The Hamas charter exists in two versions that do not say the same thing. The 1988 Covenant of the Islamic Resistance Movement frames the conflict with Israel in explicitly religious terms, targets Jews as a group, and rules out negotiation. The 2017 Document of General Principles and Policies keeps the rejection of Israel’s legitimacy and the commitment to armed resistance, but drops the religious antisemitism, distinguishes Jews from Zionists, and accepts, conditionally, a Palestinian state on the pre-1967 borders. Hamas never revoked the 1988 Covenant when it issued the 2017 text, so both documents remain part of the movement’s public record.
What the 1988 Covenant Says
The original charter was issued on August 18, 1988, under the title “The Covenant of the Islamic Resistance Movement.” Article 2 identifies Hamas as “one of the wings of Moslem Brotherhood in Palestine,”1The Avalon Project. Hamas Covenant 1988 which places the whole document inside the Brotherhood’s ideological frame. The opening line sets the register: “Israel will exist and will continue to exist until Islam will obliterate it, just as it obliterated others before it.”2Federation of American Scientists (FAS). The Covenant of the Hamas – Main Points
Palestinian Land as an Islamic Waqf
The Covenant’s central legal claim is that all of Palestine is an Islamic Waqf, a religious endowment held in trust for future generations of Muslims until the Day of Judgment. Article 11 declares that “no one can renounce it or any part, or abandon it or any part of it.”2Federation of American Scientists (FAS). The Covenant of the Hamas – Main Points Under this framing, giving up territory is not merely a political concession. It is religiously impermissible.
Article 13 follows the Waqf doctrine to its conclusion. Peace initiatives and international conferences are dismissed as “no more than a means to appoint the infidels as arbitrators in the lands of Islam,” and the article states flatly: “There is no solution for the Palestinian problem except by Jihad. Initiatives, proposals and international conferences are but a waste of time, an exercise in futility.” Article 15 then converts the struggle into a personal religious duty binding on every Muslim once enemies seize Muslim land, declaring that “it is compulsory that the banner of Jihad be raised.”2Federation of American Scientists (FAS). The Covenant of the Hamas – Main Points
Article 7 and the Targeting of Jews
Article 7 quotes an attributed hadith stating that “the Day of Judgement will not come about until Moslems fight the Jews (killing the Jews), when the Jew will hide behind stones and trees. The stones and trees will say O Moslems, O Abdulla, there is a Jew behind me, come and kill him.”2Federation of American Scientists (FAS). The Covenant of the Hamas – Main Points The target here is Jews as a religious group, not Israel as a state. Analysts across the political spectrum cite this passage as the clearest evidence that the 1988 Covenant is antisemitic in character rather than narrowly anti-Zionist.
What the 2017 Document Says
In May 2017, Hamas released a “Document of General Principles and Policies,” using the Arabic wathiqa (document) rather than mithaq (charter). Hamas officials stated at the time that the new text did not replace the 1988 Covenant. It was widely read as an attempt to present a more politically sophisticated face to the outside world, using the vocabulary of international law and national liberation.
Jews vs. Zionists
Article 16 draws the distinction the 1988 Covenant refused to draw: “Hamas affirms that its conflict is with the Zionist project not with the Jews because of their religion. Hamas does not wage a struggle against the Jews because they are Jewish but wages a struggle against the Zionists who occupy Palestine.”3Middle East Eye. Hamas in 2017: The Document in Full This language is a direct departure from the Article 7 hadith and from the wider religious framing of the Covenant.
A State on the 1967 Borders
Article 20 describes “the establishment of a Palestinian state, sovereign and complete, on the basis of the June 4, 1967 [lines], with Jerusalem as its capital and the provision for all the refugees to return to their homeland” as a formula on which the movement’s members have reached consensus.4Al Jazeera. Hamas Accepts Palestinian State With 1967 Borders This was the first time Hamas had acknowledged, even conditionally, a territorial framework short of all of historic Palestine.
The acceptance is heavily qualified. The same document insists that Israel’s establishment was illegitimate and that no part of Palestinian land shall be conceded. The 1967 borders language functions as a minimum demand and consensus position, not a final settlement, and the long-term claim to all the territory is preserved.
Armed Resistance Reframed
Article 25 affirms that “resisting the occupation with all means and methods is a legitimate right guaranteed by divine laws and by international norms and laws. At the heart of these lies armed resistance, which is regarded as the strategic choice for protecting the principles and the rights of the Palestinian people.”5Palestinian Media Watch. Hamas Document of Principles and General Policies (2017) Armed struggle is still the “strategic choice,” but the justification now runs on two tracks: religious duty and international law. The 1988 Covenant relied almost entirely on the first.
What Changed, and What Didn’t
The rhetorical shift between the two documents is substantial. The Covenant is written for an Islamist audience in the vocabulary of Quranic references, hadith literature, and Muslim Brotherhood ideology. The 2017 document reads like a political platform written for an international readership, invoking national liberation, occupation, and international norms.
On substance, less moved than the tone suggests. Both texts reject Israel’s legitimacy. Both endorse armed resistance. Both treat the whole of historic Palestine as belonging to the Palestinian people. The genuine change is Article 16’s separation of Jews from Zionists, which cannot be reconciled with Article 7 of the 1988 Covenant, and the Article 20 gesture toward a state on the 1967 lines, which cannot be reconciled with the Waqf doctrine of Article 11. The 2017 text creates rhetorical room for a phased approach: accept a 1967-lines state as a consensus position while keeping the broader claim intact.
Whether that represents a real evolution or a tactical repositioning is where analysts divide. The fact that the 1988 Covenant was never revoked weighs heavily on the skeptical side of that debate.
Why Both Documents Still Matter
Governments, intelligence services, and scholars have to decide which text better represents Hamas’s actual commitments, and that decision has shifted over time. At release, the 2017 document was widely read as a possible opening for diplomatic engagement. That reading largely collapsed after the October 7, 2023 attack on Israel, which produced mass civilian casualties in communities inside Israel’s pre-1967 borders and was carried out under leaders who held both documents as part of their ideological foundation. For many analysts, the attack vindicated the view that the 1988 Covenant remains the operative document and that the 2017 text was a presentational exercise.
The 2017 document still has weight, though. It is the language Hamas chose to present to the world, and any future negotiation framework would likely reference it. The Middle East Quartet, made up of the United States, the European Union, Russia, and the United Nations, set three conditions for diplomatic recognition of Hamas: a commitment to nonviolence, recognition of Israel, and acceptance of previous Israeli-Palestinian agreements.6U.S. Department of State. Joint Statement of the Quartet Neither document meets any of the three. The 2017 text distinguishes Jews from Zionists and mentions the 1967 lines, but it neither recognizes Israel nor renounces armed struggle.
An organization that maintains a document calling for the obliteration of a state while simultaneously publishing a document that gestures toward coexistence on modified borders has not resolved its own internal contradictions. Whether those contradictions reflect genuine internal debate or deliberate ambiguity aimed at different audiences is the question that continues to shape analysis of the charter documents.
A Note on U.S. Law
Hamas has been designated by the United States as a Foreign Terrorist Organization since October 8, 1997, and the designation remains in effect.7U.S. Department of State. Foreign Terrorist Organizations Reading, translating, or discussing the charter documents is not restricted. Providing material support or resources to Hamas is, and federal law defines “material support” broadly to include money, training, personnel, and expert advice, with penalties of up to 20 years in prison, or life imprisonment where a death results.8Office of the Law Revision Counsel. 18 USC 2339B – Providing Material Support or Resources to Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations