A funding valuation adjustment, or FVA, is the price a bank adds to or subtracts from a derivative to reflect the cost of funding the cash it must post as collateral on its hedge when the client on the other side has not posted collateral of its own. Banks borrow that cash at a rate above the overnight risk-free benchmark, and the FVA captures the spread between the two over the life of the trade. It emerged after the 2008 crisis, when the gap between risk-free rates and actual bank funding rates widened sharply, and it now sits inside the family of valuation adjustments known as XVAs that dealers apply to almost every uncollateralized derivative.
The Two Sides: Funding Cost and Funding Benefit
FVA has two components that pull in opposite directions, and the net of the two is what actually hits the price.
The funding cost adjustment, often called FCA, is the expense side. A bank enters an uncollateralized swap with a corporate client and hedges the position in the interbank market. That interbank hedge requires cash collateral. The client posted none, so the bank borrows the cash at its own unsecured funding rate. The excess over the risk-free rate, accumulated across the life of the trade, is the funding cost.
The funding benefit adjustment, FBA, runs the other way. When the hedge moves in the bank’s favor, the interbank counterparty sends cash collateral to the bank. The bank can use that cash to pay down debt or fund other positions, reducing what it would otherwise borrow. That saving is a real economic benefit. Most institutions net the two, and the combined figure determines whether a given book carries a net funding cost or a net funding benefit.
What Drives the Size of the Adjustment
Three inputs do most of the work.
Expected future exposure. Banks simulate the derivative’s potential value at many points before maturity, accounting for market volatility, and produce an exposure profile showing how much cash they expect to have tied up at each date. Higher expected exposure means more external funding needed for the hedge, and a larger adjustment.
The funding spread. This is the gap between the overnight risk-free rate and the bank’s actual borrowing cost. Banks build a funding curve from their own unsecured bond spreads or credit default swaps. A wider credit spread means a higher borrowing cost and a bigger FVA. The difference between a benchmark like SOFR and the bank’s own unsecured funding rate captures the spread in real time.
Time to maturity. A ten-year swap accumulates far more funding cost than a six-month one because the bank finances the position for longer and across more uncertain rates. The funding curve, built across tenors from the bank’s outstanding unsecured debt, carries that time dimension into the calculation.
Why FVA Is a Portfolio Number, Not a Trade Number
A single trade’s funding impact depends on the book it joins. A new position that offsets exposure already on the books can reduce the overall funding requirement rather than add to it. For that reason, banks calculate FVA at the netting-set level, grouping trades covered by the same master agreement, and segment portfolios by currency, legal entity, and jurisdiction to reflect where liquidity is actually managed and which funding curves apply.
Allocating the number back to an individual trade means computing that trade’s marginal contribution to the overall funding position. A trade that diversifies the exposure profile carries a smaller allocated cost than one that concentrates it. Two counterparties can be quoted very different FVAs on identical trades because the trades land in different books.
How Collateral Terms Change the Number
FVA is, at root, a problem created by incomplete collateralization. When both sides exchange daily cash collateral covering the full mark-to-market value, the bank receives enough cash from the client to fund its hedge and the adjustment shrinks toward zero. The number grows wherever coverage is incomplete.
Thresholds and Minimum Transfer Amounts
Collateral agreements with corporate clients commonly include a threshold below which no collateral is posted and a minimum transfer amount that avoids small operational payments. The bank’s interbank hedge triggers immediate collateral calls, but the client’s threshold means the bank receives no offsetting collateral until the trade moves past it. The bank is effectively lending the client the amount sitting inside that gap, and financing that implicit loan is exactly what FVA captures.
Cash vs. Other Collateral, and Call Frequency
Cash is the simplest collateral because it can be deployed immediately. Non-cash collateral such as government bonds adds conversion costs before it can fund anything. Less frequent margin calls leave longer windows of unfunded exposure between exchanges. Contracts with large thresholds, infrequent calls, and non-cash provisions produce the largest adjustments.
Rehypothecation
Whether a bank can reuse collateral it receives matters a great deal. Under an ISDA Credit Support Annex, collateral posted usually remains the property of the posting party but may be rehypothecated by the receiver depending on terms. With rehypothecation rights, the bank can deploy received cash to fund other positions and generate a funding benefit. Without them, the collateral sits segregated and provides no funding relief, pushing the net cost higher.
Where FVA Sits Among the Other XVAs
FVA does not stand alone, and the boundaries with its neighbors matter because overlaps create a real risk of double-counting.
Credit valuation adjustment, CVA, is the discount for the risk that the counterparty defaults. It depends on the counterparty’s credit quality. Debit valuation adjustment, DVA, is the mirror image: the benefit the bank gets from the possibility that it defaults on its own obligations. One bank’s DVA is effectively its counterparty’s CVA.
