The fentanyl tariffs were a set of import duties President Donald Trump imposed in February 2025 on goods from China, Canada, and Mexico, using the International Emergency Economic Powers Act to declare fentanyl trafficking a national emergency. They were the first tariffs ever levied under IEEPA, they drew retaliation and lawsuits almost immediately, and on February 20, 2026, the Supreme Court struck them down 6–3 in Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump, holding that IEEPA does not give the president the power to tax imports.
What the Tariffs Were
Trump signed three executive orders on February 1, 2025, each declaring a national emergency tied to drug trafficking. Executive Order 14195 added a 10 percent duty on all imports from China, effective February 4. Executive Orders 14193 and 14194 imposed a 25 percent duty on imports from Canada and Mexico, with a reduced 10 percent rate on Canadian energy resources.1White House. Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump Imposes Tariffs on Imports From Canada, Mexico, and China
The rates moved during 2025. After a one-month window, Trump found Canada’s and Mexico’s enforcement inadequate and the full 25 percent duties took effect March 4, 2025. That same day, Executive Order 14228 doubled the China rate from 10 to 20 percent.2White House. Modifying Duties Addressing the Synthetic Opioid Supply Chain in the People’s Republic of China Starting March 7, goods from Canada and Mexico that qualified for preferential treatment under the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement were exempted; non-USMCA-compliant goods paid the full surcharge on top of any existing duties.3U.S. Customs and Border Protection. Official CBP Statement on Tariffs
A separate set of “reciprocal” IEEPA tariffs rolled out April 2, 2025. Canada and Mexico were exempted from those so long as the fentanyl duties stayed in place. Chinese goods carried both, producing a cumulative IEEPA burden of 30 percent on top of normal duties and Section 301 tariffs.4U.S. Customs and Border Protection. IEEPA Tariff Guidance
The Emergency Rationale
The administration invoked IEEPA, a 1977 statute that lets the president “regulate” imports and exports during a declared national emergency. The stated justification: China had failed to stop exports of fentanyl precursor chemicals to cartels, Mexico provided safe havens for drug manufacturing, and Canadian cartels were increasingly running synthesis labs. Roughly 200 daily American deaths from synthetic opioids were characterized as an “unusual and extraordinary threat” to national security.5The American Presidency Project. Executive Order 14195: Imposing Duties to Address the Synthetic Opioid Supply Chain6Federal Register. Imposing Duties to Address the Synthetic Opioid Supply Chain in the People’s Republic of China
How the Three Countries Responded
Canada moved on two tracks. Ottawa announced a C$1.3 billion border plan in December 2024, designated seven transnational criminal organizations as terrorist entities, and appointed a “Fentanyl Czar.” On March 4, 2025, it hit back with 25 percent retaliatory tariffs on roughly C$30 billion of U.S. imports and opened consultations on a further C$125 billion. Prime Minister Justin Trudeau called the U.S. pretext “totally false.” His successor Mark Carney, who took office March 14, said the “old” U.S.-Canada relationship “is over” and that retaliation would stay in place until Washington offered “credible, reliable commitments to free and fair trade.” Canada also challenged the tariffs at the World Trade Organization and under the USMCA.7Congress.gov. Canada’s Response to U.S. Fentanyl Tariffs
Mexico was more conciliatory. President Claudia Sheinbaum sent 10,000 soldiers to the northern border and negotiated with a U.S. team led by Secretary of State Marco Rubio, Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent, and Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick. She secured a U.S. commitment to work on southbound firearms trafficking but resisted expanding U.S. law enforcement inside Mexico. Trump found the enforcement insufficient and imposed the full 25 percent duty on March 4.8CNBC. Trump Tariffs: Mexico, Canada, China — Sheinbaum Responds
China’s rate reversed later in the year. On November 1, 2025, Beijing agreed to stop shipping certain designated precursor chemicals to North America and to tighten controls on other chemicals worldwide. The administration cut the China fentanyl tariff back to 10 percent effective November 10, 2025, with the Secretary of Homeland Security tasked with monitoring compliance and the president reserving the right to raise it again.9White House. Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump Strikes Deal on Economic and Trade Relations With China
The Supreme Court Ruling
A coalition of 12 states led by Oregon sued in April 2025 in the U.S. Court of International Trade, arguing that IEEPA does not authorize tariffs and that Article I gives the duty power to Congress. A private suit, V.O.S. Selections, Inc. v. United States, made similar arguments. On May 28, 2025, the CIT granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs, holding that IEEPA does not confer “unbounded authority” to impose unlimited tariffs.10U.S. Court of International Trade. Slip Opinion 25-66
The consolidated cases reached the Supreme Court as Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump. On February 20, 2026, the Court ruled 6–3 that IEEPA does not authorize presidential tariffs. Chief Justice John Roberts wrote for the majority, joined in various parts by Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, Barrett, and Jackson. Justices Thomas, Alito, and Kavanaugh dissented, contending that tariffs are a traditional tool for regulating importation and fit within the statute.11SCOTUSblog. Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump
