To verify wire instructions, call the recipient at a phone number you sourced on your own, completely separate from the email or message that delivered the instructions, and ask them to read the bank name, routing number, account number, and account holder name back to you. That one call is the single most effective defense against wire fraud, and it takes about five minutes. Skipping it can mean losing the entire transfer, because banks have limited ability to recover funds once a wire leaves your account. Business email compromise alone cost victims over $2.77 billion in 2024 according to the FBI.1Federal Bureau of Investigation. FBI Releases Annual Internet Crime Report
Get a Phone Number the Fraudster Couldn’t Have Touched
The verification process hinges on one principle: never use any phone number, email address, or contact detail that appears in the message containing the wire instructions. If that message has been tampered with, every piece of information in it is suspect, including the “call to confirm” number helpfully provided at the bottom.
Pull contact details from something you had before the transaction got underway. Good sources include a business card handed to you at your first meeting, a phone number from the firm’s official website typed directly into your browser rather than clicked from a link, or a number on a signed engagement letter or retainer agreement. For a real estate closing, the number on your signed listing or buyer representation agreement is reliable. For a business payment, use the main switchboard listed on the vendor’s website and ask to be transferred.
Before you dial, put the wire instructions in front of you. You will need to compare the bank name, the nine-digit ABA routing number, the account number, and the exact legal name on the receiving account. Write each element down so you can check it digit by digit on the call rather than relying on memory.
How the Verification Call Should Go
Ask to speak with the specific person handling your file: the escrow officer, the closing attorney, or the accounts receivable contact. This matters because a fraudster who compromised the firm’s email system has not necessarily compromised its phone system, and the person on the other end should recognize the transaction.
Then ask them to read the wire instructions to you. Do not read your version first. If you read the numbers, someone who intercepted only part of the transaction could simply agree with whatever you say. When they read theirs, you are testing whether what you received actually matches what they sent. Compare every digit of the routing number, every digit of the account number, and the exact legal name on the account.
If anything does not match, stop. Do not send the wire, even if the discrepancy looks like a typo. A single wrong digit in a routing or account number does not mean a slip of the finger; it means either the instructions were intercepted or there has been a genuine error, and either way the money ends up somewhere other than where it belongs. Resolve the discrepancy through your verified channel before doing anything else.
What You Are Actually Checking
For a domestic wire, the four pieces that have to match exactly are the receiving bank’s name, the nine-digit ABA routing number, the account number, and the legal name on the account. Fraudulent instructions sometimes keep the bank name genuine while swapping only the account number, which is why checking the name alone is not enough.
International transfers add complexity because they use different identification systems. Instead of an ABA routing number, you need a SWIFT or BIC code, which is 8 or 11 alphanumeric characters identifying the recipient’s bank internationally. Many countries also use an IBAN (International Bank Account Number), which can run up to 34 characters depending on the country. The length and unfamiliarity of these numbers make manual verification even more important; a transposed character is easy to miss in a 34-character string.
For an international wire, your verification call should also confirm any intermediary or correspondent bank details and the currency of the transfer. Intermediary banks are common in international wires and add another point where instructions could be wrong or manipulated. Some banks now offer payment pre-validation services that check whether the beneficiary account details are valid before the transfer is sent, which adds automated verification on top of your phone call.
Signs the Instructions You Received Are Fraudulent
Most wire fraud starts with a compromised email account. A scammer gains access to a real estate agent’s, attorney’s, or vendor’s inbox, watches the conversation until the moment money is about to move, and then sends instructions from an address that looks almost identical to the real one. The differences are easy to miss: a lowercase “l” swapped for the number “1,” an extra letter in the domain, or a “.co” ending where the real address uses “.com.” Hovering over the sender’s address rather than trusting the display name catches most of these.
A subtler trick involves the “Reply-To” header. The email appears to come from a legitimate address, but a hidden reply-to field routes your response to an account the fraudster controls. Most email clients do not display this field by default. If your email program lets you view full message headers, check that the reply-to address matches the sender.
