{"id":200,"date":"2026-07-22T02:52:20","date_gmt":"2026-07-22T02:52:20","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/fedlaws.org\/?p=200"},"modified":"2026-07-22T02:52:20","modified_gmt":"2026-07-22T02:52:20","slug":"5-u-s-c-553-rulemaking-steps-exemptions-and-petitions","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/fedlaws.org\/?p=200","title":{"rendered":"5 U.S.C. 553: Rulemaking Steps, Exemptions, and Petitions"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>Section 5 of the U.S. Code, at 5 U.S.C. \u00a7 553, sets the rulemaking requirements and exemptions that federal agencies must follow when they issue binding regulations. The core requirement is notice-and-comment: publish a proposed rule in the Federal Register, accept public comments, and issue a final rule with a reasoned explanation. The main exemptions cover military and foreign affairs, agency management and benefits, interpretive rules and policy statements, procedural rules, and situations where the agency finds good cause that notice and comment would be impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest.<\/p>\n<h2>What Section 553 Requires<\/h2>\n<p>Section 553 applies to every federal agency issuing regulations with the force of law, from Cabinet departments to independent commissions. The provision governs what is called informal rulemaking, and it is by far the most common way federal rules get made. Three stages structure the process, and each has its own trap for agencies that cut corners.<\/p>\n<h3>The Notice of Proposed Rulemaking<\/h3>\n<p>Before a rule takes effect, the agency must publish a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in the Federal Register. The notice must state the legal authority for the rule, describe either the terms of the proposed rule or the subjects and issues involved, and provide enough supporting rationale that the public can understand what is being proposed and why.<sup class=\"modern-footnotes-footnote \" data-mfn=\"1\" data-mfn-post-scope=\"00000000000001670000000000000000_200\"><a href=\"javascript:void(0)\"  role=\"button\" aria-pressed=\"false\" aria-describedby=\"mfn-content-00000000000001670000000000000000_200-1\">1<\/a><\/sup><span id=\"mfn-content-00000000000001670000000000000000_200-1\" role=\"tooltip\" class=\"modern-footnotes-footnote__note\" tabindex=\"0\" data-mfn=\"1\">Office of the Law Revision Counsel. <a href=\"https:\/\/uscode.house.gov\/view.xhtml?req=(title:5%20section:553%20edition:prelim)\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">5 U.S. Code 553 &#8211; Rule Making<\/a><\/span> Agencies typically release supporting data, economic analyses, or scientific studies alongside the notice.<\/p>\n<p>Inadequate notice is one of the most common reasons a rule gets struck down. In <em>United States v. Nova Scotia Food Products Corp.<\/em>, the Second Circuit invalidated an FDA regulation because the agency relied on undisclosed data and gave the public no meaningful chance to respond to its reasoning.<sup class=\"modern-footnotes-footnote \" data-mfn=\"2\" data-mfn-post-scope=\"00000000000001670000000000000000_200\"><a href=\"javascript:void(0)\"  role=\"button\" aria-pressed=\"false\" aria-describedby=\"mfn-content-00000000000001670000000000000000_200-2\">2<\/a><\/sup><span id=\"mfn-content-00000000000001670000000000000000_200-2\" role=\"tooltip\" class=\"modern-footnotes-footnote__note\" tabindex=\"0\" data-mfn=\"2\">Justia. <a href=\"https:\/\/law.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/appellate-courts\/F2\/568\/240\/288437\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">United States v. Nova Scotia Food Products Corp., 568 F.2d 240<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n<h3>The Comment Period<\/h3>\n<p>Once the notice is published, the public must have an opportunity to submit written comments. Section 553 itself does not fix a minimum length. Comment periods for significant rules commonly run 60 to 90 days; less consequential proposals sometimes allow 30. Anyone can comment: individuals, companies, trade groups, state governments, advocacy organizations. Most agencies collect comments through Regulations.gov.<\/p>\n<p>An agency does not have to accept every suggestion, but it must genuinely consider the substantive feedback it receives. The D.C. Circuit made the point in <em>Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC<\/em>: the opportunity to comment is empty unless the agency responds to significant points raised by the public.