Incentive distribution rights in MLPs are a contractual feature that gives the general partner a growing share of each quarter’s cash distributions once payments to common unitholders cross set per-unit targets. The general partner starts at zero, and its slice ramps up through tiers that can reach 50% of every additional dollar the partnership pays out. The design rewards the GP for growing cash flow, but once distributions sit in the top tier, IDRs raise the partnership’s cost of capital and put the GP in direct tension with the people holding common units. That tension is why most large MLPs have removed their IDRs over the past decade.
How the Distribution Waterfall Works
Every MLP’s partnership agreement lays out a distribution waterfall, the order in which quarterly cash is paid. It begins with the minimum quarterly distribution, a per-unit target the MLP aims to hit before any IDR payments kick in. The MQD is a contractual target, not a legal obligation. No federal tax or securities law requires an MLP to distribute cash, unlike a REIT.
Once the MQD is covered, cash above that level moves through tiers. Each tier hands a larger share of the next dollar to the IDR holder. A typical structure looks like this:
- Up to 115% of the MQD: 100% to unitholders, nothing to the IDR holder.
- 115% to 125% of the MQD: 85% to unitholders, 15% to the IDR holder.
- 125% to 150% of the MQD: 75% to unitholders, 25% to the IDR holder.
- Above 150% of the MQD: 50% to unitholders, 50% to the IDR holder.
These are marginal rates. The 50/50 split applies only to the cash above the third target, not to the entire distribution. Still, once an MLP is comfortably in the top tier, that marginal rate dominates the economics of every additional dollar. The GP may also hold a separate 2% general partner interest and a block of common units, so its total take from the partnership is usually larger than the IDR line alone suggests.
Why IDRs Hurt Returns Over Time
The waterfall aligns incentives early, when both the GP and common unitholders benefit from pushing distributions higher. The trouble starts once distributions reach the top tier. At a 50/50 split, the MLP has to generate two dollars of incremental cash flow for every one dollar of additional distributions to common unitholders. That math makes it progressively harder to fund growth projects that actually benefit the people holding common units.
This is the core complaint about IDRs. An MLP deep in the high split carries a much higher effective cost of equity than a comparable partnership without IDRs, because every new project has to clear a hurdle rate that accounts for half the incremental cash going to the GP. Acquisitions that would be immediately accretive for a simplified MLP turn dilutive or break-even once the IDR drag is included.
Markets price this in. MLPs stuck in the high-split tier often trade at lower valuations than their simplified peers, which reflects skepticism about future distribution growth. The lower unit price raises the MLP’s cost of equity further, which makes accretive deals even harder to finance. The constraint feeds itself.
Why Most MLPs Have Eliminated Their IDRs
By late 2019, roughly 85% of the Alerian MLP Index by weighting had removed its IDRs, up from less than half in late 2016. Sponsors eventually recognized that keeping IDRs was shrinking the very partnerships they relied on for growth.
Three transaction structures do most of the work:
- Direct buyout. The MLP purchases the IDR rights from the GP for cash, new debt, or both. The price reflects the present value of the cash the IDRs would have produced, which requires assumptions about long-term distribution growth and a discount rate.
- Unit-for-IDR exchange. The GP surrenders its IDR claim for a block of newly issued common units. This avoids loading the MLP with debt and keeps the GP invested, though it dilutes existing unitholders. The exchange ratio generally gives the GP a premium over the current market value of the IDR cash stream.
- Full merger or C-corporation conversion. The GP and the MLP combine into one entity, often converting from a partnership to a traditional corporation. ONEOK used this model to acquire ONEOK Partners in a deal valued at roughly $9.3 billion, and Williams Companies absorbed Williams Partners in a transaction valued at approximately $10.5 billion.
The valuation is always the hardest part. The GP wants credit for the full growth potential of its IDR claim. Common unitholders want to pay as little as possible to remove a drag on their distributions. That is why partnership agreements route these deals through an independent conflicts committee.
The Governance Problem Behind IDRs
IDRs put the GP on both sides of every major decision. It benefits from the IDR claim while controlling the partnership’s operations. The legal framework governing most MLPs does surprisingly little to constrain this.
