OECD Tax Standards: Pillar Two, Pillar One, and Transfer Pricing

The OECD’s two-pillar rules and transfer pricing framework now govern how large multinational groups allocate and tax their cross-border profits: Pillar One reallocates certain taxing rights to market countries, Pillar Two imposes a 15-percent global minimum effective tax on groups above 750 million euros in annual revenue, and the arm’s length principle continues to determine intercompany pricing under a three-tiered documentation package. If your group is in scope, the compliance picture is now three overlapping obligations rather than one, and the order in which countries collect any top-up tax can decide who gets paid and whether you pay twice.

Who Is In Scope

The Pillar Two Global Anti-Base Erosion (GloBE) rules apply to multinational groups with consolidated annual revenue of at least 750 million euros in at least two of the four fiscal years immediately preceding the year being tested.1OECD. Minimum Tax Implementation Handbook (Pillar Two) Government entities, nonprofits, pension funds, and certain investment vehicles are excluded. Country-by-Country Reporting under BEPS Action 13 tracks the same 750-million-euro threshold internationally; the US version, Form 8975, uses an 850-million-dollar prior-year revenue test.2Office of the Law Revision Counsel. 26 USC 6038 – Information Reporting With Respect to Certain Foreign Corporations and Partnerships

Transfer pricing rules apply regardless of size to any cross-border related-party transaction, but the formal three-tiered documentation package generally follows the same 750-million-euro threshold as the CbC report.

How Pillar Two Collects Top-Up Tax

Pillar Two ensures that a group’s income in every jurisdiction is taxed at an effective rate of at least 15 percent.3OECD. Global Minimum Tax When the effective rate falls short, a top-up tax fills the gap. Three interlocking mechanisms decide which country collects it, and the sequence is what determines your exposure.

Qualified Domestic Minimum Top-up Tax

A country can enact its own domestic top-up tax on low-taxed profits earned within its borders. If that Qualified Domestic Minimum Top-up Tax (QDMTT) meets the OECD standard, the source jurisdiction collects the shortfall first, and the amount is fully creditable against anything otherwise owed under the other two rules.4OECD. Qualified Status Under the Global Minimum Tax – Questions and Answers For groups, this means the low-tax jurisdiction keeps the revenue rather than seeing it flow to a parent country.

Income Inclusion Rule

If the low-tax jurisdiction does not have a qualifying QDMTT, the parent company’s home country applies a top-up tax on the low-taxed profits of its subsidiaries. The Income Inclusion Rule (IIR) took effect in many jurisdictions for fiscal years beginning on or after December 31, 2023.3OECD. Global Minimum Tax

Undertaxed Profits Rule

The Undertaxed Profits Rule (UTPR) is a backstop for cases where neither a QDMTT nor an IIR has captured the shortfall. Other jurisdictions in the group’s structure can deny deductions or require equivalent adjustments to collect the residual top-up. Most implementing countries brought the UTPR into effect for fiscal years beginning in 2025.5OECD. Global Anti-Base Erosion Model Rules (Pillar Two)

The coordination depends on every implementing jurisdiction recognizing the “qualified” status of the others’ legislation. If one country’s QDMTT fails to meet the standard, the IIR in the parent’s jurisdiction switches back on, and the group could face double top-up taxes until the issue is resolved.

What Gets Carved Out

The Substance-Based Income Exclusion

The GloBE rules do not tax every dollar of profit below 15 percent. A substance-based income exclusion (SBIE) shields a portion of income tied to real economic activity, calculated as a percentage of eligible payroll costs plus a percentage of the carrying value of tangible assets. During a transitional period running from 2023 through 2032, the payroll carve-out starts at 10 percent and the tangible asset carve-out starts at 8 percent, both declining to a permanent rate of 5 percent.1OECD. Minimum Tax Implementation Handbook (Pillar Two) Only profits above the SBIE are exposed to top-up tax, so groups with substantial manufacturing footprints or large local workforces may see their exposure shrink considerably.

Transitional CbCR Safe Harbour

Rather than running the full GloBE calculation in every jurisdiction from day one, groups can rely on a transitional safe harbour built on existing Country-by-Country Reporting data. A jurisdiction’s top-up tax is treated as zero for a fiscal year if the group meets any one of three tests:

  • De minimis: total revenue below 10 million euros and profit before tax below 1 million euros in the jurisdiction.
  • Simplified effective tax rate: income tax expense divided by pre-tax profit from the CbC report meets or exceeds the transition rate, which is 15 percent for 2023–2024, 16 percent for 2025, and 17 percent for 2026.
  • Routine profits: the jurisdiction’s pre-tax profit does not exceed the SBIE amount calculated under the GloBE rules.

