Section 280G Cutback Provisions: Types, Threshold, and Implementation

A 280G cutback provision is a clause in an executive’s change-in-control agreement that automatically reduces the total payout to just below the level that would trigger the golden parachute penalties under Section 280G of the Internal Revenue Code. Left unaddressed, crossing that line hits the executive with a 20% excise tax on top of regular income tax and strips the company of its deduction for the excess. The cutback is the contractual fix, and it shows up in two main forms with meaningfully different results for the executive.

The Threshold the Cutback Is Built Around

Every 280G analysis runs off a single number: the executive’s “base amount,” which is average annual compensation includible in gross income over the five tax years ending before the change in control.1Office of the Law Revision Counsel. 26 USC 280G – Golden Parachute Payments If the executive has been with the company for less time, the average covers whatever period they worked there. It captures more than W-2 wages; vested equity and amounts included under Section 83(b) elections count too.2eCFR. 26 CFR 1.280G-1 – Golden Parachute Payments

If the total present value of all change-in-control payments equals or exceeds three times the base amount, every dollar above one times the base amount becomes an “excess parachute payment.”1Office of the Law Revision Counsel. 26 USC 280G – Golden Parachute Payments The penalty does not apply only to the sliver above three times. Once the line is crossed, the excise tax reaches back and grabs everything above one times the base amount. That cliff effect is what makes the safe harbor of 2.99 times the base amount so valuable, and it’s the exact number that cutback provisions target.

The calculation has to account for cash severance, accelerated stock options and RSUs, continued health benefits, and any other compensation tied to the deal. Combined, an executive who crosses the threshold can face an effective tax rate above 60% on the excess, while the company pays out the money without any offsetting deduction.3Office of the Law Revision Counsel. 26 USC 4999 – Golden Parachute Payments

Mandatory Cutback Provisions

A mandatory cutback, sometimes called a hard cap, automatically reduces total change-in-control payments to 2.99 times the base amount whenever the threshold would otherwise be crossed. There’s no comparison, no discretion, no scenario analysis. If the numbers trip the wire, the payments get cut.

Companies favor this approach because it eliminates ambiguity at closing. The full company deduction is preserved for the remaining compensation, financial reporting is clean, and no one has to run competing calculations while a deal is being papered. The tradeoff falls on the executive. A hard cutback can slice away significant compensation regardless of whether the excise tax would actually have eaten more than the reduction itself. When a payout only barely crosses three times the base amount, a mandatory cutback can leave the executive worse off than if they had simply taken the full payment and absorbed the excise tax.

Better-Off Provisions

A better-off provision, also called a best-net clause, fixes that problem by running the numbers both ways and paying whichever result puts more money in the executive’s pocket after tax. It is the dominant approach in current practice, used by roughly 77% of companies that address the excise tax in change-in-control agreements.

The first scenario applies the cutback. Payments are reduced to 2.99 times the base amount, no excise tax applies, and the executive pays only ordinary federal, state, and local income tax on the capped figure. The second scenario pays in full. The executive receives every dollar promised, but the 20% excise tax applies to the excess parachute payment measured from one times the base amount, and both income tax and excise tax come out of the total.1Office of the Law Revision Counsel. 26 USC 280G – Golden Parachute Payments

Whichever scenario leaves more after-tax cash is the one that controls. When the payout is well above three times the base amount, the full payment usually wins even with the excise tax. When the payout barely crosses the line, the cutback usually wins because the excise tax chews through a large percentage of a relatively small excess. The exact crossover point depends on the executive’s state tax rate, deduction profile, and the mix of cash and equity in the package. The company still loses its deduction on the excess when the full-payment path wins, and most boards accept that cost as the price of protecting the executive from the worst-case cliff.