<sup class=\"modern-footnotes-footnote \" data-mfn=\"3\" data-mfn-post-scope=\"00000000000001670000000000000000_200\"><a href=\"javascript:void(0)\"  role=\"button\" aria-pressed=\"false\" aria-describedby=\"mfn-content-00000000000001670000000000000000_200-3\">3<\/a><\/sup><span id=\"mfn-content-00000000000001670000000000000000_200-3\" role=\"tooltip\" class=\"modern-footnotes-footnote__note\" tabindex=\"0\" data-mfn=\"3\">Justia. <a href=\"https:\/\/law.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/appellate-courts\/F2\/567\/9\/194284\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9<\/a><\/span> Failing to address a well-supported objection, or brushing past it without explanation, is a reliable path to reversal.<\/p>\n<h3>The Final Rule and the Logical Outgrowth Test<\/h3>\n<p>When the comment period closes, the agency publishes the final rule in the Federal Register with a concise general statement of its basis and purpose.<sup class=\"modern-footnotes-footnote \" data-mfn=\"1\" data-mfn-post-scope=\"00000000000001670000000000000000_200\"><a href=\"javascript:void(0)\"  role=\"button\" aria-pressed=\"false\" aria-describedby=\"mfn-content-00000000000001670000000000000000_200-1\">1<\/a><\/sup><span id=\"mfn-content-00000000000001670000000000000000_200-1\" role=\"tooltip\" class=\"modern-footnotes-footnote__note\" tabindex=\"0\" data-mfn=\"1\">Office of the Law Revision Counsel. <a href=\"https:\/\/uscode.house.gov\/view.xhtml?req=(title:5%20section:553%20edition:prelim)\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">5 U.S. Code 553 &#8211; Rule Making<\/a><\/span> The preamble usually addresses the major comments, explains the agency&#8217;s response, and identifies any changes made from the proposal.<\/p>\n<p>The final rule need not be identical to what was proposed, but it must be a logical outgrowth of the proposal, meaning something affected parties could reasonably have anticipated from the notice. In <em>Chocolate Manufacturers Association v. Block<\/em>, the Fourth Circuit reversed a USDA rule that banned flavored milk from the WIC nutrition program because the proposal never signaled that flavored milk was in question.<sup class=\"modern-footnotes-footnote \" data-mfn=\"4\" data-mfn-post-scope=\"00000000000001670000000000000000_200\"><a href=\"javascript:void(0)\"  role=\"button\" aria-pressed=\"false\" aria-describedby=\"mfn-content-00000000000001670000000000000000_200-4\">4<\/a><\/sup><span id=\"mfn-content-00000000000001670000000000000000_200-4\" role=\"tooltip\" class=\"modern-footnotes-footnote__note\" tabindex=\"0\" data-mfn=\"4\">Justia. <a href=\"https:\/\/law.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/appellate-courts\/F2\/755\/1098\/51931\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Chocolate Manufacturers Association of the United States v. Block, 755 F.2d 1098<\/a><\/span> When a final rule surprises the public with provisions that had no basis in the notice, the agency has effectively denied notice.<\/p>\n<h3>Publication and the 30-Day Effective Date<\/h3>\n<p>A rule must be published in the Federal Register before it can be enforced. A requirement buried in an internal agency manual cannot be used to deny benefits or impose penalties. The Supreme Court applied this principle in <em>Morton v. Ruiz<\/em>, holding that the Bureau of Indian Affairs could not enforce a general assistance eligibility limit it had never published.<sup class=\"modern-footnotes-footnote \" data-mfn=\"5\" data-mfn-post-scope=\"00000000000001670000000000000000_200\"><a href=\"javascript:void(0)\"  role=\"button\" aria-pressed=\"false\" aria-describedby=\"mfn-content-00000000000001670000000000000000_200-5\">5<\/a><\/sup><span id=\"mfn-content-00000000000001670000000000000000_200-5\" role=\"tooltip\" class=\"modern-footnotes-footnote__note\" tabindex=\"0\" data-mfn=\"5\">Justia U.S. Supreme Court Center. <a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/415\/199\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199 (1974)<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n<p>Section 553(d) also requires that substantive rules take effect no earlier than 30 days after publication, giving regulated parties time to adjust. Three exceptions allow an earlier effective date: rules that grant an exemption or relieve a restriction, interpretive rules and policy statements, and cases where the agency makes a good cause finding justifying earlier effect.<sup class=\"modern-footnotes-footnote \" data-mfn=\"1\" data-mfn-post-scope=\"00000000000001670000000000000000_200\"><a href=\"javascript:void(0)\"  role=\"button\" aria-pressed=\"false\" aria-describedby=\"mfn-content-00000000000001670000000000000000_200-1\">1<\/a><\/sup><span id=\"mfn-content-00000000000001670000000000000000_200-1\" role=\"tooltip\" class=\"modern-footnotes-footnote__note\" tabindex=\"0\" data-mfn=\"1\">Office of the Law Revision Counsel. <a href=\"https:\/\/uscode.house.gov\/view.xhtml?req=(title:5%20section:553%20edition:prelim)\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">5 U.S. Code 553 &#8211; Rule Making<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n<h2>Exemptions from Notice and Comment<\/h2>\n<p>Section 553 contains several categories of rulemaking that escape some or all of the notice-and-comment requirements. These exemptions exist because certain government functions require speed, secrecy, or flexibility that formal public participation would undermine. They also generate a large share of administrative law litigation, because agencies sometimes stretch them further than courts will allow.<\/p>\n<h3>Military and Foreign Affairs<\/h3>\n<p>Section 553(a) exempts rules involving a military or foreign affairs function of the United States.<sup class=\"modern-footnotes-footnote \" data-mfn=\"1\" data-mfn-post-scope=\"00000000000001670000000000000000_200\"><a href=\"javascript:void(0)\"  role=\"button\" aria-pressed=\"false\" aria-describedby=\"mfn-content-00000000000001670000000000000000_200-1\">1<\/a><\/sup><span id=\"mfn-content-00000000000001670000000000000000_200-1\" role=\"tooltip\" class=\"modern-footnotes-footnote__note\" tabindex=\"0\" data-mfn=\"1\">Office of the Law Revision Counsel. <a href=\"https:\/\/uscode.house.gov\/view.xhtml?req=(title:5%20section:553%20edition:prelim)\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">5 U.S. Code 553 &#8211; Rule Making<\/a><\/span> The Department of Defense, the Department of State, and other national security bodies rely on this when regulating matters where public deliberation could compromise operations or diplomacy.<\/p>\n<h3>Agency Management, Personnel, and Public Benefits<\/h3>\n<p>The same subsection exempts rules relating to agency management or personnel, or to public property, loans, grants, benefits, or contracts.<sup class=\"modern-footnotes-footnote \" data-mfn=\"1\" data-mfn-post-scope=\"00000000000001670000000000000000_200\"><a href=\"javascript:void(0)\"  role=\"button\" aria-pressed=\"false\" aria-describedby=\"mfn-content-00000000000001670000000000000000_200-1\">1<\/a><\/sup><span id=\"mfn-content-00000000000001670000000000000000_200-1\" role=\"tooltip\" class=\"modern-footnotes-footnote__note\" tabindex=\"0\" data-mfn=\"1\">Office of the Law Revision Counsel. <a href=\"https:\/\/uscode.house.gov\/view.xhtml?req=(title:5%20section:553%20edition:prelim)\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">5 U.S. Code 553 &#8211; Rule Making<\/a><\/span> Internal hiring practices, pay structures, federal grant program terms, and government contracting standards all fall outside the notice-and-comment mandate. This exemption is most often contested when an agency claims that changes to benefit eligibility or loan terms are internal management rather than binding rules affecting the public.<\/p>\n<h3>Interpretive Rules, Policy Statements, and Procedural Rules<\/h3>\n<p>Interpretive rules, general statements of policy, and rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice are exempt from prior notice and public comment.<sup class=\"modern-footnotes-footnote \" data-mfn=\"1\" data-mfn-post-scope=\"00000000000001670000000000000000_200\"><a href=\"javascript:void(0)\"  role=\"button\" aria-pressed=\"false\" aria-describedby=\"mfn-content-00000000000001670000000000000000_200-1\">1<\/a><\/sup><span id=\"mfn-content-00000000000001670000000000000000_200-1\" role=\"tooltip\" class=\"modern-footnotes-footnote__note\" tabindex=\"0\" data-mfn=\"1\">Office of the Law Revision Counsel. <a href=\"https:\/\/uscode.house.gov\/view.xhtml?req=(title:5%20section:553%20edition:prelim)\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">5 U.S. Code 553 &#8211; Rule Making<\/a><\/span> An interpretive rule explains how the agency reads a statute it enforces. A policy statement signals how the agency intends to exercise its discretion. Neither creates new legal obligations. The Supreme Court confirmed in <em>Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Association<\/em> that interpretive rules are categorically outside the notice-and-comment requirement, and that an agency can amend or repeal an interpretive rule without going through those procedures either.