The transitional period covers fiscal years beginning on or before December 31, 2026, and not ending after June 30, 2028.6OECD. Safe Harbours and Penalty Relief – Global Anti-Base Erosion Rules (Pillar Two) Once the transition ends, the full top-up computation applies everywhere.

Pillar One Today: Amount B Is Live, Amount A Is Not

Amount A of Pillar One would reallocate 25 percent of the profit above a 10-percent profitability threshold to market jurisdictions for groups with global revenue above 20 billion euros.7OECD. Progress Report on Amount A of Pillar One It is not in force. The Multilateral Convention needed to implement it has not been opened for signature.8OECD. Multilateral Convention to Implement Amount A of Pillar One Groups that would fall in scope should monitor progress but face no compliance obligation under Amount A today.

Amount B is a different story. It provides a simplified method for pricing routine in-country marketing and distribution activities under the arm’s length principle and has been incorporated directly into the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines.9OECD. Pillar One – Amount B Adopting countries can apply a standardized return to qualifying distributors instead of a full benchmarking study, and Inclusive Framework members that use Amount B expect other members to respect the outcome and take reasonable steps to relieve any resulting double taxation.

Transfer Pricing Sits Alongside, Not Underneath, Pillar Two

Pillar Two does not replace the arm’s length principle. Every intercompany transaction still needs a defensible transfer price, because that price determines each jurisdiction’s taxable base before any GloBE calculation runs on top of it. The OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines require internal prices to reflect what independent parties would agree to under comparable circumstances.10OECD. Transfer Pricing

The Five Methods

The guidelines describe five accepted methods, split into traditional transaction methods and transactional profit methods.11OECD. OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations The traditional methods compare prices directly: Comparable Uncontrolled Price benchmarks the intercompany price against a similar transaction between unrelated parties; Resale Price works backward from the price to an independent buyer, subtracting a distributor’s gross margin; Cost Plus starts with supplier costs and adds a market-consistent markup. When direct comparisons aren’t available, two profit methods take over: the Transactional Net Margin Method compares net profit margins against those of independent companies performing similar functions, and Profit Split divides combined profit based on each entity’s economic contribution, which works best when both sides contribute unique intangibles.

Method selection has to be defended with a functional analysis mapping each entity’s functions, risks, and assets. Tax authorities challenge method choice regularly, and convenience is not an accepted rationale.

Hard-to-Value Intangibles

Intellectual property is where the largest transfer pricing adjustments tend to land. Under BEPS Actions 8–10, the OECD adopted a specific approach for hard-to-value intangibles that lets tax authorities use actual outcomes as a reference point when the intangible’s value was highly uncertain at the time of transfer.12OECD. Guidance for Tax Administrations on the Application of the Approach to Hard-to-Value Intangibles, BEPS Action 8 An early-stage patent priced low at transfer can be revisited if it later generates far more revenue than the original projection anticipated. Contemporaneous valuation documentation is the primary defense.

The Three-Tiered Documentation Package

BEPS Action 13 established the documentation framework that most implementing jurisdictions now require.13OECD. Transfer Pricing Documentation and Country-by-Country Reporting, Action 13 – 2015 Final Report Each tier serves a different audience within tax administration.

Master File

The Master File gives tax authorities a group-wide view: organizational structure, each business line, overall transfer pricing policies, and the global allocation of income and economic activity. It also covers intangibles, intercompany financial activities, and consolidated financial and tax positions. Because it is shared across jurisdictions, consistency is critical. A mismatch between the Master File and a local entity’s records is one of the fastest ways to trigger an audit.

Local File

The Local File covers a single entity’s intercompany transactions in one jurisdiction, with a detailed functional analysis, the method selected for each material transaction, and supporting financial data.14OECD. Guidance on Transfer Pricing Documentation and Country-by-Country Reporting It must include copies of all material intercompany agreements, a breakdown of intercompany payments and receipts by category and counterparty jurisdiction, and any APAs or tax rulings that relate to the covered transactions. Incomplete Local Files, especially where agreements do not match the economic substance of what is actually happening, are a routine audit trigger.

