Insured vs. Insured Exclusion in D&O: Carve-Backs and Side A DIC

The insured vs. insured exclusion is a standard provision in directors and officers (D&O) liability policies that bars coverage when one person or entity protected by the policy sues another person or entity protected by the same policy. Nearly every D&O policy contains some version of it. What varies is how broadly the policy defines “insured,” which carve-backs the insurer agreed to, and whether the form uses the traditional broad wording or the narrower entity-vs.-insured version common in public company programs.

Why Insurers Added the Exclusion

The original purpose was to prevent collusion. When two parties share a policy, they can in theory agree to a lawsuit, settle for a large sum, and split the proceeds the carrier pays. The plaintiff and defendant in that scenario are not truly adverse. The exclusion removes that moral hazard by refusing coverage whenever both sides of a dispute sit under the same D&O policy.

It also addresses what the industry calls corporate housecleaning. When new management arrives, the incoming team often wants to hold prior leadership responsible for decisions that produced losses. Insurers view those claims as an inherent business risk companies should handle through governance, not insurance. Without the exclusion, D&O coverage would function as a performance guarantee and become unaffordable to sell.

Who Counts as an Insured

The exclusion only triggers when both the claimant and the target meet the policy’s definition of “insured.” That definition usually covers three groups. The organization itself, meaning the parent company and any subsidiaries listed on the declarations page. The individuals: past, present, and future directors and officers in a management capacity. And depending on the form, certain employees such as risk managers or general counsel.

The “past” piece catches many people off guard. A former CEO who left three years ago is still an insured under most policy definitions. If that person sues the company or its current directors, the exclusion applies the same way it would for a sitting board member. Some policies include a carve-back for former insureds who have been gone for a specified period, often two or more years, but this is negotiated rather than standard.

What the Exclusion Blocks

The most common scenario is a company suing its former executives for breach of fiduciary duty. A corporation claiming a departed CFO’s financial mismanagement caused losses will typically find its D&O policy denying both defense costs and any settlement. The exclusion operates on the identity of the parties, not the merit of the claim. A strong, legitimate lawsuit still gets blocked if both sides are insureds.

Board member disputes are another frequent trigger. One director sues another over strategy, personal conduct, or a contested removal. Insurers treat these as internal political fights the policy was not designed to fund. Both parties are insureds, so the carrier stays out.

Less obvious situations also arise. A subsidiary suing its parent, or vice versa, usually falls inside the exclusion because both are named insureds. If a general counsel listed as an insured person files a claim against a director, the exclusion may apply even though the dispute feels like an employment matter. How far the exclusion reaches depends entirely on how aggressively the policy defines its insured population.

Carve-Backs That Restore Coverage

The exclusion would be unworkably harsh without exceptions, so nearly all modern policies include carve-backs restoring coverage for specific categories of internal claims. These carve-backs are where most of the negotiating energy goes during policy placement, and they often matter more than the exclusion itself, because they define what the policy actually covers.

Whistleblower Retaliation

Most D&O policies carve back coverage for whistleblower retaliation claims. If an officer reports securities fraud or accounting irregularities to a federal agency, a congressional committee, or an internal supervisor, and the company retaliates, the policy provides defense and potential damages despite the insured-vs.-insured relationship. Federal law prohibits public companies from retaliating against employees who report conduct they reasonably believe violates securities regulations or federal fraud statutes.1Office of the Law Revision Counsel. United States Code Title 18 – 1514A Civil Action to Protect Against Retaliation in Fraud Cases Without this carve-back, the exclusion could discourage officers from reporting misconduct, an outcome in direct conflict with federal policy.

Shareholder Derivative Suits

When shareholders independently file a derivative suit against directors for failing to oversee operations or wasting corporate assets, the exclusion generally does not apply, provided no insured helped initiate or direct the litigation. The carve-back restores coverage only for derivative actions brought and maintained without the solicitation, assistance, or active participation of any insured.2The Hartford. Private Choice Premier Policy for Community Banks “Independently” is doing serious work in that sentence, as the next section explains.

Bankruptcy and Insolvency

When a company enters bankruptcy, a court-appointed trustee or receiver often sues former directors to recover assets for creditors. These claims would be barred if the trustee were treated as standing in the shoes of the debtor company, which is itself an insured. Most modern policies include a carve-back recognizing that a bankruptcy trustee acts on behalf of creditors, not the insured entity, and should be treated as a third-party claimant. Courts have split on whether that distinction holds when a debtor-in-possession, meaning the company itself still operating under bankruptcy protection, brings the claim instead of an independent trustee. Getting the insolvency language right is one of the most consequential D&O negotiations, because by the time bankruptcy arrives, it is too late to amend the policy.

Employment Practices Claims

Some D&O policies carve back coverage for employment-related claims such as wrongful termination, harassment, or discrimination brought by one insured against another. Insurers accept this exception because the dispute arises from the personal employment relationship rather than from corporate governance. The carve-back typically covers only the individual defendants, not the entity, and some carriers offer it only when the policyholder also carries a standalone employment practices liability policy.

Cross-Claims and Contribution Actions

When a covered third-party lawsuit produces cross-claims or third-party claims between insureds, such as one director seeking contribution from another after both are named in a shareholder suit, many policies carve back coverage for these redirection claims. The underlying lawsuit is a legitimate external dispute, and the cross-claim is a byproduct of multiple defendants sorting out relative liability. Without this carve-back, an insured pulled into an otherwise covered suit could lose coverage because a co-defendant is also an insured.