<sup class=\"modern-footnotes-footnote \" data-mfn=\"6\" data-mfn-post-scope=\"00000000000001670000000000000000_200\"><a href=\"javascript:void(0)\"  role=\"button\" aria-pressed=\"false\" aria-describedby=\"mfn-content-00000000000001670000000000000000_200-6\">6<\/a><\/sup><span id=\"mfn-content-00000000000001670000000000000000_200-6\" role=\"tooltip\" class=\"modern-footnotes-footnote__note\" tabindex=\"0\" data-mfn=\"6\">Justia. <a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/575\/92\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Association<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n<p>The line between a legislative rule and an interpretive one drives most of the disputes here. If a rule the agency labels &#8220;interpretive&#8221; actually imposes binding requirements or changes existing legal obligations, a court can reclassify it as a legislative rule and invalidate it for skipping notice and comment. Courts tend to look at what the rule does, not what the agency calls it.<\/p>\n<h3>The Good Cause Exception<\/h3>\n<p>Section 553(b)(B) lets an agency skip notice and comment when it finds, for good cause, that those procedures would be impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest. The finding and a brief explanation must be published with the rule itself.<sup class=\"modern-footnotes-footnote \" data-mfn=\"1\" data-mfn-post-scope=\"00000000000001670000000000000000_200\"><a href=\"javascript:void(0)\"  role=\"button\" aria-pressed=\"false\" aria-describedby=\"mfn-content-00000000000001670000000000000000_200-1\">1<\/a><\/sup><span id=\"mfn-content-00000000000001670000000000000000_200-1\" role=\"tooltip\" class=\"modern-footnotes-footnote__note\" tabindex=\"0\" data-mfn=\"1\">Office of the Law Revision Counsel. <a href=\"https:\/\/uscode.house.gov\/view.xhtml?req=(title:5%20section:553%20edition:prelim)\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">5 U.S. Code 553 &#8211; Rule Making<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n<p>Courts treat this as an emergency valve, not a convenience. The agency must point to documented facts showing real harm from delay. &#8220;Impracticable&#8221; generally means a time-sensitive function the agency cannot carry out through normal procedures. &#8220;Contrary to the public interest&#8221; generally requires evidence of a threat to public health, safety, or welfare. Economic costs to the agency or to regulated parties are not enough, since nearly every rule imposes some cost. In <em>Jifry v. FAA<\/em>, the D.C. Circuit noted that the good cause exception is generally limited to emergencies or situations where delay could cause serious harm.<sup class=\"modern-footnotes-footnote \" data-mfn=\"7\" data-mfn-post-scope=\"00000000000001670000000000000000_200\"><a href=\"javascript:void(0)\"  role=\"button\" aria-pressed=\"false\" aria-describedby=\"mfn-content-00000000000001670000000000000000_200-7\">7<\/a><\/sup><span id=\"mfn-content-00000000000001670000000000000000_200-7\" role=\"tooltip\" class=\"modern-footnotes-footnote__note\" tabindex=\"0\" data-mfn=\"7\">U.S. Department of Transportation. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.transportation.gov\/sites\/dot.gov\/files\/2022-06\/Good%20Cause%20Memorandum.pdf\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Good Cause Memorandum<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n<p>When agencies invoke good cause, they often issue an interim final rule that takes effect immediately while a post-publication comment period runs, allowing retroactive public input.<\/p>\n<h2>The Right to Petition for a Rule<\/h2>\n<p>Section 553(e) gives any interested person the right to petition a federal agency to issue, amend, or repeal a rule.