Country-by-Country Report

The CbC report gives a jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction breakdown of revenue, pre-tax profit, income tax paid on a cash basis, income tax accrued, headcount, stated capital, retained earnings, and tangible assets. Authorities use it for high-level risk assessment, and a jurisdiction showing high revenue with near-zero tax draws attention. The report is filed by the ultimate parent entity. In the United States, that means Form 8975 with the income tax return once prior-year revenue reaches 850 million dollars.2Office of the Law Revision Counsel. 26 USC 6038 – Information Reporting With Respect to Certain Foreign Corporations and Partnerships

Deadlines and Data Exchange

Under the Action 13 standard, CbC reports are generally due within 12 months after the end of the reporting fiscal year, with some jurisdictions extending to 15 months for local filings.15OECD. Guidance on the Implementation of Country-by-Country Reporting, BEPS Action 13 The parent’s tax authority then shares the report with treaty partners through the Multilateral Competent Authority Agreement on the Exchange of CbC Reports, which sets the legal basis and confidentiality requirements for automated exchange.16OECD. Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters Receiving authorities run the data through risk-assessment tools; inconsistencies between reported numbers and reported activity can open an inquiry.

Penalties

In the United States, failure to furnish required information under 26 U.S.C. Section 6038 triggers an initial penalty of $10,000 per annual accounting period. If noncompliance continues more than 90 days after IRS notice, an additional $10,000 accrues for each 30-day period, up to $50,000 in additional penalties.2Office of the Law Revision Counsel. 26 USC 6038 – Information Reporting With Respect to Certain Foreign Corporations and Partnerships Continued failure also reduces foreign tax credits by 10 percent initially, rising by 5 percent for each additional three-month period. The credit reduction often costs more than the cash penalty.

Transfer pricing adjustments carry separate penalty exposure. Under US law, a substantial valuation misstatement (net adjustment exceeding 5 million dollars or 10 percent of gross receipts) triggers a 20-percent accuracy-related penalty; a gross valuation misstatement (exceeding 20 million dollars or 20 percent of gross receipts) escalates that to 40 percent. Other jurisdictions run their own regimes. Well-maintained contemporaneous documentation is the primary penalty defense everywhere, and tax authorities generally have discretion to waive or reduce penalties on a showing of reasonable, good-faith effort.

Where the United States Stands

The United States has not adopted the GloBE rules. A January 2025 executive order declared the OECD Global Tax Deal to have no force or effect in the United States, and the Treasury Department has stated that it will not amend domestic rules to accommodate Pillar Two. The core US objection concerns the UTPR, which it views as an extraterritorial tax on American-headquartered companies.

In June 2025, the United States and the other G7 nations reached agreement on a side-by-side system under which Pillar Two and the US tax system would operate in parallel, resulting in a full exclusion of US-parented groups from both the IIR and the UTPR in G7 countries. A proposed Section 899 in Congress would have imposed higher tax rates on companies from countries applying the UTPR to US firms; those provisions were removed from the pending legislation after the G7 agreement.

US multinationals are not exempt from the framework in practice. Their foreign subsidiaries still operate in jurisdictions that have enacted GloBE rules, QDMTTs, or both. A US-parented group with a subsidiary in a QDMTT jurisdiction will owe top-up tax there if the subsidiary’s effective rate falls below 15 percent, regardless of US policy. Form 8975 filing under Treasury Regulation Section 1.6038-4 is separately required for US ultimate parents that meet the 850-million-dollar threshold.

Preventing and Resolving Double Tax

Advance Pricing Agreements

An Advance Pricing Agreement (APA) is a binding arrangement with one or more tax authorities that confirms the transfer pricing method, comparables, and arm’s length range for specified transactions over a fixed period, typically three to five years. The IRS runs its program through the Advance Pricing and Mutual Agreement division.17Internal Revenue Service. Advance Pricing and Mutual Agreement Program Bilateral and multilateral APAs, involving two or more countries, eliminate the risk of double taxation on the covered transactions for the agreement period.

Mutual Agreement Procedure

When two countries disagree on how to tax the same income, the Mutual Agreement Procedure (MAP) is the treaty-based route to relief. Under BEPS Action 14, Inclusive Framework members committed to making MAP accessible, timely, and effective, backed by peer review.18OECD. Dispute Resolution in Cross-Border Taxation A case begins when the taxpayer notifies the competent authority in its home jurisdiction that another country’s action has caused, or will cause, taxation inconsistent with a treaty. The two competent authorities then negotiate.

MAP is not fast. In 2023, average resolution time across all MAP cases was 27.3 months, and transfer pricing cases averaged 32 months.19OECD. OECD Releases Information and Statistics on Mutual Agreement Procedures and Advance Pricing Arrangements For groups anticipating recurring transfer pricing disputes, an APA is generally the better investment. MAP resolves disputes after they arise; an APA prevents them.