How a Cutback Differs From a Gross-Up

A tax gross-up is the opposite of a cutback: instead of reducing the payment to duck the excise tax, the company pays the executive an additional amount to cover it, then grosses up the gross-up because that payment is itself taxable. The cascading cost can be enormous. Gross-ups were common before 2005, appearing in over half of the largest public companies, but proxy advisor pressure sharply reversed the trend after Institutional Shareholder Services began flagging them as a problematic governance practice in 2008. By 2020, only about 5% of surveyed companies still offered them. Gross-up payments also count as parachute payments themselves, and the excess portion remains nondeductible.2eCFR. 26 CFR 1.280G-1 – Golden Parachute Payments Most compensation committees have concluded that a better-off cutback accomplishes the executive-protection goal at a fraction of the cost.

How the Cutback Gets Implemented

When a cutback triggers, someone has to decide which payments get reduced first. Well-drafted contracts spell out the order. Cash typically goes first because its value is straightforward — severance, transaction bonuses, and other immediate cash tied to the deal. If cutting cash isn’t enough to reach 2.99, equity comes next, meaning the accelerated vesting of options or RSUs gets pared back. Payments subject to Section 409A deferred compensation rules are usually reduced last, because altering deferred compensation timing or amounts can create separate tax penalties under that provision. Relying on the Treasury Regulations’ default order rather than specifying it in the contract creates avoidable risk.

Valuing Accelerated Equity

Cutting equity requires knowing what it’s worth for 280G purposes, and that figure isn’t the same as the market price of the underlying stock. The 280G value of accelerated vesting reflects the economic benefit of receiving the equity earlier than originally scheduled. IRS Revenue Procedure 2003-68 provides a safe harbor valuation method based on the Black-Scholes model, taking in the stock’s volatility, the exercise price, the current stock price, and the remaining term of the option. Companies can use other methods so long as they follow generally accepted accounting principles and account for the factors listed in the regulations.4Internal Revenue Service. Revenue Procedure 2003-68 – Valuation of Stock Options for Purposes of Sections 280G and 4999

Getting the valuation wrong in either direction hurts. Overvaluing means cutting too much compensation unnecessarily; undervaluing means the cutback doesn’t go deep enough and the executive still faces the excise tax. Deal teams typically hire an independent valuation firm and rerun the 280G calculation as deal terms shift.

The Private-Company Alternative

A cutback is not the only way out of 280G. Private corporations whose stock is not traded on an established securities market can bypass the entire parachute framework if disinterested shareholders approve the payments. Public companies don’t have this option.2eCFR. 26 CFR 1.280G-1 – Golden Parachute Payments

The vote requires more than 75% of the outstanding voting power held by shareholders who are not themselves receiving the parachute payments, and the recipients are excluded from voting. Every eligible shareholder must receive adequate disclosure of the material facts around each payment that would otherwise be a parachute payment, including the total value, the recipient, and why 280G would apply.2eCFR. 26 CFR 1.280G-1 – Golden Parachute Payments Incomplete or misleading disclosure can invalidate the vote and leave the payments fully exposed. The disclosure and the vote both have to happen before the change in control closes. If the vote fails, most agreements fall back to whatever cutback mechanism the contract specifies.

Who a Cutback Provision Actually Affects

Section 280G only applies to “disqualified individuals.” You fall in that category if you performed services for the company at any point during the 12 months before the change in control and you’re either an officer, a shareholder who owns more than 1% of the stock by value, or a member of the highest-paid group of employees.1Office of the Law Revision Counsel. 26 USC 280G – Golden Parachute Payments

That last category is broader than it sounds. It covers the top 1% of all employees ranked by compensation, or the top 250 employees, whichever number is smaller.1Office of the Law Revision Counsel. 26 USC 280G – Golden Parachute Payments For 2026, the threshold used to identify highly compensated employees under the related Section 414(q) definition remains $160,000.5Internal Revenue Service. Notice 2025-67 The officer group is capped: no more than 50 employees, or 10% of the workforce if that number is lower, with a floor of three.2eCFR. 26 CFR 1.280G-1 – Golden Parachute Payments In a 200-person company, that means no more than 20 officers for 280G purposes. If a cutback provision sits in your contract, you’re almost certainly in one of these categories, and the specific type of provision — mandatory or better-off — determines whether the drafters prioritized certainty for the company or after-tax outcome for you.