The majority’s reasoning: the power to “lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises” belongs to Congress under Article I, and the president has no inherent peacetime tariff authority, a point the government conceded. IEEPA’s authorization to “regulate… importation” does not encompass the power to tax, and unlike statutes that clearly delegate tariff authority, IEEPA never uses the words “duty” or “tariff.” The Court defined “regulate” as the ability to “fix, establish, or control” by rule and held that tariffs are “different in kind, not degree” from IEEPA’s other tools because they operate directly on domestic importers to raise revenue. The majority also applied the major questions doctrine: in a half-century, no president had used IEEPA this way, and reading it to allow “unbounded” tariffs on any product from any country would be a “transformative expansion” of executive power that Congress had not clearly authorized.12Supreme Court of the United States. Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump, 607 U.S. ___ (2026)
What Replaced Them
The same day the Court ruled, Trump signed an executive order titled “Ending Certain Tariff Actions,” directing agencies to stop collecting IEEPA-based duties. It covered the three fentanyl orders (EO 14193, 14194, and 14195), the reciprocal tariff order, and country-specific IEEPA tariffs on Venezuela, Brazil, Russia, Cuba, and Iran. The underlying national emergency declarations stayed in effect, and tariffs imposed under other authorities, such as Section 301 and Section 232, were unaffected.13White House. Ending Certain Tariff Actions
Also on February 20, Trump used Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974 to impose a temporary 10 percent global import surcharge from February 24 through July 24, 2026, the 150-day maximum the statute permits. USMCA-qualifying goods from Canada and Mexico were exempt, and the surcharge did not stack on existing Section 232 tariffs.14White House. Imposing a Temporary Import Surcharge to Address Fundamental International Payments Problems The administration signaled it would pursue further duties under Sections 301, 232, and potentially Section 338 of the Tariff Act of 1930.15Yale Budget Lab. State of U.S. Tariffs: SCOTUS Ruling Update
Refunds of Tariffs Already Paid
Between $142 billion and $166 billion in IEEPA tariffs were collected during 2025 and early 2026, and the question of who gets that money back is now its own legal fight. The Court of International Trade ordered U.S. Customs and Border Protection to reliquidate entries and issue refunds with 6 percent annual interest. CBP set up a phased refund process through its Automated Customs Environment platform, handling unliquidated entries first.16Foley & Lardner LLP. What Every Multinational Should Know About the Government’s IEEPA Federal Circuit Appeal
The government appealed to the Federal Circuit in June 2026, arguing that the CIT cannot order universal refunds and that “finally liquidated” entries should be refunded only to importers who filed their own lawsuits. Trump said the dispute could remain “in court for the next five years.” Consumer class actions have also been filed against companies including UPS, FedEx, Costco, and EssilorLuxottica by customers seeking a share of any returned tariff payments.17Sullivan & Cromwell LLP. Tariff Refund Claims Spur Litigation
Did the Tariffs Reduce Fentanyl Deaths?
The available evidence does not show that the tariffs themselves drove down overdose deaths. U.S. deaths involving synthetic opioids fell from roughly 72,800 in 2023 to about 47,700 in 2024, a 35.6 percent decline, and provisional CDC data show the drop continued through 2025.18CDC. Drug Overdose Death Rates: United States, 2014–202419CDC. Drug Overdose Death Data
But the decline began before the tariffs existed. Analysis from the Peterson Institute for International Economics notes the trend started in 2023, with the purity of seized fentanyl powder falling in late 2023 and pill purity in 2024. Research in Science attributed those supply-side shifts to intensified Chinese enforcement following a November 2023 meeting between Presidents Biden and Xi, more than a year before the tariffs. PIIE concluded that “variations in tariff rates cannot explain an epidemic that had already begun to recede” and found “no evidence” the tariffs themselves improved Chinese cooperation, warning they could have “a perverse effect by reducing Chinese cooperation.”20PIIE. Fentanyl, China, and Trump’s 2025 Tariffs Brookings scholar Vanda Felbab-Brown argued that large tariffs would “eviscerate” Beijing’s counternarcotics cooperation and that Mexico lacked the capacity to unilaterally stop fentanyl flows, pointing instead to expanded naloxone access, medication-assisted treatment, and diplomatic engagement as the drivers of the decline in deaths.21Brookings Institution. The Fentanyl Crisis: From Naloxone to Tariffs
Congressional testimony in June 2026 described China’s post-deal enforcement as “real but incomplete.” Beijing added chemicals to its controlled export list, reaching 16 substances for North American shipments by May 2026, but public U.S. readouts provide limited detail on prosecutions, seizures, or firm closures, with a November 2024 case involving Hubei Aoks a notable exception.22U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee. Testimony of Zongyuan Zoe Liu