<sup class=\"modern-footnotes-footnote \" data-mfn=\"1\" data-mfn-post-scope=\"00000000000001670000000000000000_200\"><a href=\"javascript:void(0)\"  role=\"button\" aria-pressed=\"false\" aria-describedby=\"mfn-content-00000000000001670000000000000000_200-1\">1<\/a><\/sup><span id=\"mfn-content-00000000000001670000000000000000_200-1\" role=\"tooltip\" class=\"modern-footnotes-footnote__note\" tabindex=\"0\" data-mfn=\"1\">Office of the Law Revision Counsel. <a href=\"https:\/\/uscode.house.gov\/view.xhtml?req=(title:5%20section:553%20edition:prelim)\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">5 U.S. Code 553 &#8211; Rule Making<\/a><\/span> The agency must acknowledge the petition, but the statute sets no deadline for a decision and does not guarantee approval. If the agency denies a petition or lets it sit indefinitely, the petitioner can seek judicial review. Courts review petition denials under the arbitrary or capricious standard, which is deferential, and they can also compel an agency to act on a petition that has been unreasonably delayed.<sup class=\"modern-footnotes-footnote \" data-mfn=\"8\" data-mfn-post-scope=\"00000000000001670000000000000000_200\"><a href=\"javascript:void(0)\"  role=\"button\" aria-pressed=\"false\" aria-describedby=\"mfn-content-00000000000001670000000000000000_200-8\">8<\/a><\/sup><span id=\"mfn-content-00000000000001670000000000000000_200-8\" role=\"tooltip\" class=\"modern-footnotes-footnote__note\" tabindex=\"0\" data-mfn=\"8\">Administrative Conference of the United States. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.acus.gov\/sites\/default\/files\/documents\/31-Petitions-for-Rulemaking-IIB_0.pdf\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Petitions for Rulemaking<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n<h2>What Happens When an Agency Skips a Step<\/h2>\n<p>A rule adopted in violation of Section 553 is vulnerable. Under 5 U.S.C. \u00a7 706, a reviewing court can set aside agency action that is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.<sup class=\"modern-footnotes-footnote \" data-mfn=\"9\" data-mfn-post-scope=\"00000000000001670000000000000000_200\"><a href=\"javascript:void(0)\"  role=\"button\" aria-pressed=\"false\" aria-describedby=\"mfn-content-00000000000001670000000000000000_200-9\">9<\/a><\/sup><span id=\"mfn-content-00000000000001670000000000000000_200-9\" role=\"tooltip\" class=\"modern-footnotes-footnote__note\" tabindex=\"0\" data-mfn=\"9\">Office of the Law Revision Counsel. <a href=\"https:\/\/uscode.house.gov\/view.xhtml?req=(title:5%20section:706%20edition:prelim)\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">5 USC 706 &#8211; Scope of Review<\/a><\/span> That standard reaches procedural failures, substantive failures, and legal overreach alike.<\/p>\n<p>In <em>Chrysler Corp. v. Brown<\/em>, the Supreme Court held that a regulation only carries the force and effect of law if it is a substantive rule affecting individual rights, the product of a congressional grant of authority, and promulgated in conformity with applicable procedural requirements.<sup class=\"modern-footnotes-footnote \" data-mfn=\"10\" data-mfn-post-scope=\"00000000000001670000000000000000_200\"><a href=\"javascript:void(0)\"  role=\"button\" aria-pressed=\"false\" aria-describedby=\"mfn-content-00000000000001670000000000000000_200-10\">10<\/a><\/sup><span id=\"mfn-content-00000000000001670000000000000000_200-10\" role=\"tooltip\" class=\"modern-footnotes-footnote__note\" tabindex=\"0\" data-mfn=\"10\">Justia. <a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/441\/281\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281 (1979)<\/a><\/span> Miss any of those elements and the rule is unenforceable.<\/p>\n<p>The most frequent procedural challenges involve inadequate notice, failure to respond meaningfully to significant comments, reliance on undisclosed evidence, and invoking good cause without a factual basis. When a court finds a violation, it can vacate the rule outright or remand it to the agency to redo the process.<\/p>\n<h2>Related Tracks Outside Section 553<\/h2>\n<p>A few other procedural regimes sit alongside Section 553 and are worth knowing about, though they operate separately.<\/p>\n<p>When a separate statute requires an agency to make rules &#8220;on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing,&#8221; the formal rulemaking procedures of Sections 556 and 557 apply instead. That process looks more like a trial, with oral and documentary evidence, cross-examination, and a presiding officer.