{"id":101,"date":"2026-07-22T02:52:09","date_gmt":"2026-07-22T02:52:09","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/fedlaws.org\/?p=101"},"modified":"2026-07-22T02:52:09","modified_gmt":"2026-07-22T02:52:09","slug":"42-usc-2000-titles-ii-vi-and-vii-explained","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/fedlaws.org\/?p=101","title":{"rendered":"42 USC 2000: Titles II, VI, and VII Explained"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>Codified at 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 2000 and its subchapters, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination in three settings through three main titles: Title II covers public accommodations, Title VI covers federally funded programs, and Title VII covers employment. The protected classes are not identical across titles. Title VII reaches race, color, religion, sex, and national origin. Title II covers race, color, religion, and national origin. Title VI covers race, color, and national origin. Since 2020, the Supreme Court has read Title VII&#8217;s ban on sex discrimination to include sexual orientation and gender identity.<\/p>\n<h2>Title II: Public Accommodations<\/h2>\n<p>Title II guarantees equal access to businesses that serve the public, including hotels, restaurants, gas stations, theaters, and concert halls, without discrimination based on race, color, religion, or national origin.<sup class=\"modern-footnotes-footnote \" data-mfn=\"1\" data-mfn-post-scope=\"00000000000001670000000000000000_101\"><a href=\"javascript:void(0)\"  role=\"button\" aria-pressed=\"false\" aria-describedby=\"mfn-content-00000000000001670000000000000000_101-1\">1<\/a><\/sup><span id=\"mfn-content-00000000000001670000000000000000_101-1\" role=\"tooltip\" class=\"modern-footnotes-footnote__note\" tabindex=\"0\" data-mfn=\"1\">Office of the Law Revision Counsel. <a href=\"https:\/\/uscode.house.gov\/view.xhtml?req=(title:42%20section:2000a%20edition:prelim)\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">42 U.S. Code 2000a &#8211; Prohibition Against Discrimination or Segregation in Places of Public Accommodation<\/a><\/span> It reaches establishments whose operations affect interstate commerce or whose discriminatory practices are supported by state action.<\/p>\n<p>A few carve-outs matter. Private clubs and establishments not actually open to the public are exempt, though a club loses that exemption if it makes its facilities available to customers of a covered business.<sup class=\"modern-footnotes-footnote \" data-mfn=\"2\" data-mfn-post-scope=\"00000000000001670000000000000000_101\"><a href=\"javascript:void(0)\"  role=\"button\" aria-pressed=\"false\" aria-describedby=\"mfn-content-00000000000001670000000000000000_101-2\">2<\/a><\/sup><span id=\"mfn-content-00000000000001670000000000000000_101-2\" role=\"tooltip\" class=\"modern-footnotes-footnote__note\" tabindex=\"0\" data-mfn=\"2\">Department of Justice. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.justice.gov\/crt\/title-ii-civil-rights-act-public-accommodations\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Title II of the Civil Rights Act (Public Accommodations)<\/a><\/span> Small owner-occupied lodgings with five or fewer rooms for rent are also exempt.<\/p>\n<p>Sex is not a protected class under Title II. Someone denied service at a restaurant because of their national origin has a Title II claim; sex-based discrimination in public accommodations falls outside this statute and has to be pursued under other laws.<\/p>\n<h2>Title VI: Federally Funded Programs<\/h2>\n<p>Title VI bars any program or activity that receives federal financial assistance from discriminating based on race, color, or national origin.<sup class=\"modern-footnotes-footnote \" data-mfn=\"3\" data-mfn-post-scope=\"00000000000001670000000000000000_101\"><a href=\"javascript:void(0)\"  role=\"button\" aria-pressed=\"false\" aria-describedby=\"mfn-content-00000000000001670000000000000000_101-3\">3<\/a><\/sup><span id=\"mfn-content-00000000000001670000000000000000_101-3\" role=\"tooltip\" class=\"modern-footnotes-footnote__note\" tabindex=\"0\" data-mfn=\"3\">Office of the Law Revision Counsel. <a href=\"https:\/\/uscode.house.gov\/view.xhtml?req=(title:42%20section:2000d%20edition:prelim)\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">42 USC 2000d &#8211; Prohibition Against Exclusion From Participation in, Denial of Benefits of, and Discrimination Under Federally Assisted Programs on Ground of Race, Color, or National Origin<\/a><\/span> The coverage is broad: public schools, universities, hospitals, state agencies, and any other entity that receives federal grants, loans, or contracts. Each federal department that distributes funding has authority to issue rules enforcing the prohibition.