The Huawei security risk, as US officials frame it, is that the world’s largest telecom equipment maker is legally obligated under Chinese law to assist Beijing’s intelligence services if asked, and that its gear has been found in places and configurations that would make such assistance devastating. That concern has driven a decade of US action: an Entity List designation, export controls on advanced chips, a federal procurement ban, a nearly $5 billion program to rip Huawei equipment out of American telecom networks, and an active criminal prosecution set for trial in September 2026.
Huawei denies it would ever spy for the Chinese government and continues to operate as the top telecom equipment supplier globally in markets where it is permitted. The dispute is not close to over.
What the Security Risk Actually Is
The case against Huawei rests on three overlapping concerns: who controls the company, what Chinese law can force it to do, and how transparent it is about either.
Huawei’s founder, Ren Zhengfei, served as an engineer in the People’s Liberation Army during the Cultural Revolution, and since the mid-1990s the Chinese government and military have treated the company as a “national champion.” Reports indicate Huawei has received roughly $75 billion in state support through subsidies and favorable financing.1Council on Foreign Relations. China’s Huawei Threat to US National Security Huawei says it is a private company fully owned by its employees. A US State Department document described the identity of 99% of Huawei’s ownership as a “closely-held secret” and noted that the company does not permit external audits; US officials have also pointed out that all trade unions in China are effectively state-controlled.2U.S. Department of State. Huawei 5G Myth vs. Fact
The legal concern is more concrete. China’s 2017 National Intelligence Law states in Article 7 that “all organizations and citizens shall support, assist, and cooperate with national intelligence efforts in accordance with law,” and Article 14 empowers intelligence agencies to demand that organizations provide “necessary support, assistance, and cooperation.” Obstruction can lead to detention or criminal prosecution.3China Law Translate. National Intelligence Law of the PRC Two other laws reinforce that framework. The 2016 Cybersecurity Law requires network operators to cooperate with security officials and mandates that key data be stored on servers inside China. The 2020 Cryptography Law requires that encryption systems used in China give the state access to encryption keys.4U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Data Security Business Advisory
A Department of Homeland Security advisory concluded that these laws collectively allow the Chinese government to compel firms to turn over data, install backdoors in hardware and software, and serve as “proxies and tools” of the Chinese Communist Party, with no meaningful avenue for companies to appeal or challenge such demands.4U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Data Security Business Advisory Chinese regulation also requires companies to maintain Chinese Communist Party branches within their corporate structures.1Council on Foreign Relations. China’s Huawei Threat to US National Security
Ren has publicly said Huawei would refuse any government request for intelligence and that he “would never harm the interest of my customers.” In 2018, Huawei commissioned a report from a Chinese law firm arguing it cannot legally be forced to spy, though legal experts have noted these laws remain untested in that context.1Council on Foreign Relations. China’s Huawei Threat to US National Security
What US Investigators and Auditors Have Found
Huawei Equipment Near US Military Bases
An FBI investigation that began during the Obama administration found that Huawei equipment installed on cell towers near US military bases in the rural Midwest was capable of capturing and disrupting highly restricted Defense Department communications, including those used by US Strategic Command, the entity that oversees the country’s nuclear arsenal. The equipment had been installed starting in late 2011, when a regional carrier called Viaero signed a contract with Huawei for 3G upgrades across approximately 1,000 towers along Interstate 25.5CNN. FBI Investigation Huawei China Defense Department Communications Nuclear
Investigators also determined that surveillance cameras mounted on towers running on Huawei networks were being monitored and could potentially be “tasked” by Chinese intelligence to track US military movements.5CNN. FBI Investigation Huawei China Defense Department Communications Nuclear Sources told reporters it was difficult to prove definitively whether data had been intercepted or transmitted to another country.6The Hill. FBI Found Huawei Equipment in Midwest Could Disrupt US Nuclear Communications Huawei rejected the findings, stating its products operate only on spectrum allocated by the FCC for commercial use.
Firmware Flaws and UK Oversight Findings
In June 2019, cybersecurity firm Finite State published an analysis of nearly 10,000 firmware images across 558 Huawei enterprise networking products and found that 55% contained at least one potential backdoor, including hard-coded credentials and unsafe cryptographic keys. On average, each device had 102 known security vulnerabilities in its firmware.7Finite State. Report Finds Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities Embedded Within Huawei Devices The study also found significant failures in updating open-source components, with the average component being more than five years old and some instances of the Heartbleed-vulnerable OpenSSL library dating back to 1999.8ZDNet. Huawei Security: Half Its Kit Has at Least One Potential Backdoor The study’s authors said they could not determine whether the flaws were introduced intentionally or accidentally.