<sup class=\"modern-footnotes-footnote \" data-mfn=\"11\" data-mfn-post-scope=\"00000000000001670000000000000000_200\"><a href=\"javascript:void(0)\"  role=\"button\" aria-pressed=\"false\" aria-describedby=\"mfn-content-00000000000001670000000000000000_200-11\">11<\/a><\/sup><span id=\"mfn-content-00000000000001670000000000000000_200-11\" role=\"tooltip\" class=\"modern-footnotes-footnote__note\" tabindex=\"0\" data-mfn=\"11\">Office of the Law Revision Counsel. <a href=\"https:\/\/uscode.house.gov\/view.xhtml?req=(title:5%20section:556%20edition:prelim)\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">5 U.S. Code 556 &#8211; Hearings; Presiding Employees; Powers and Duties; Burden of Proof; Evidence; Record as Basis of Decision<\/a><\/span> The Supreme Court read the trigger narrowly in <em>United States v. Florida East Coast Railway<\/em>, so formal rulemaking is rare today.<\/p>\n<p>The Regulatory Flexibility Act requires agencies that publish a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking under Section 553 to also prepare an initial regulatory flexibility analysis describing the rule&#8217;s effect on small businesses, small nonprofits, and small governmental jurisdictions, and to consider less burdensome alternatives.<sup class=\"modern-footnotes-footnote \" data-mfn=\"12\" data-mfn-post-scope=\"00000000000001670000000000000000_200\"><a href=\"javascript:void(0)\"  role=\"button\" aria-pressed=\"false\" aria-describedby=\"mfn-content-00000000000001670000000000000000_200-12\">12<\/a><\/sup><span id=\"mfn-content-00000000000001670000000000000000_200-12\" role=\"tooltip\" class=\"modern-footnotes-footnote__note\" tabindex=\"0\" data-mfn=\"12\">Office of the Law Revision Counsel. <a href=\"https:\/\/uscode.house.gov\/view.xhtml?req=(title:5%20section:603%20edition:prelim)\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">5 U.S. Code 603 &#8211; Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis<\/a><\/span> The agency can skip the analysis only by certifying that the rule will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities, and that certification is itself challengeable.<\/p>\n<p>The Negotiated Rulemaking Act, at 5 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 561\u2013570, offers an alternative front end. Instead of drafting a proposal internally, an agency can convene a committee of affected interests, work with a neutral facilitator, and try to negotiate the terms of the proposed rule before publication.<sup class=\"modern-footnotes-footnote \" data-mfn=\"13\" data-mfn-post-scope=\"00000000000001670000000000000000_200\"><a href=\"javascript:void(0)\"  role=\"button\" aria-pressed=\"false\" aria-describedby=\"mfn-content-00000000000001670000000000000000_200-13\">13<\/a><\/sup><span id=\"mfn-content-00000000000001670000000000000000_200-13\" role=\"tooltip\" class=\"modern-footnotes-footnote__note\" tabindex=\"0\" data-mfn=\"13\">Office of the Law Revision Counsel. <a href=\"https:\/\/uscode.house.gov\/view.xhtml?req=(title:5%20section:563%20edition:prelim)\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">5 U.S. Code 563 &#8211; Determination of Need for Negotiated Rulemaking Committee<\/a><\/span> Whether consensus is reached or not, the resulting proposal still goes through normal Section 553 notice and comment.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Learn how 5 U.S.C. 553 rulemaking requirements and exemptions work, from notice-and-comment steps to key exceptions and the right to petition agencies.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[7],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-200","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-constitution-government-civil-rights","article","has-excerpt","has-avatar","has-author","has-date","has-comment-count","has-category-meta","has-read-more","thumbnail-"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/fedlaws.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/200","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/fedlaws.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/fedlaws.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/fedlaws.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/fedlaws.org\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=200"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/fedlaws.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/200\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/fedlaws.org\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=200"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/fedlaws.org\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=200"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/fedlaws.org\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=200"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}