<sup class=\"modern-footnotes-footnote \" data-mfn=\"4\" data-mfn-post-scope=\"00000000000001670000000000000000_101\"><a href=\"javascript:void(0)\"  role=\"button\" aria-pressed=\"false\" aria-describedby=\"mfn-content-00000000000001670000000000000000_101-4\">4<\/a><\/sup><span id=\"mfn-content-00000000000001670000000000000000_101-4\" role=\"tooltip\" class=\"modern-footnotes-footnote__note\" tabindex=\"0\" data-mfn=\"4\">U.S. Department of Labor. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.dol.gov\/agencies\/oasam\/regulatory\/statutes\/title-vi-civil-rights-act-of-1964\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Title VI, Civil Rights Act of 1964<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n<p>Title VI reaches unintentional discrimination too. In Lau v. Nichols (1974), the Supreme Court ruled that a school district receiving federal funds violated the law by failing to provide English-language instruction to Chinese-speaking students, even without evidence of intentional bias.<sup class=\"modern-footnotes-footnote \" data-mfn=\"5\" data-mfn-post-scope=\"00000000000001670000000000000000_101\"><a href=\"javascript:void(0)\"  role=\"button\" aria-pressed=\"false\" aria-describedby=\"mfn-content-00000000000001670000000000000000_101-5\">5<\/a><\/sup><span id=\"mfn-content-00000000000001670000000000000000_101-5\" role=\"tooltip\" class=\"modern-footnotes-footnote__note\" tabindex=\"0\" data-mfn=\"5\">Justia U.S. Supreme Court Center. <a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/414\/563\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974)<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n<h2>Title VII: Employment<\/h2>\n<p>Title VII makes it unlawful for employers to discriminate in hiring, firing, pay, job assignments, promotions, or any other term of employment based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.<sup class=\"modern-footnotes-footnote \" data-mfn=\"6\" data-mfn-post-scope=\"00000000000001670000000000000000_101\"><a href=\"javascript:void(0)\"  role=\"button\" aria-pressed=\"false\" aria-describedby=\"mfn-content-00000000000001670000000000000000_101-6\">6<\/a><\/sup><span id=\"mfn-content-00000000000001670000000000000000_101-6\" role=\"tooltip\" class=\"modern-footnotes-footnote__note\" tabindex=\"0\" data-mfn=\"6\">Office of the Law Revision Counsel. <a href=\"https:\/\/uscode.house.gov\/view.xhtml?req=(title:42%20section:2000e-2%20edition:prelim)\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">42 U.S. Code 2000e-2 &#8211; Unlawful Employment Practices<\/a><\/span> The same rules bind labor organizations and employment agencies.<\/p>\n<p>In 2020, the Supreme Court held in Bostock v. Clayton County that firing someone for being gay or transgender qualifies as sex discrimination under Title VII, extending the statute&#8217;s reach to sexual orientation and gender identity.<sup class=\"modern-footnotes-footnote \" data-mfn=\"7\" data-mfn-post-scope=\"00000000000001670000000000000000_101\"><a href=\"javascript:void(0)\"  role=\"button\" aria-pressed=\"false\" aria-describedby=\"mfn-content-00000000000001670000000000000000_101-7\">7<\/a><\/sup><span id=\"mfn-content-00000000000001670000000000000000_101-7\" role=\"tooltip\" class=\"modern-footnotes-footnote__note\" tabindex=\"0\" data-mfn=\"7\">Justia U.S. Supreme Court Center. <a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/590\/17-1618\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Bostock v. Clayton County, 590 U.S. ___ (2020)<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n<h3>Which Employers Are Covered<\/h3>\n<p>Title VII applies to private employers with 15 or more employees, along with labor unions and employment agencies.<sup class=\"modern-footnotes-footnote \" data-mfn=\"8\" data-mfn-post-scope=\"00000000000001670000000000000000_101\"><a href=\"javascript:void(0)\"  role=\"button\" aria-pressed=\"false\" aria-describedby=\"mfn-content-00000000000001670000000000000000_101-8\">8<\/a><\/sup><span id=\"mfn-content-00000000000001670000000000000000_101-8\" role=\"tooltip\" class=\"modern-footnotes-footnote__note\" tabindex=\"0\" data-mfn=\"8\">U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.eeoc.gov\/statutes\/title-vii-civil-rights-act-1964\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964<\/a><\/span> The threshold is met when the employer had 15 workers on its payroll for at least 20 calendar weeks in the current or preceding year. Part-time workers count; independent contractors do not.