Beyond the technical signs, fraudulent instructions tend to share behavioral patterns. The sender insists the transfer must happen immediately or the deal will collapse; legitimate parties rarely manufacture deadlines around wiring money. A “corrected” or “updated” set of instructions arrives after a previous version, which is the single most common setup for real estate wire fraud. The request comes late on a Friday or just before a holiday, when the bank’s fraud department is harder to reach. Or the sender discourages you from calling to confirm, often saying the recipient is in a meeting or only available by email. Any one of these should push you harder toward verifying through an independent channel, not away from it.
Protections at the Moment of Transfer
Even after you have verified the instructions, a few mechanical steps add protection.
Consider a test wire. Some banks allow you to send a small amount, typically $25 to $100, before transferring the full balance. After sending it, call the recipient through your verified number to confirm the test amount arrived in the correct account. Only then send the remainder. The cost is one extra wire fee, typically $25 to $40 at major retail banks for a domestic transfer, but it confirms the entire payment channel is clean. For a six-figure closing or business acquisition, that fee is small insurance.
Turn on multi-factor authentication for outgoing wires. Most banks require a secondary form of verification, which may be a one-time code sent to your phone, a physical security token, or a callback from the bank to a pre-registered number. These features exist specifically because wire transfers are irreversible. A physical token is more secure than a texted code, since text messages can be intercepted through SIM-swapping attacks. If your bank offers a callback service where a designated person must approve outgoing wires with a passcode, enable it.
Save everything. After the wire is sent, keep all confirmation numbers, receipts, and screenshots of the verified instructions. If something goes wrong later, that documentation becomes your evidence for a fraud claim, an insurance filing, or a law enforcement report.
Real Estate Closings Need Extra Caution
Real estate transactions are the prime hunting ground for wire fraud because they combine large dollar amounts, tight deadlines, and multiple parties exchanging instructions by email. The FBI reported over 2,200 victims of real estate-related business email compromise in a single year, with losses exceeding $446 million. The typical homebuyer who falls victim loses around $70,000, often their entire down payment.
The scam almost always follows the same pattern. A fraudster monitors email between the buyer, the real estate agent, and the title company, then sends “updated” wire instructions at the last minute, often on the day of closing. The instructions look legitimate because the fraudster has been reading the real correspondence and can mimic the format, tone, and timing.
A few industry-level protections exist, though not every title company and agent uses them. Services like CertifID and ClosingLock let title companies send wire instructions through encrypted, verified channels rather than email, validating identities and bank account details before any money moves. If your title company offers one of these platforms, use it. Many brokerages and title companies also include signed wire fraud warnings in the closing package; treat them as substantive advice rather than boilerplate. And remember the standing-instruction rule: legitimate title companies and attorneys almost never change wire instructions mid-transaction. If you receive updated or corrected details by email, treat it as a near-certain fraud attempt until a phone call to your verified number proves otherwise.
If You Already Sent the Money
Speed decides everything. The FBI’s Recovery Asset Team froze $538 million of $758 million in reported wire fraud losses in 2023, a 71% success rate, but that success depends entirely on how quickly victims report.2FBI. 2023 IC3 Annual Report The window for recovering a fraudulent domestic wire is roughly 24 to 72 hours. After that, the money has typically been moved through multiple accounts or converted to cryptocurrency.
Call your bank first. Tell them you need to initiate a wire recall and use the word “fraud,” which triggers different internal procedures than a standard recall request. Your bank will contact the receiving bank and request a freeze on the funds. The receiving bank will likely require an indemnification agreement before returning money; signing it is standard industry practice and often the only path to recovery.
Then file a complaint with the FBI’s Internet Crime Complaint Center at ic3.gov. Include the transaction date and amount, the receiving account information, and full email headers from the fraudulent message if you have them. For wires over a certain threshold, IC3 can activate the Financial Fraud Kill Chain, which coordinates directly with banks to freeze funds.3Internet Crime Complaint Center. Frequently Asked Questions File a police report as well; you will need the case number for insurance claims and any civil action. Finally, notify every other party to the transaction, because the compromised email account that targeted you may be targeting them too.
One boundary worth knowing before you assume you will be made whole: standard homeowner’s, renter’s, and commercial property policies do not cover money lost to wire fraud. Some cyber liability and crime policies include a social engineering fraud endorsement that does, but coverage is typically sublimited and often conditioned on the policyholder having followed specific verification procedures. The five minutes spent on a verification call is worth considerably more than the recovery odds after the fact.