The Assistance Trap in Derivative Carve-Backs

The derivative suit carve-back contains a condition that voids coverage if any insured provides voluntary assistance to the shareholder plaintiffs. The policy language typically requires that the action be “brought and maintained without the solicitation, assistance, or active participation of any insured.”2The Hartford. Private Choice Premier Policy for Community Banks This creates real problems in practice.

Consider a director who disagrees with the board’s handling of a financial reporting issue. That director cannot quietly tip off a shareholder group and then claim the resulting derivative suit is independent. If the insurer can show the director encouraged, facilitated, or informally assisted the litigation, the carve-back disappears and the exclusion snaps back for all defendants, including those who had nothing to do with the solicitation. One insured’s cooperation can contaminate coverage for every insured named in the suit.

Whistleblowing by itself is generally excluded from the definition of “assistance” or “solicitation.” Most policies explicitly state that reporting illegal activity to regulators does not count as participating in subsequent litigation for purposes of this carve-back.2The Hartford. Private Choice Premier Policy for Community Banks But the line between protected whistleblowing and prohibited assistance can blur, particularly when the same facts underlie both the regulatory report and the shareholder suit. Directors in that position should expect the insurer to examine every communication with plaintiffs’ counsel.

Entity vs. Insured: The Narrower Public Company Version

Many public company D&O programs now use a narrower entity-vs.-insured exclusion instead of the traditional form. Under this version, the exclusion only blocks claims brought by the company itself against its directors and officers. Claims between individual insureds, such as a former officer suing a current director, are not automatically excluded.3Chubb. The Chubb Primary Directors and Officers and Entity Securities Liability Insurance That provides noticeably more flexibility in environments with heavy executive turnover and predictable interpersonal disputes.

Private companies and nonprofits generally still see the broader insured-vs.-insured form. Carriers prefer the wider exclusion for smaller organizations where the line between the company and its leadership is less distinct. A five-person board at a family-controlled company presents a higher collusion risk than the board of a Fortune 500 company with independent directors, and the broader exclusion keeps premiums manageable for those smaller entities.

Negotiating a Narrower Exclusion

The exclusion is a starting point for negotiation, not fixed language. Experienced brokers routinely seek modifications. The modifications that tend to matter most include:

  • Successor-in-interest clarification stating that the exclusion does not apply to claims brought by bankruptcy trustees, receivers, liquidators, examiners, or creditor committees. Without this, an insurer may argue a trustee inherits the insured entity’s status.
  • A former insured carve-back restoring coverage for claims brought by former directors or officers who have not held a position for a specified period, typically two or more years, and who act independently of current management.
  • A foreign jurisdiction exception for claims arising from operations in countries where local law may require an entity to bring claims against directors that would otherwise be barred.
  • An employment practices carve-back covering employment claims brought by insured employees against other insureds, protecting the individual defendants without extending coverage to the entity.
  • A cross-claim and contribution carve-back ensuring that third-party claims and contribution actions arising from an otherwise covered lawsuit are not pulled into the exclusion.

Leverage in these negotiations depends on the company’s risk profile, claims history, and the state of the D&O market at renewal. In a soft market, carriers grant modifications readily. In a hard market, they resist. Either way, each of these carve-backs should be on the table during placement, not discovered missing after a claim arrives.

Side A DIC as a Backstop

When the primary policy’s exclusion cannot be narrowed enough, a Side A Difference in Conditions (DIC) policy offers a possible safety net. Side A coverage applies only to non-indemnifiable losses, meaning situations where the company cannot or will not reimburse its directors and officers, such as after a bankruptcy. A DIC policy sits above the primary program and drops down to fill gaps, including gaps created by exclusions in the underlying policy.

Some Side A DIC policies do not contain an insured vs. insured exclusion at all, or contain one so narrow it rarely triggers. That makes them valuable precisely in the scenarios where the primary exclusion bites hardest, such as a bankrupt company’s trustee suing former directors, or a new controlling shareholder using the company to pursue prior management. The limit is scope: DIC policies cover individual directors and officers for personal liability, not the entity. For a director personally facing a claim the primary policy excludes, a well-structured DIC can be the difference between coverage and out-of-pocket exposure.

Defense Cost Allocation in Mixed Claims

Litigation rarely breaks cleanly into covered and uncovered categories. A single lawsuit might include covered shareholder claims alongside potentially excluded cross-claims between directors. When covered and excluded allegations mix, the question becomes how to split defense costs and settlement amounts between the insurer and the policyholder.

Two methods dominate. Under the larger settlement rule, if the excluded claims or parties do not increase the total settlement amount, the insurer cannot allocate any portion away and must cover the full settlement. The logic: the excluded claims added nothing to the price tag. Under the relative legal exposure method, costs are divided based on each party’s proportional potential liability at the time of settlement, a fact-intensive inquiry considering likelihood of adverse judgment, each party’s risk exposure, and the motivations of the settling parties.

Which method applies depends on the policy language and the governing jurisdiction. Some policies specify a formula. Others stay silent, leaving the question to negotiation or litigation. Policyholders generally prefer the larger settlement rule because it maximizes coverage; insurers prefer relative exposure because it limits their share. When evaluating a D&O policy, the allocation provision, or its absence, deserves as much scrutiny as the exclusion itself.