<sup class=\"modern-footnotes-footnote \" data-mfn=\"9\" data-mfn-post-scope=\"00000000000001670000000000000000_101\"><a href=\"javascript:void(0)\"  role=\"button\" aria-pressed=\"false\" aria-describedby=\"mfn-content-00000000000001670000000000000000_101-9\">9<\/a><\/sup><span id=\"mfn-content-00000000000001670000000000000000_101-9\" role=\"tooltip\" class=\"modern-footnotes-footnote__note\" tabindex=\"0\" data-mfn=\"9\">U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.eeoc.gov\/how-do-you-count-number-employees-employer-has\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">How Do You Count the Number of Employees an Employer Has?<\/a><\/span> Employees across multiple worksites can be counted together.<\/p>\n<p>The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 extended Title VII to federal, state, and local government employers.<sup class=\"modern-footnotes-footnote \" data-mfn=\"10\" data-mfn-post-scope=\"00000000000001670000000000000000_101\"><a href=\"javascript:void(0)\"  role=\"button\" aria-pressed=\"false\" aria-describedby=\"mfn-content-00000000000001670000000000000000_101-10\">10<\/a><\/sup><span id=\"mfn-content-00000000000001670000000000000000_101-10\" role=\"tooltip\" class=\"modern-footnotes-footnote__note\" tabindex=\"0\" data-mfn=\"10\">U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.eeoc.gov\/history\/equal-employment-opportunity-act-1972\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n<h2>How Courts Recognize Discrimination<\/h2>\n<h3>Disparate Treatment<\/h3>\n<p>Disparate treatment is intentional: an employer treats someone worse because of a protected characteristic. Direct evidence isn&#8217;t always available, so courts use the framework from McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green (1973). A worker establishes a preliminary case by showing they belong to a protected group, were qualified, were rejected, and the employer kept looking for similarly qualified candidates.<sup class=\"modern-footnotes-footnote \" data-mfn=\"11\" data-mfn-post-scope=\"00000000000001670000000000000000_101\"><a href=\"javascript:void(0)\"  role=\"button\" aria-pressed=\"false\" aria-describedby=\"mfn-content-00000000000001670000000000000000_101-11\">11<\/a><\/sup><span id=\"mfn-content-00000000000001670000000000000000_101-11\" role=\"tooltip\" class=\"modern-footnotes-footnote__note\" tabindex=\"0\" data-mfn=\"11\">Justia U.S. Supreme Court Center. <a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/411\/792\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)<\/a><\/span> The employer then offers a legitimate reason, and the worker gets to show that reason is pretextual.<\/p>\n<h3>Disparate Impact<\/h3>\n<p>Disparate impact involves policies that look neutral but disproportionately screen out a protected group without a legitimate business justification. In Griggs v. Duke Power Co. (1971), the Supreme Court struck down aptitude tests and a high school diploma requirement that neither measured the ability to do the job nor let Black applicants through at similar rates.<sup class=\"modern-footnotes-footnote \" data-mfn=\"12\" data-mfn-post-scope=\"00000000000001670000000000000000_101\"><a href=\"javascript:void(0)\"  role=\"button\" aria-pressed=\"false\" aria-describedby=\"mfn-content-00000000000001670000000000000000_101-12\">12<\/a><\/sup><span id=\"mfn-content-00000000000001670000000000000000_101-12\" role=\"tooltip\" class=\"modern-footnotes-footnote__note\" tabindex=\"0\" data-mfn=\"12\">Justia U.S. Supreme Court Center. <a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/401\/424\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971)<\/a><\/span> Discriminatory intent is not required.<\/p>\n<h3>Hostile Work Environment<\/h3>\n<p>A hostile work environment exists when harassment based on a protected characteristic becomes severe or pervasive enough to alter the conditions of employment. Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson (1986) confirmed that Title VII is not limited to economic harms; unwelcome conduct that creates an intimidating or offensive workplace violates the statute even without any loss of pay or position.<sup class=\"modern-footnotes-footnote \" data-mfn=\"13\" data-mfn-post-scope=\"00000000000001670000000000000000_101\"><a href=\"javascript:void(0)\"  role=\"button\" aria-pressed=\"false\" aria-describedby=\"mfn-content-00000000000001670000000000000000_101-13\">13<\/a><\/sup><span id=\"mfn-content-00000000000001670000000000000000_101-13\" role=\"tooltip\" class=\"modern-footnotes-footnote__note\" tabindex=\"0\" data-mfn=\"13\">Justia U.S. Supreme Court Center. <a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/477\/57\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986)<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n<h2>Exceptions an Employer Can Invoke<\/h2>\n<p>Title VII carves out a few narrow situations where an employer may lawfully consider a protected characteristic.