Executive Order 13936, signed July 14, 2020, ended Hong Kong’s special treatment under U.S. law and directed federal agencies to treat the region the same as mainland China for trade, export licensing, immigration, sanctions, and law enforcement cooperation. The national emergency it declared has been renewed every year since, most recently on July 10, 2025, and every operative provision remains in force.1The American Presidency Project. Notice – Continuation of the National Emergency With Respect to Hong Kong
The order suspended provisions of the United States-Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992 that had recognized Hong Kong as distinct from the PRC. That is what made the order so sweeping. It didn’t just add new penalties on top of the existing framework; it pulled out the legal floor that framework rested on, and then rebuilt the U.S.-Hong Kong relationship on the same terms that apply to Beijing.2The White House. The President’s Executive Order on Hong Kong Normalization
Bilateral Agreements Ended
Three bilateral agreements that had treated Hong Kong as an independent partner were dismantled. The Agreement for the Surrender of Fugitive Offenders was suspended. The Agreement for the Transfer of Sentenced Persons was terminated outright. Both ceased to operate, closing the formal channels for extraditing criminal suspects or letting convicted individuals serve sentences in the other jurisdiction.3U.S. Department of State. Suspension or Termination of Three Bilateral Agreements With Hong Kong
The third agreement had provided reciprocal tax exemptions on income from international shipping. Its termination exposed Hong Kong-based shipping companies and residents to the U.S. Gross Transportation Income tax on earnings tied to U.S. ports, a cost the treaty had previously waived.
Export Controls Now Match Mainland China
On December 23, 2020, the Bureau of Industry and Security confirmed that exports, reexports, and transfers to Hong Kong are treated under the Export Administration Regulations the same as transactions destined for mainland China, unless a regulation explicitly says otherwise.4Bureau of Industry and Security. Hong Kong Export Controls
Before the change, sensitive technologies, dual-use goods, and advanced components could often be shipped to Hong Kong under license exceptions that did not apply to the mainland. That distinction is gone. U.S. companies exporting controlled technology to Hong Kong now face the same licensing requirements and review standards as if the shipment were going to Shanghai or Shenzhen. For businesses that had used Hong Kong as a logistics hub precisely because of its lighter regulatory treatment, the operational disruption was fundamental.
Sanctions and Asset Blocking
The order authorized the Treasury Secretary, in consultation with the Secretary of State, to block the property of any person determined to be responsible for or complicit in actions that undermine Hong Kong’s autonomy, implement the PRC’s National Security Law, or engage in serious human rights abuses in the region. The reach extends to anyone who materially assists or provides financial support to a designated person.2The White House. The President’s Executive Order on Hong Kong Normalization
Once designated, an individual or entity is added to the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List maintained by the Office of Foreign Assets Control. All property and interests in property within U.S. jurisdiction are frozen. U.S. persons cannot deal with designated parties in any form: no wire transfers, no professional services, no contracts. Foreign banks track the SDN List closely because clearing a prohibited transaction through the U.S. financial system can trigger enforcement against non-U.S. institutions.
The Hong Kong Autonomy Act, signed the same day as the order, adds a secondary layer. Foreign financial institutions that knowingly conduct significant transactions with sanctioned individuals face mandatory penalties, which can include being cut off from U.S. correspondent banking. Congress also built in a joint resolution of disapproval mechanism to override any presidential waiver, signaling that these sanctions were not meant to be easily reversed.5Congress.gov. H.R. 7440 – Hong Kong Autonomy Act
Immigration and Visas
Hong Kong passport holders lost the immigration advantages they had held over mainland Chinese nationals. The order suspended favorable treatment under the Immigration Act of 1990’s diversity visa provisions, the visa interview waiver program, and the longer nonimmigrant visa validity periods Hong Kong passports had received. Consular officers were directed to amend regulations to eliminate the preference for Hong Kong passports over PRC passports.2The White House. The President’s Executive Order on Hong Kong Normalization
Separately, using Section 212(f) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, the order restricted entry for officials and their immediate family members responsible for implementing the National Security Law or related coercive measures against the people of Hong Kong. This is a targeted visa ban, not a blanket restriction, and it runs alongside the sanctions framework rather than replacing it.
Fulbright Program Terminated
The order terminated the Fulbright exchange program with respect to both China and Hong Kong, covering future participants in either direction.6The American Presidency Project. Executive Order 13936 – The President’s Executive Order on Hong Kong Normalization Fulbright had been one of the most prominent academic and cultural exchange channels between the U.S. and Hong Kong, and its termination extended the normalization policy into educational and soft-power relationships.
What This Means for U.S. Businesses
For companies operating in or through Hong Kong, U.S. sanctions law and Hong Kong’s expanding security legislation can pull in opposite directions. A September 2024 State Department business advisory identifies two Hong Kong legal frameworks as primary sources of operational risk: the National Security Law and the March 2024 Safeguarding National Security Ordinance, sometimes called “Article 23.”7United States Department of State. Hong Kong Business Advisory
Both laws contain broad and vaguely defined provisions, according to the advisory, and the Safeguarding National Security Ordinance has extraterritorial application that can reach businesses and individuals outside Hong Kong. Companies face legal, regulatory, financial, and reputational exposure for perceived violations. U.S. sanctions obligations remain fully in force at the same time, so a company can face penalties in one jurisdiction for conduct required by the other.
The stakes on the U.S. side are high. Under IEEPA, civil penalties can reach the greater of $377,700 per violation or twice the value of the underlying transaction. Willful violations carry criminal penalties of up to $1,000,000 in fines and up to 20 years in prison for individuals.8eCFR. 31 CFR 560.701 – Penalties
Why the Order Is Still in Force and Hard to Unwind
Every provision of EO 13936 remains active: the bilateral agreement actions, the export control alignment, the sanctions and asset-blocking authority, the immigration restrictions, and the Fulbright termination. Treasury and State continue to designate individuals and entities, and OFAC maintains an active Hong Kong-related sanctions program.
The order’s core changes were implemented through regulatory amendments at the Commerce Department, the State Department, and DHS. Revoking the executive order alone would not restore the pre-2020 framework. The export control rules, immigration regulation changes, and OFAC program infrastructure all live independently in the Code of Federal Regulations. Absent a significant shift in U.S.-China relations and affirmative regulatory action across multiple agencies, the normalization of Hong Kong’s status under U.S. law is effectively a permanent feature of the current landscape.