Nearly all large MLPs are Delaware limited partnerships organized under the Delaware Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act. DRULPA’s core principle is freedom of contract. It expressly allows partnership agreements to expand, restrict, or eliminate the fiduciary duties that would otherwise apply to the GP. The one thing a partnership agreement cannot eliminate is the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
In practice, most MLP partnership agreements replace traditional fiduciary duties with a contractual standard. Instead of the duty of loyalty and care a corporate director owes shareholders, the GP may only need to act in “good faith” as the agreement itself defines that term. Delaware courts have upheld these arrangements and declined to apply corporate-style scrutiny where the partnership agreement has eliminated fiduciary duties.
The main practical check is the conflicts committee, a group of independent directors on the GP’s board. When the GP proposes a transaction that benefits itself at the partnership’s expense, the committee reviews the deal and typically obtains a fairness opinion from an independent financial advisor. Approval under the standards set in the partnership agreement can create a safe harbor against unitholder litigation. A fairness opinion alone is not enough. Delaware courts have held that the GP must show it actually relied on the opinion during its decision-making, not just collected it as a formality after the deal was already agreed.
How IDR Income Is Taxed to the GP
An MLP is a pass-through entity. The partnership itself pays no federal income tax. Each partner pays tax on its allocated share of partnership income, whether or not the partnership distributes any cash that quarter. The partnership reports each partner’s share on Schedule K-1 (Form 1065).1Internal Revenue Service. Partner’s Instructions for Schedule K-1 (Form 1065)
The GP’s IDR income is part of its distributive share of partnership income, determined by the partnership agreement.2Office of the Law Revision Counsel. 26 USC 704 – Partner’s Distributive Share The character of that income depends on what the MLP does. For a pipeline or processing plant operator, most income flows through as ordinary business income. If the partnership sells depreciable assets, recaptured depreciation passes through as ordinary income as well.
Limited partners generally do not owe self-employment tax on their distributive share. General partners face the opposite rule. A GP’s distributive share is subject to self-employment tax regardless of how active the GP is in the business, which creates a meaningful additional tax burden for GP entities receiving substantial IDR payments.3Internal Revenue Service. Self-Employment Tax and Partners
Income from a publicly traded partnership can qualify for the qualified business income deduction under Section 199A. That deduction applies to a separate component covering REIT dividends and PTP income and is not limited by the W-2 wage or capital asset thresholds that restrict the deduction for other pass-through businesses.4Internal Revenue Service. Qualified Business Income Deduction The One Big Beautiful Bill Act made Section 199A permanent and raised the deduction rate to 23% starting in 2026, up from 20%. Most midstream energy MLPs generate income from natural resource transportation and processing, which is not a specified service trade or business, so the phase-out rules rarely bite for typical MLP investors.5Office of the Law Revision Counsel. 26 USC 7704 – Certain Publicly Traded Partnerships Treated as Corporations
What to Check Before Buying an MLP With IDRs
If you’re looking at an MLP that still has IDRs in place, find out how deep into the waterfall the current distribution sits. An MLP paying well below the first target has room to grow before IDRs bite. One already in the 50/50 tier faces fundamentally different growth math, and you should discount its distribution growth outlook accordingly.
Look at the GP’s total economic interest, not just the IDR splits. Add the GP’s 2% interest, its IDR payments, and any common units it holds. That combined figure, as a percentage of total distributions, tells you how much of every dollar leaving the partnership goes to the GP rather than to you. Some GPs have collected more than 20% of total distributions once all three pieces are added together.
Read the partnership agreement’s conflict-of-interest provisions. Check whether fiduciary duties have been eliminated or replaced with a contractual standard, and look at how the conflicts committee is defined and empowered. Those provisions determine your practical recourse if the GP later proposes a transaction that looks tilted in its own favor.
Finally, think about the simplification trajectory. An MLP with IDRs deep in the high split is a plausible candidate for a future buyout, exchange, or C-corp conversion. That can be a catalyst for unit price appreciation when the deal is structured well, and it can leave common unitholders overpaying to remove a burden they never created when it isn’t. The track record of past simplifications spans both outcomes, and the independence and rigor of the conflicts committee is the best predictor of which end you land on.