Huawei challenged the methodology, arguing that Finite State’s static scanning tools had error rates of up to 90%, that many identified vulnerabilities existed in code that was never compiled into production firmware, and that the firm had not coordinated with Huawei before publication. Huawei said certain configurations that had previously presented privilege escalation risks were fixed in a 2018 software release, and that debugging keys flagged in the report were scheduled for removal.9Huawei. Security Notice Regarding Finite State Report
The most sustained technical scrutiny of Huawei has come from the UK’s Huawei Cyber Security Evaluation Centre, a facility set up specifically to review Huawei’s code for the British government. Its 2019 report concluded it could provide only “limited assurance that all risks to UK national security” could be mitigated over the long term and said it had “no confidence” that recent improvements were sustainable. The board cited poor coding practices, employees ignoring internal guidelines, and a volume of vulnerabilities “significantly beyond” those discovered the previous year. One vulnerability affecting broadband was deemed of “national significance” and required extraordinary measures to fix, though officials found no evidence it had been exploited.10BBC. Huawei Cyber Security Evaluation Centre Oversight Board Report Ian Levy, technical director of the UK’s National Cyber Security Centre, called Huawei’s security standards “objectively worse” and “shoddy” compared to rivals like Cisco, Nokia, and Ericsson.8ZDNet. Huawei Security: Half Its Kit Has at Least One Potential Backdoor British officials did state they did not believe the defects resulted from Chinese state interference.
Huawei also has a documented history of intellectual property theft findings. In 2017, a US jury found the company guilty of stealing trade secrets from T-Mobile.1Council on Foreign Relations. China’s Huawei Threat to US National Security It has also faced legal actions from Motorola, Nortel, and Cisco, with some cases resulting in settlements where Huawei paid restitution.2U.S. Department of State. Huawei 5G Myth vs. Fact
What the US Government Has Done
Procurement Ban and Export Controls
A 2012 report from the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence warned that Huawei’s equipment could “undermine core US national security interests,” and legislative and administrative measures followed.1Council on Foreign Relations. China’s Huawei Threat to US National Security Section 889 of the 2019 National Defense Authorization Act banned the federal government from procuring Huawei equipment, effective August 2019, and from contracting with any entity that uses Huawei equipment as a substantial component, effective August 2020.11Acquisition.gov. Section 889 Policies The ban also covers ZTE, Hytera, Hangzhou Technology, and Dahua Technology.12Department of Defense. Section 889 of the FY 2019 NDAA
In May 2019, the Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security placed Huawei and its subsidiaries on the Entity List, citing activities “contrary to the national security or foreign policy interests of the United States.”13ITIF. Backfire: Export Controls Helped Huawei and Hurt US Firms The listing imposed a licensing requirement with a presumption of denial on all exports of items subject to US export regulations to Huawei. In August 2020, the government expanded the restriction through the Foreign Direct Product Rule, extending US jurisdiction to foreign-manufactured items that incorporate US technology or software and effectively cutting Huawei off from advanced chip manufacturing at Taiwan’s TSMC.14Federal Register. Addition of Huawei Non-US Affiliates to the Entity List
Controls have kept tightening. In May 2024, the Biden administration revoked export licenses that had allowed Intel and Qualcomm to supply Huawei with less advanced chips, after Huawei unveiled a phone featuring a processor manufactured using Dutch and American technology.15MUFG Americas. Tightening the Noose on Export and Licensing Restrictions In May 2025, the Bureau of Industry and Security issued guidance specifically targeting Huawei’s Ascend 910B, 910C, and 910D AI chips, establishing a presumption that any activity involving those chips constitutes an ongoing violation of export regulations absent prior authorization.16Georgetown CSET. Pushing the Limits: Huawei’s AI Chip Tests US Export Controls
Ripping Huawei Out of US Networks
In 2019, the FCC designated Huawei a national security threat and moved to ban small telecom providers from using its equipment.5CNN. FBI Investigation Huawei China Defense Department Communications Nuclear Congress initially approved $1.9 billion in 2020 for a “rip and replace” program to reimburse small and rural carriers for the cost of removing Huawei and ZTE gear.17U.S. Senator Cynthia Lummis. Rip and Replace That figure fell far short. Total costs were estimated at nearly $5 billion, and the FCC was reimbursing carriers at roughly 40 cents on the dollar.18MeriTalk. FCC Chair: Rip-and-Replace Program Faces $3B Shortfall
In December 2024, Congress authorized an additional $3.08 billion as part of the Fiscal Year 2025 National Defense Authorization Act, bringing the program’s total to $4.98 billion. The FCC borrowed the full amount in March 2025 and made funding available to recipients in April, bringing allocations to 100% of approved cost estimates. As of mid-2025, the FCC had disbursed roughly $1.15 billion in reimbursement claims, and about 29% of the 126 participating carriers had completed full removal and replacement.19FCC. Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Reimbursement Program Status Report By June 2026, the FCC reported that nearly half of all projects had been completed, though the agency was still granting deadline extensions to providers struggling to finish on time.20Broadband Breakfast. FCC Grants Four More Rip and Replace Extensions
