Executive Order 13920 is not currently being enforced, but it has never been formally rescinded. President Biden suspended the order on January 20, 2021, through Executive Order 13990, and the Department of Energy revoked its only implementing action in April 2021.1Department of Energy. Securing the United States Bulk-Power System Executive Order Archive As of mid-2026, no direct replacement has been issued, and grid supply-chain security is now handled through mandatory reliability standards, statutory authority under the Federal Power Act, and Department of Energy strategy.
What the Order Did
President Trump signed EO 13920, “Securing the United States Bulk-Power System,” on May 1, 2020.2Federal Register. Securing the United States Bulk-Power System It declared a national emergency over the risk that foreign adversaries could exploit vulnerabilities in electrical equipment supplied to U.S. utilities, and it drew its authority from the International Emergency Economic Powers Act and the National Emergencies Act.3The White House. Executive Order on Securing the United States Bulk-Power System
The order prohibited acquiring, importing, transferring, or installing bulk-power system equipment designed, developed, manufactured, or supplied by anyone owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction of a foreign adversary. Covered equipment included power transformers, circuit breakers, reactive power equipment, and the associated software and firmware, all at 69 kV or higher. Local distribution equipment, the lines carrying power the final stretch to homes and businesses, was excluded.4Federal Register. Prohibition Order Securing Critical Defense Facilities
The order was not self-executing. It required the Secretary of Energy to issue implementing rules identifying which transactions actually fell within the prohibition, in consultation with the Department of Defense, the Director of National Intelligence, and other agencies.3The White House. Executive Order on Securing the United States Bulk-Power System
The One Implementing Action, Later Revoked
The only formal implementing action came in December 2020, when the Department of Energy issued a Prohibition Order aimed at the People’s Republic of China. The DOE stated it had reason to believe the Chinese government was “equipped and actively planning to undermine the BPS.”4Federal Register. Prohibition Order Securing Critical Defense Facilities
The prohibition was narrower than the executive order itself. It applied only to utilities operating defense critical electric infrastructure serving facilities designated by the Secretary of Energy under Section 215A of the Federal Power Act. Those utilities could not acquire, import, or install Chinese-manufactured BPS equipment at 69 kV or higher, from the point of interconnection with the defense facility up to the next upstream transmission substation. Digital components manufactured or supplied by persons under PRC jurisdiction were covered even when installed in equipment assembled elsewhere.4Federal Register. Prohibition Order Securing Critical Defense Facilities
On April 20, 2021, the DOE formally revoked that Prohibition Order.5Federal Register. Revocation of Prohibition Order Securing Critical Defense Facilities With that action gone, the executive order’s substantive reach effectively fell to zero.
The Biden Suspension
President Biden signed Executive Order 13990 on his first day in office. It suspended EO 13920 for 90 days and directed the Secretary of Energy and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget to jointly assess the actions already taken and consider whether to recommend a replacement.6Federal Register. Protecting Public Health and the Environment and Restoring Science To Tackle the Climate Crisis
The distinction between suspension and revocation matters. EO 13990 did not rescind EO 13920; it paused it.1Department of Energy. Securing the United States Bulk-Power System Executive Order Archive Legally, the order remains on the books in a dormant state. No replacement executive order specifically mirroring its approach was issued during the Biden administration, though Executive Order 14028 on Improving the Nation’s Cybersecurity addressed supply chain risks more broadly across federal systems.
What Actually Governs Grid Supply Chains Now
The concern that prompted EO 13920, adversarial exploitation of grid supply chains, is now handled through three overlapping mechanisms that operate independently of any single executive order.
NERC CIP-013 Mandatory Standards
The North American Electric Reliability Corporation sets enforceable reliability standards for the grid, and its CIP-013 standard makes supply chain risk management mandatory. Under CIP-013-2, every entity responsible for high- and medium-impact cyber systems on the grid must develop and implement a documented supply chain risk management plan.7NERC. Cyber Security – Supply Chain Risk Management (CIP-013-2)
Those plans have to cover procurement and vendor transitions, and the procurement process itself has to address several specific areas:
- Vendor notification of security incidents affecting their products
- Vendor disclosure of known vulnerabilities
- Verification of the integrity and authenticity of vendor-supplied software and patches
- Coordination of vendor remote access, including notification when vendor personnel should no longer have access
Senior management must review and approve the plan at least once every 15 calendar months.7NERC. Cyber Security – Supply Chain Risk Management (CIP-013-2) An updated version, CIP-013-3, has been approved and takes effect July 1, 2028. In November 2025, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission also issued a rule revising supply chain risk management reliability standards to address risks from equipment and services produced or provided by certain foreign entities.
Section 215A of the Federal Power Act
Congress separately authorized the Secretary of Energy to address grid security emergencies through Section 215A of the Federal Power Act. That provision defines “critical electric infrastructure” as any BPS asset whose destruction or incapacity would threaten national security, economic security, or public safety.8FERC. Federal Power Act It also creates a framework for protecting defense critical electric infrastructure, the same category the December 2020 Prohibition Order targeted, and protects critical electric infrastructure information shared with the government. This authority exists independently of any executive order.
CESER Strategic Plan
The Department of Energy’s Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response published a five-year strategic plan on March 18, 2026, running through fiscal year 2030.9Department of Energy. CESER Prioritizes American Energy Dominance and Infrastructure Hardening in New Strategic Plan The plan organizes DOE efforts around developing security technologies for energy infrastructure, hardening the grid’s physical and cyber defenses, and leading coordinated emergency response. CESER continues to serve as the federal government’s designated sector risk management agency for the energy sector.
Trump Second-Term Grid Actions
On April 8, 2025, President Trump signed a new executive order titled “Strengthening the Reliability and Security of the United States Electric Grid.” It directs the Secretary of Energy to develop a methodology for identifying generation resources critical to system reliability and to prevent critical generators over 50 megawatts from leaving the grid.10The White House. Strengthening the Reliability and Security of the United States Electric Grid
That order focuses on grid reliability and resource adequacy, not on foreign supply chain threats. As of mid-2026, EO 13920 itself has not been reinstated, and no executive order has been issued that directly mirrors its prohibition on adversary-supplied bulk-power equipment.