Continuing Resolution Anomalies: FY2026 Examples and How They Work

Continuing resolution anomalies are provisions Congress writes into a short-term funding bill to override the default flat-funding rule for specific programs. When a continuing resolution (CR) keeps the government open by holding agencies to last year’s spending levels, an anomaly carves out a named account and lets it spend more money, spend at a faster pace, or spend on something new. Without these carve-outs, programs with front-loaded costs, seasonal demand, or expiring authorities would run into legal or operational walls the moment the fiscal year turned over.

The Default Rule Anomalies Override

A standard CR funds the government at the rate set by the prior year’s appropriations bills. Section 101 of a typical CR authorizes “such amounts as may be necessary, at a rate for operations as provided in the applicable appropriations Acts” for the previous fiscal year, and limits that authority to projects or activities that were already underway.¹ The Office of Management and Budget then apportions each agency’s funding on a pro-rata basis, spreading the annual total evenly across the CR’s duration.²

Under that default, agencies cannot start new programs, sign new contracts that weren’t funded the year before, or spend faster than their monthly share allows. For many accounts, this works fine for a few weeks. For others, it doesn’t.

What an Anomaly Actually Changes

An anomaly is text in the CR itself that modifies the flat-funding rule for a specific account. The provision typically begins with “notwithstanding section 101,” signaling that it overrides the general rule for that account only. There is no limit on how many anomalies a CR can contain; the FY2025 full-year CR organized them across 13 separate titles corresponding to the regular appropriations bills, and some CRs run to dozens of carve-outs.

Once the president signs the CR, anomalies are legally binding. They supersede Section 101 for the accounts they name, and agencies can rely on them immediately. But they are temporary. Anomaly authority expires when the CR lapses or when a full-year appropriations bill takes over, and an agency relying on a spend-faster provision has to resubmit its apportionment request every time Congress extends the CR.³

Anomalies fall into three functional categories based on what part of the default rule they change.

Rate-of-Operations Changes

The most straightforward type raises or lowers the annual funding rate for a specific account. OMB Circular A-11 instructs agencies to calculate these by taking the full-year amount specified in the anomaly, subtracting any recurring rescissions, and adding or subtracting mandated transfers.³ A program that needs more funding than it received the prior year, because of cost increases or expanded eligibility, gets this type of anomaly to avoid running dry.

Spend-Faster Anomalies

Some programs don’t need more money; they need to access their existing allocation earlier than an even monthly pace allows. A program that consumes 40 percent of its annual budget in the first quarter cannot survive on a monthly apportionment of roughly 8 percent. A spend-faster anomaly lets the agency draw down at the rate necessary to keep operating, without increasing the total available. OMB must still approve an account-specific apportionment before the agency can obligate at the faster pace.²

New Authorities and Purpose Changes

Because a standard CR only continues activities that existed in the prior fiscal year, any genuinely new program or contract requires an anomaly granting specific authority. Without one, an agency cannot begin a project that was not funded before, even if Congress clearly plans to fund it in the upcoming full-year bill. This category also covers multi-year procurement contracts that would otherwise be disrupted by the CR’s prohibition on new obligations, and it can be used to remove or modify authorities carried forward from the prior year.

Examples from the FY2026 Continuing Resolution

The FY2026 CR shows how varied these exceptions can be:

FEMA Disaster Relief Fund. Since FY2018, every CR funding the Department of Homeland Security has included an anomaly allowing FEMA’s Disaster Relief Fund to be “apportioned at a rate for operations necessary to carry out response and recovery activities under the Stafford Act.” The FY2026 version made up to $22.5 billion available during the CR period so disaster response would not be capped by a monthly ceiling.
U.S. Marshals Service. The CR let the Marshals Service allocate funding at the rate necessary to maintain operations and added $30 million for protective operations, available through the end of FY2027.
Air Force E-7 Wedgetail. The CR directed the Air Force to spend up to $199.7 million on rapid prototyping for the E-7 Wedgetail aircraft, plus a $200 million transfer from a procurement account into a research and development account, to maintain the program’s production schedule.
Small Business Administration loan programs. The SBA received authority to apportion funding at the rate necessary to meet demand for loan commitments across several lending programs, preventing a freeze on small business lending.
Office of Personnel Management. Rather than getting more money, OPM’s salaries and expenses account was rebalanced between general appropriations ($197.4 million annualized) and funds transferred from retirement and insurance programs ($214.6 million annualized).