<\/p>\n<p>A bona fide occupational qualification, or BFOQ, allows hiring based on religion, sex, or national origin when the characteristic is genuinely necessary for the job. Hiring a female attendant for a women&#8217;s correctional facility for privacy reasons is a familiar example. Race and color can never serve as a BFOQ. Customer preference alone does not justify one; courts have rejected arguments like passengers preferring female flight attendants.<sup class=\"modern-footnotes-footnote \" data-mfn=\"6\" data-mfn-post-scope=\"00000000000001670000000000000000_101\"><a href=\"javascript:void(0)\"  role=\"button\" aria-pressed=\"false\" aria-describedby=\"mfn-content-00000000000001670000000000000000_101-6\">6<\/a><\/sup><span id=\"mfn-content-00000000000001670000000000000000_101-6\" role=\"tooltip\" class=\"modern-footnotes-footnote__note\" tabindex=\"0\" data-mfn=\"6\">Office of the Law Revision Counsel. <a href=\"https:\/\/uscode.house.gov\/view.xhtml?req=(title:42%20section:2000e-2%20edition:prelim)\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">42 U.S. Code 2000e-2 &#8211; Unlawful Employment Practices<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n<p>Religious corporations, associations, and educational institutions may prefer co-religionists when hiring for positions connected to their religious activities. A Catholic diocese can require its employees to be Catholic, and a seminary can limit faculty to members of its denomination. The exemption covers religious preference only. A religious employer still cannot discriminate based on race or sex.<sup class=\"modern-footnotes-footnote \" data-mfn=\"14\" data-mfn-post-scope=\"00000000000001670000000000000000_101\"><a href=\"javascript:void(0)\"  role=\"button\" aria-pressed=\"false\" aria-describedby=\"mfn-content-00000000000001670000000000000000_101-14\">14<\/a><\/sup><span id=\"mfn-content-00000000000001670000000000000000_101-14\" role=\"tooltip\" class=\"modern-footnotes-footnote__note\" tabindex=\"0\" data-mfn=\"14\">Office of the Law Revision Counsel. <a href=\"https:\/\/uscode.house.gov\/view.xhtml?req=(title:42%20section:2000e-1%20edition:prelim)\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">42 U.S. Code 2000e-1 &#8211; Exemption<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n<h2>Retaliation Is Separately Prohibited<\/h2>\n<p>Title VII prohibits employers from retaliating against anyone who opposes a discriminatory practice or participates in a Title VII investigation, proceeding, or hearing.<sup class=\"modern-footnotes-footnote \" data-mfn=\"15\" data-mfn-post-scope=\"00000000000001670000000000000000_101\"><a href=\"javascript:void(0)\"  role=\"button\" aria-pressed=\"false\" aria-describedby=\"mfn-content-00000000000001670000000000000000_101-15\">15<\/a><\/sup><span id=\"mfn-content-00000000000001670000000000000000_101-15\" role=\"tooltip\" class=\"modern-footnotes-footnote__note\" tabindex=\"0\" data-mfn=\"15\">Office of the Law Revision Counsel. <a href=\"https:\/\/uscode.house.gov\/view.xhtml?req=(title:42%20section:2000e-3%20edition:prelim)\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">42 U.S. Code 2000e-3 &#8211; Other Unlawful Employment Practices<\/a><\/span> That covers formal actions like filing a charge and informal ones like complaining to a supervisor. A worker bringing a retaliation claim does not have to prove the underlying discrimination actually happened. A reasonable, good-faith belief that it did is enough.<\/p>\n<p>In Burlington Northern &#038; Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White (2006), the Supreme Court ruled that retaliatory conduct does not have to be workplace-related or affect the terms of employment. Any action that would dissuade a reasonable worker from making or supporting a discrimination charge counts. A reassignment to less desirable duties and a 37-day unpaid suspension (later reversed with back pay) were both held to be materially adverse.<sup class=\"modern-footnotes-footnote \" data-mfn=\"16\" data-mfn-post-scope=\"00000000000001670000000000000000_101\"><a href=\"javascript:void(0)\"  role=\"button\" aria-pressed=\"false\" aria-describedby=\"mfn-content-00000000000001670000000000000000_101-16\">16<\/a><\/sup><span id=\"mfn-content-00000000000001670000000000000000_101-16\" role=\"tooltip\" class=\"modern-footnotes-footnote__note\" tabindex=\"0\" data-mfn=\"16\">Justia U.S. Supreme Court Center. <a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/548\/53\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006)<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n<h2>How to Enforce Your Rights<\/h2>\n<h3>Title VII: EEOC First, Then Court<\/h3>\n<p>You cannot go straight to court with a Title VII claim. Filing a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission first is mandatory.