The Criminal Case
In 2019, the Department of Justice unsealed indictments against Huawei and its then-CFO Meng Wanzhou for bank fraud, wire fraud, and conspiracy related to allegations the company deceived HSBC and other financial institutions about its business dealings with Iran and North Korea in violation of US sanctions.21Reuters. Huawei CFO’s Admissions Can Be Used Against Company Criminal Trial, US Judge Rules The scheme allegedly involved Meng presenting a PowerPoint to a global bank in August 2013 that falsely characterized a Huawei-controlled entity called Skycom as a mere business partner rather than a subsidiary, allowing Huawei to process roughly $100 million in US-dollar transactions.22U.S. Department of Justice. Huawei CFO Wanzhou Meng Admits Misleading Global Financial Institution A superseding indictment added charges of racketeering conspiracy and conspiracy to steal trade secrets.1Council on Foreign Relations. China’s Huawei Threat to US National Security
Meng entered into a deferred prosecution agreement in September 2021, admitting to the accuracy of a statement of facts detailing her misrepresentations. The charges against her personally were later dismissed.22U.S. Department of Justice. Huawei CFO Wanzhou Meng Admits Misleading Global Financial Institution The corporate criminal case against Huawei remains active. In June 2026, a federal judge ruled that Meng’s admissions from the deferred prosecution agreement can be used as evidence against Huawei at trial, and jury selection is scheduled for September 8, 2026.21Reuters. Huawei CFO’s Admissions Can Be Used Against Company Criminal Trial, US Judge Rules
What US Allies Have Done
The United Kingdom banned mobile providers from purchasing new Huawei 5G equipment after December 31, 2020, and set a deadline of the end of 2027 for all existing Huawei 5G equipment to be removed from UK networks, at an estimated cost of up to £2 billion.23BBC. Huawei 5G Kit Must Be Removed From UK by 2027 Enforcement is being carried out under the Telecoms Security Act through “designated-vendor directions” issued to all 35 UK telecom network operators, with Huawei categorized as a “high-risk vendor.” Some interim deadlines were extended in 2022 after operators warned that pandemic-related supply chain disruptions risked causing network outages.24BBC. Huawei: UK 5G Deadlines Extended
Canada announced its ban on Huawei and ZTE from 5G networks in May 2022, requiring removal of all existing 5G equipment by June 28, 2024, and 4G equipment by December 31, 2027.25Government of Canada. Policy Statement: Securing Canada’s Telecommunications System
In Germany, the government reached an agreement with Deutsche Telekom, Vodafone, and Telefónica in July 2024 requiring all Huawei and ZTE components to be removed from 5G core networks by the end of 2026 and from critical management systems in access and transport networks by the end of 2029.26VOA News. Germany to Remove Chinese Components From 5G Networks Deutsche Telekom reported it had already phased out Huawei from its 5G core network as of late 2024.27Deutsche Telekom. Interim Report Q3 2024 – Risks and Opportunities
Across the EU more broadly, 11 member states had used legal powers to impose restrictions on Huawei and ZTE in 5G infrastructure as of August 2024, and 21 had adopted regulatory rules to restrict high-risk providers.28Euronews. Eleven EU Countries Took 5G Security Measures to Ban Huawei ZTE The European Commission said Huawei and ZTE “represent in fact materially higher risks than other 5G suppliers” and took steps to restrict them from its own internal communication systems.29European Commission. Communication on Implementation of the 5G Cybersecurity Toolbox Sweden was among the first to order a full ban, requiring removal of previously installed equipment by January 2025, and Japan has excluded Huawei from public tenders.
Where the Fight Stands Now
The sanctions have not stopped Huawei from advancing. In August 2023, the company released the Mate 60 Pro smartphone, powered by the Kirin 9000s processor fabricated in China by Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation using 7nm technology, without access to the extreme ultraviolet lithography machines that Western restrictions were designed to deny.30Bloomberg. Inside the Huawei Mate 60 Pro Phone Powered by Made-in-China Chip31TechInsights. TechInsights Finds SMIC 7nm in Huawei Mate 60 Pro Huawei’s Ascend 910B AI chip delivers 400 FP16 TFLOPS of compute performance and has been deployed through Huawei’s cloud services to Chinese clients including Baidu, Tencent, and iFLYTEK. A key bottleneck remains SMIC’s limited 7nm fabrication capacity, which Huawei must split between AI chips and smartphone processors.16Georgetown CSET. Pushing the Limits: Huawei’s AI Chip Tests US Export Controls
At a February 2025 meeting with Xi Jinping, Ren said that concerns about China’s lack of domestic advanced semiconductor production had “eased” due to recent breakthroughs, and described leading a network of over 2,000 Chinese companies working toward more than 70% self-sufficiency across the semiconductor value chain by 2028.32CSIS. DeepSeek, Huawei, Export Controls, and the Future of the US-China AI Race
With a corporate criminal trial set for fall 2026, the rip-and-replace program still years from completion in the United States and across Europe, and Huawei pressing ahead with its own semiconductor ecosystem, the security dispute is likely to keep expanding rather than resolving.