharge-like protection to third parties who never filed is inconsistent with the statute’s structure. The majority stressed that Congress knows how to authorize non-debtor releases when it wants to. It did so explicitly for asbestos cases in § 524(g) in 1994. The absence of similar authorization elsewhere was treated as a deliberate choice, not a gap for courts to fill.
What Changed on the Ground
Purdue had to rebuild its plan around actual consent. In March 2025, Purdue filed a new plan of reorganization in which the Sackler family agreed to contribute approximately $6.5 billion over 15 years, with the possibility of an additional $500 million depending on the sale of international pharmaceutical businesses.4Purdue Pharma L.P. Purdue Pharma LP Files New Plan of Reorganization Providing for More Than 7.4 Billion in Creditor Distributions The higher payout reflects the new leverage structure. When consent replaces a court order, the price goes up.
The Asbestos Exception Under Section 524(g)
Section 524(g), enacted in 1994, explicitly authorizes a bankruptcy court to issue an injunction that redirects all current and future asbestos-related claims away from protected third parties and into a dedicated settlement trust.5Office of the Law Revision Counsel. 11 USC 524 – Effect of Discharge The Purdue Pharma majority specifically acknowledged this provision as the model Congress chose to use when it wanted to authorize non-debtor releases.2Supreme Court of the United States. Harrington v Purdue Pharma LP
The statute imposes strict conditions. The trust must assume the debtor’s asbestos liabilities and be funded at least in part by the debtor’s securities and future payment obligations. The court must find that the debtor is likely to face substantial future claims whose number and timing cannot be predicted, and that letting those claims proceed outside the trust would threaten equitable treatment. A legal representative must be appointed to protect people who have been exposed but have not yet developed symptoms or filed claims.5Office of the Law Revision Counsel. 11 USC 524 – Effect of Discharge
Non-debtor third parties, often parent companies or successor corporations, fund these trusts, sometimes contributing hundreds of millions or billions of dollars in exchange for permanent protection. Claimants then submit evidence to the trust, which pays settlements according to a predetermined schedule based on disease type and severity. Mesothelioma and other cancer claims pay out at higher amounts than less severe conditions such as asbestosis. Trust payouts typically begin within three to six months of filing, though they may arrive in installments over a year or more depending on the amount.
Claims a Release Cannot Reach
Even where releases are permitted, they do not sweep in every type of claim. Federal tax liabilities are a hard limit. Bankruptcy courts lack jurisdiction to determine or discharge the federal tax obligations of non-debtor parties, so a partnership’s bankruptcy leaves its individual partners’ tax debts intact, and the same goes for shareholders of S corporations whose companies go through Chapter 11.6Internal Revenue Service. General Provisions of Bankruptcy
Fraud and intentional harm claims sit on contested ground. Section 523 of the Bankruptcy Code excepts from discharge any debt obtained through false pretenses, false representation, or actual fraud, along with debts arising from willful and malicious injury.7Office of the Law Revision Counsel. 11 US Code 523 – Exceptions to Discharge That section technically governs an individual debtor’s own discharge rather than third-party releases, but its policy weight has made courts reluctant to extend release protection to conduct the Code treats as non-dischargeable even for a debtor who completes the bankruptcy process. A third party accused of fraud faces a steeper path to a release than one defending ordinary negligence claims.
How Plan Injunctions Enforce the Release
A release without enforcement is a promise on paper. The plan injunction is the court order that gives it force by barring creditors from starting or continuing legal action against the released parties in any federal or state court. The statutory anchor is 11 U.S.C. § 105(a), which authorizes any order necessary or appropriate to carry out the Code.8Office of the Law Revision Counsel. 11 USC 105 – Power of Court
Violating a plan injunction can expose a creditor to civil contempt. The Supreme Court set the standard in Taggart v. Lorenzen: a court may hold someone in contempt when there is “no fair ground of doubt” that the order barred the conduct.9Supreme Court of the United States. Taggart v Lorenzen The test is objective. A creditor who pursues a released claim based on an unreasonable reading of the injunction can face attorney’s fees, compensatory damages, and in some cases punitive damages. A creditor with a genuinely reasonable basis for thinking the conduct falls outside the order will not be held in contempt even if a court ultimately disagrees.
Gatekeeper Provisions as a Narrower Alternative
With non-consensual releases off the table, practitioners have turned to gatekeeper provisions. A gatekeeper provision releases nothing. It requires anyone who wants to sue a protected party, typically officers, directors, advisors, or committee members, to first obtain the bankruptcy court’s permission. The court screens the proposed suit for colorability before letting it proceed.10Supreme Court of the United States. Amicus Brief of Bankruptcy Law Professors in Highland Capital Management LP v NexPoint Advisors LP
The distinction has substantive weight. A release eliminates a claim permanently. A gatekeeper provision adds a procedural step: a filter for frivolous suits that allows meritorious ones through. Because no substantive right is extinguished, proponents argue these provisions sit outside the Purdue Pharma prohibition entirely. Whether that distinction holds up on appellate review is still unsettled, but gatekeeper provisions are appearing in more post-Purdue plans as a way to give restructuring participants some protection without triggering the consent requirement.
The Texas Two-Step and Divisional Mergers
One strategy worth understanding is the “Texas Two-Step,” a divisional merger that exploits Texas corporate law. A company facing mass tort liability splits into two entities: one keeps the operating business and assets, the other inherits the liabilities. The liability-bearing shell then files for Chapter 11, invoking the automatic stay to pause litigation and historically seeking injunctions to protect its non-bankrupt affiliates.
Johnson & Johnson pursued this approach for its talc litigation. After two prior filings by a subsidiary called LTL Management were dismissed, J&J tried again in September 2024 through a new entity called Red River Talc, with a pre-packaged plan that reportedly had support from 83 percent of talc claimants. The bankruptcy court dismissed that attempt as well.
The Ending Corporate Bankruptcy Abuse Act, introduced in 2024 and reintroduced later that year, would direct courts to presume bad faith when a filing involves a divisional merger and would prohibit extending the automatic stay to non-bankrupt affiliates in those cases. As of early 2026 the bill has not advanced, but the combination of judicial pushback and legislative attention has narrowed the strategy’s room to operate.
Where This Leaves Creditors and Non-Debtors
The law of third-party releases is more unsettled than it has been in decades. Non-consensual releases under § 1123(b)(6) are prohibited. Asbestos channeling injunctions under § 524(g) remain in force with explicit statutory backing. The space in between is live: opt-out mechanisms produce conflicting rulings, gatekeeper provisions are untested on appeal, and Congress has shown interest without delivering legislation.
If you are a creditor, your consent now carries real value in any Chapter 11 negotiation that touches non-debtor releases. A plan that asks you to release claims against officers, parent companies, or other connected parties is a plan you can bargain over, and one you can refuse. If you are a non-debtor seeking protection, the path runs through genuine creditor buy-in or the narrow asbestos authorization. The era of obtaining a judicial discharge without filing for bankruptcy is, for now, closed.