<sup class=\"modern-footnotes-footnote \" data-mfn=\"17\" data-mfn-post-scope=\"00000000000001670000000000000000_101\"><a href=\"javascript:void(0)\"  role=\"button\" aria-pressed=\"false\" aria-describedby=\"mfn-content-00000000000001670000000000000000_101-17\">17<\/a><\/sup><span id=\"mfn-content-00000000000001670000000000000000_101-17\" role=\"tooltip\" class=\"modern-footnotes-footnote__note\" tabindex=\"0\" data-mfn=\"17\">U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.eeoc.gov\/filing-charge-discrimination\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Filing a Charge of Discrimination<\/a><\/span> The EEOC notifies the employer and investigates. If it finds reasonable cause, it first tries to settle the matter through informal conciliation.<sup class=\"modern-footnotes-footnote \" data-mfn=\"18\" data-mfn-post-scope=\"00000000000001670000000000000000_101\"><a href=\"javascript:void(0)\"  role=\"button\" aria-pressed=\"false\" aria-describedby=\"mfn-content-00000000000001670000000000000000_101-18\">18<\/a><\/sup><span id=\"mfn-content-00000000000001670000000000000000_101-18\" role=\"tooltip\" class=\"modern-footnotes-footnote__note\" tabindex=\"0\" data-mfn=\"18\">Office of the Law Revision Counsel. <a href=\"https:\/\/uscode.house.gov\/view.xhtml?req=(title:42%20section:2000e-5%20edition:prelim)\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">42 U.S. Code 2000e-5 &#8211; Enforcement Provisions<\/a><\/span> If that fails, the EEOC may sue itself or refer the case to the Department of Justice when a government employer is involved.<\/p>\n<p>You generally have 180 calendar days from the discriminatory act to file the charge. That deadline stretches to 300 days if a state or local agency enforces a law prohibiting the same type of discrimination, which is the case in most states.<sup class=\"modern-footnotes-footnote \" data-mfn=\"19\" data-mfn-post-scope=\"00000000000001670000000000000000_101\"><a href=\"javascript:void(0)\"  role=\"button\" aria-pressed=\"false\" aria-describedby=\"mfn-content-00000000000001670000000000000000_101-19\">19<\/a><\/sup><span id=\"mfn-content-00000000000001670000000000000000_101-19\" role=\"tooltip\" class=\"modern-footnotes-footnote__note\" tabindex=\"0\" data-mfn=\"19\">U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.eeoc.gov\/time-limits-filing-charge\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Time Limits for Filing a Charge<\/a><\/span> Missing this deadline can permanently bar the claim.<\/p>\n<p>If the EEOC dismisses the charge, declines to sue within 180 days, or otherwise closes its investigation, it issues a Notice of Right to Sue. You then have 90 days from receipt to file a lawsuit in federal or state court.<sup class=\"modern-footnotes-footnote \" data-mfn=\"20\" data-mfn-post-scope=\"00000000000001670000000000000000_101\"><a href=\"javascript:void(0)\"  role=\"button\" aria-pressed=\"false\" aria-describedby=\"mfn-content-00000000000001670000000000000000_101-20\">20<\/a><\/sup><span id=\"mfn-content-00000000000001670000000000000000_101-20\" role=\"tooltip\" class=\"modern-footnotes-footnote__note\" tabindex=\"0\" data-mfn=\"20\">U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.eeoc.gov\/filing-lawsuit\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Filing a Lawsuit<\/a><\/span> Courts routinely dismiss cases filed even one day late. You can also request a right-to-sue notice before the EEOC finishes if you want to move straight to litigation.<\/p>\n<h3>Title II and Title VI Complaints<\/h3>\n<p>Title II matters are handled by the Department of Justice&#8217;s Civil Rights Division.<sup class=\"modern-footnotes-footnote \" data-mfn=\"21\" data-mfn-post-scope=\"00000000000001670000000000000000_101\"><a href=\"javascript:void(0)\"  role=\"button\" aria-pressed=\"false\" aria-describedby=\"mfn-content-00000000000001670000000000000000_101-21\">21<\/a><\/sup><span id=\"mfn-content-00000000000001670000000000000000_101-21\" role=\"tooltip\" class=\"modern-footnotes-footnote__note\" tabindex=\"0\" data-mfn=\"21\">U.S. Department of Justice. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.justice.gov\/crt\/laws-we-enforce\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Laws We Enforce<\/a><\/span> Title VI complaints go to the federal agency providing the funding; the Department of Education&#8217;s Office for Civil Rights, for example, takes complaints about schools and universities. If the administrative process does not resolve the matter, individuals may pursue private litigation, which courts have recognized under both titles.<\/p>\n<h2>What You Can Recover<\/h2>\n<p>Remedies depend on the title and the type of discrimination.<\/p>\n<p>Successful Title VII plaintiffs can recover back pay, reinstatement, and front pay when reinstatement isn&#8217;t practical. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 added compensatory damages for emotional distress and punitive damages for intentional discrimination, but capped the combined total based on employer size:<sup class=\"modern-footnotes-footnote \" data-mfn=\"22\" data-mfn-post-scope=\"00000000000001670000000000000000_101\"><a href=\"javascript:void(0)\"  role=\"button\" aria-pressed=\"false\" aria-describedby=\"mfn-content-00000000000001670000000000000000_101-22\">22<\/a><\/sup><span id=\"mfn-content-00000000000001670000000000000000_101-22\" role=\"tooltip\" class=\"modern-footnotes-footnote__note\" tabindex=\"0\" data-mfn=\"22\">Office of the Law Revision Counsel. <a href=\"https:\/\/uscode.house.gov\/view.xhtml?req=(title:42%20section:1981a%20edition:prelim)\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">42 U.S. Code 1981a &#8211; Damages in Cases of Intentional Discrimination in Employment<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>15 to 100 employees: up to $50,000<\/li>\n<li>101 to 200 employees: up to $100,000<\/li>\n<li>201 to 500 employees: up to $200,000<\/li>\n<li>More than 500 employees: up to $300,000<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>The caps apply per complaining party and cover future financial losses, emotional pain, and punitive damages combined. Back pay is not capped. Courts can also order injunctive relief, requiring an employer to change policies, provide training, or take other corrective steps.<\/p>\n<p>Under Title VI, the primary enforcement tool is federal funding itself. An agency can terminate or refuse to continue financial assistance to a noncompliant recipient. The sanction is limited to the specific program where the violation occurred, and it cannot take effect until 30 days after the agency reports the action to the relevant congressional committees.<sup class=\"modern-footnotes-footnote \" data-mfn=\"23\" data-mfn-post-scope=\"00000000000001670000000000000000_101\"><a href=\"javascript:void(0)\"  role=\"button\" aria-pressed=\"false\" aria-describedby=\"mfn-content-00000000000001670000000000000000_101-23\">23<\/a><\/sup><span id=\"mfn-content-00000000000001670000000000000000_101-23\" role=\"tooltip\" class=\"modern-footnotes-footnote__note\" tabindex=\"0\" data-mfn=\"23\">Office of the Law Revision Counsel. <a href=\"https:\/\/uscode.house.gov\/view.xhtml?req=(title:42%20section:2000d-1%20edition:prelim)\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">42 U.S. Code 2000d-1 &#8211; Federal Authority and Financial Assistance to Programs or Activities by Way of Grant, Loan, or Contract Other Than Contract of Insurance or Guaranty<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Learn how the 42 USC 2000 Civil Rights Act bars discrimination, from public accommodations and federally funded programs to workplace rights and remedies.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[7],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-101","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-constitution-government-civil-rights","article","has-excerpt","has-avatar","has-author","has-date","has-comment-count","has-category-meta","has-read-more","thumbnail-"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/fedlaws.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/101","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/fedlaws.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/fedlaws.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/fedlaws.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/fedlaws.org\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=101"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/fedlaws.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/101\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/fedlaws.org\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=101"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/fedlaws.org\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=101"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/fedlaws.org\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=101"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}