The contentious overlap is between FBA and DVA. Both reflect a benefit tied to the bank’s own credit. FBA captures cheaper financing when the bank can use received collateral; DVA captures the reduced present value of the bank’s liabilities because it might not survive to pay them. Researchers have argued that including both counts the same economic benefit twice.
FCA is more clearly distinct from CVA, since FCA depends on the bank’s own credit while CVA depends on the counterparty’s. But because the bank’s funding spread is partly driven by its own credit risk, the boundary is still delicate, and managing it is one of the harder problems on an XVA desk.
Two further adjustments round out the funding picture. The margin valuation adjustment, MVA, captures the cost of posting initial margin that cannot be reused, which has grown as uncleared margin rules reach more counterparties. The collateral valuation adjustment, COLVA, measures the gap between the rate earned on posted collateral (typically the overnight risk-free rate) and the bank’s actual funding cost. For fully collateralized positions, COLVA captures the residual funding friction that remains even when there is no outright funding gap.
Why FVA Is Still Debated
Whether FVA should exist at all remains unsettled, and the debate shapes pricing, capital, and reported earnings.
The academic case against FVA comes most prominently from John Hull and Alan White. They argue derivatives should be discounted at the risk-free rate regardless of what the bank pays to borrow. Under risk-neutral valuation, the discount rate reflects the risk of the derivative’s cash flows, not the creditworthiness of the institution holding it. Mixing a bank’s funding costs into derivative pricing, in their view, violates the corporate finance principle that a project’s value depends on the project’s own risk, not on how the firm finances it. They further argue that FVA and one component of DVA are mathematically equal and opposite: the extra interest the bank pays to borrow funds for the position equals the expected benefit from possibly defaulting on that borrowed money. Include both and they cancel; include only FVA and the bank overstates its costs.
Dealers counter that real markets are not the frictionless setting the models assume. Banks cannot borrow and lend freely at the same rate, and no one actually funds at the risk-free rate. From a trading-desk view, the funding cost is as real as any other operating expense. A trader borrowing at 80 basis points above the overnight rate to finance a hedge who ignores that cost books a trade that looks profitable on paper while destroying shareholder value in practice. Competitive pressure settled the practical question: once large dealers began pricing FVA into trades, those that did not risked attracting unprofitable flow from counterparties arbitraging the difference.
What FVA Means for a Corporate Client
For a corporate treasury, the practical effect is simple: uncollateralized derivatives cost more than they used to. Banks embed the funding cost into the bid-ask spread, and the size of that embedded cost scales with the bank’s own credit spread and with how collateralized the trade is.
That creates visible pricing dispersion. A bank with a strong rating and tight funding spreads can quote tighter prices because its FVA is smaller. A lower-rated bank passing through its full funding cost may be uncompetitive on certain products. Treasurers shopping an interest rate or currency hedge will sometimes see materially different quotes on nominally identical trades, and FVA is often the largest driver of the gap.
There are levers on the client side. Agreeing to post collateral, even partially, narrows the unfunded gap and shrinks the FVA the bank needs to charge. Tighter thresholds and more frequent margin calls do the same. Consolidating derivative activity with fewer banks can help as well, because a larger book creates more netting opportunities and spreads any residual funding cost across more trades.
Accounting and Capital Context
Two accounting frameworks pull FVA into financial statements. IFRS 13 defines fair value as the price that would be received to sell an asset or paid to transfer a liability in an orderly transaction at the measurement date, an exit price.1IFRS Foundation. IFRS 13 Fair Value Measurement ASC 820 in the United States uses nearly identical language.2SEC. ASC 820-10 Fair Value Definition The exit-price concept is what pulls FVA in: a hypothetical buyer taking over the position would factor in its own funding costs before agreeing to a price, so a value that ignores those costs is not a transferable price. Neither standard explicitly mandates or prohibits FVA; it enters through the requirement that fair value reflect what a market participant would consider.
On the capital side, the Basel III framework from the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision connects derivative valuations to the capital banks must hold.3Bank for International Settlements. Basel III: A Global Regulatory Framework for More Resilient Banks and Banking Systems Basel III’s explicit XVA capital charges target CVA risk rather than funding risk directly, with a standardised approach and a basic approach available for the CVA calculation.4Bank for International Settlements. MAR50 – Credit Valuation Adjustment Framework The leverage ratio adds a non-risk-based capital charge against derivative exposures that XVA desks internalize alongside funding cost, and cash variation margin can reduce the exposure under certain conditions, giving banks another reason to prefer full collateralization.5Bank for International Settlements. Basel III Leverage Ratio Framework and Disclosure Requirements Uncleared margin rules then layer on initial margin requirements that cannot generally be rehypothecated, creating the trapped-collateral funding cost that MVA is designed to measure.