Each solves a different problem. The FEMA provision handles unpredictable disaster timing. The E-7 Wedgetail provision prevents a procurement gap that would raise long-term costs. The SBA anomaly responds to market demand that does not pause for a budget fight.

How an Anomaly Gets Into a CR

The process starts inside the executive branch, before Congress drafts the CR text. An agency has to build a case that its current funding rate is legally or operationally insufficient, and the bar is high.

The core legal question is whether operating at the flat rate would force the agency to violate the Antideficiency Act, which prohibits obligating more money than an appropriation makes available.⁴ The apportionment statute also requires that funds be apportioned to prevent a spending pace that would create a need for supplemental funding.⁵ Agencies follow OMB Circular A-11, particularly Sections 120 and 123, which lay out the format and criteria for CR-related submissions.²

OMB then vets the package. Without a spend-faster anomaly already enacted, OMB will generally approve exception apportionments “only in extraordinary circumstances.”² If the numbers don’t hold up, OMB issues a passback and the agency has to revise.

After OMB clears the package, the administration transmits its anomaly requests to the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations. Committee staff review each proposal, evaluate bipartisan support, and decide what makes it into the CR text. OMB approval does not guarantee inclusion; appropriations leadership makes the final call. The drafting has to be precise, because a poorly worded provision could grant broader authority than intended or fail to override the right part of the CR’s default rules. Once committee agreement is reached, the anomalies go into the bill, both chambers vote, and the president signs. The whole sequence often compresses into a few weeks as the funding deadline approaches.

What Happens Without a Needed Anomaly

An agency operating under a CR without an anomaly it genuinely needs faces a binary choice: halt the program or risk an Antideficiency Act violation. The Act makes it illegal for any federal employee to spend more than the amount available in an appropriation or to commit the government to pay money before an appropriation exists.⁴

The individual consequences are real. A federal employee who violates the Act faces administrative discipline that can include suspension without pay or removal.⁶ A knowing and willful violation carries criminal penalties of up to $5,000 in fines, up to two years in prison, or both.⁷

Every violation also triggers mandatory reporting. The agency head must send a report package to the Director of OMB, the President, both chambers of Congress, and the Comptroller General, laying out the facts, the amount, the position of the responsible employee, any disciplinary action, and whether the violation was knowing and willful. Suspected criminal intent requires a referral to the Department of Justice.⁸ That reporting burden alone gives agencies a strong incentive to get anomaly requests right the first time.

Where Anomalies Don’t Apply

Not all federal spending is exposed to the CR flat-funding squeeze. Mandatory programs, including entitlements like Social Security and Medicare, operate under permanent authorizations that don’t hinge on annual appropriations in the same way. CRs typically include a provision continuing mandatory programs and appropriated entitlements at current program levels. The FY2026 CR did this and also included specific provisions delaying scheduled reductions to Medicaid Disproportionate Share Hospital allotments and extending a behavioral health demonstration program for several states.

The practical result is that the flat-funding restrictions bite hardest on discretionary programs, and that is where anomalies cluster. Accounts funded by contract authority, like federal highway spending, and those that received advanced appropriations in a prior year also tend to ride out CRs without needing special treatment. The programs most vulnerable are discretionary grants and operational accounts whose spending patterns simply don’t fit an even monthly allocation.

1
U.S. Congress. H.R. 5371 – 119th Congress – Continuing Appropriations Act, 2026
2
The White House. OMB Bulletin No. 26-01 – Apportionment of the Continuing Resolutions for Fiscal Year 2026
3
The White House. OMB Circular A-11 Section 123 – Apportionments Under Continuing Resolutions
4
Office of the Law Revision Counsel. 31 USC 1341 – Limitations on Expending and Obligating Amounts
5
Office of the Law Revision Counsel. 31 USC 1512 – Apportionment and Reserves
6
Office of the Law Revision Counsel. 31 USC 1349 – Administrative Discipline
7
Office of the Law Revision Counsel. 31 USC 1350 – Criminal Penalty
8
The White House. OMB Circular A-11 Section 145 – Requirements for Reporting Antideficiency Act Violations