Construction Procurement Methods: Design-Build, CM at Risk, and IPD

Construction procurement methods are the standard ways an owner structures who designs a project, who builds it, and how money and risk move between them. Five dominate the industry: design-bid-build, design-build, construction management at risk, management contracting, and integrated project delivery. A separate choice sits on top of the delivery method: the payment structure, which decides how the builder gets paid and where cost risk lands day to day. Picking the wrong combination for a project’s complexity and timeline is one of the most expensive mistakes an owner can make.

Design-Bid-Build

Design-bid-build is the most established delivery method and still the default for many public projects. The owner hires an architect to produce a complete set of construction documents, then uses those finished drawings to solicit competitive bids from general contractors. Design happens first, bidding second, construction third. Nothing overlaps.

The legal backbone is two separate contracts. One runs between the owner and the architect; the other runs between the owner and the general contractor. The contractor has no contractual relationship with the architect. AIA Document A201, the industry-standard General Conditions, makes this explicit: the contract documents “shall not be construed to create a contractual relationship of any kind” between the contractor and the architect.1American Institute of Architects. AIA Document A201 – General Conditions of the Contract for Construction

That separation has a major consequence: the contractor is generally not liable for errors in the design. The principle comes from the 1918 Supreme Court decision in United States v. Spearin, which held that when an owner hands a contractor detailed plans and specifications, the owner impliedly warrants those documents are adequate for the work.2Justia U.S. Supreme Court Center. United States v. Spearin If a design flaw causes problems during construction, the owner bears the cost, not the builder who followed the drawings. The Spearin doctrine remains one of the most frequently litigated principles in construction law.

Once the design is complete, the owner solicits bids. On public projects this usually means a sealed-bid process: fixed prices come in, bids are opened publicly, and the award goes to the lowest responsive, responsible bidder. Private owners have more flexibility and can invite a short list of firms, negotiate pricing, or weight qualifications alongside cost. The feature that makes the method work in any setting is that scope is fully defined before anyone prices it, so bids are directly comparable. The trade-off is time. Nothing gets built until the design is finished and a bid is accepted, making this the slowest delivery method from start to occupancy.

Design-Build

Design-build collapses the two-contract structure into one. The owner signs a single agreement with a design-builder who is responsible for both the architectural design and the physical construction.3AIA Contract Documents. Summary A141-2024, Agreement Between Owner and Design-Builder for a Traditional Design-Build Project That entity might be a single firm with in-house capabilities, a joint venture between an architect and a contractor, or a contractor who subcontracts the design work.4AIA Design Shop. A141-2014, Standard Form of Agreement Between Owner and Design-Builder

Single-point responsibility flips the Spearin logic. Because the design-builder controls both the drawings and the construction, conflicts between the two are the design-builder’s problem. The owner avoids the finger-pointing that can erupt in design-bid-build when a contractor blames the architect’s drawings and the architect blames the contractor’s execution. If something goes wrong, the owner looks in one direction.

Bridging Documents

Owners rarely hand the design-builder a blank page. Instead, the owner’s independent consultant prepares bridging documents: preliminary drawings and performance criteria that define what the building needs to accomplish without dictating every detail. The level of development varies with complexity, typically anywhere from about 5% to 35% of the total design effort. Simple projects might need only a basic program and performance outline. Technically complex facilities often require more advanced documentation to define the scope and reduce ambiguity in proposals.

Selection and the Progressive Variant

Because design-build proposals include both a design concept and a price, selection usually goes beyond lowest cost. Best-value procurement evaluates technical approach, team qualifications, and price together, letting the owner pick the strongest overall package rather than the cheapest number. Federal design-build projects follow a two-phase process: Phase One evaluates qualifications and past performance with no cost consideration and narrows the field to no more than five firms; only those shortlisted firms submit detailed technical and price proposals in Phase Two.5Acquisition.GOV. Subpart 36.3 – Two-Phase Design-Build Selection Procedures

A newer variant, progressive design-build, pushes further. The owner selects a team primarily on qualifications, often before any design work begins, and the two sides develop scope, schedule, and budget collaboratively. The design-builder provides preconstruction services and the parties negotiate a final price once the design is sufficiently developed. This hybrid borrows the early contractor involvement of CMAR while keeping the single-contract simplicity of design-build.6Federal Highway Administration. Introduction to Progressive Design-Build

Construction Management at Risk

Construction management at risk (CMAR, sometimes called CM/GC) splits the difference between the owner control of design-bid-build and the single-point responsibility of design-build. The owner hires an architect and a construction manager under separate contracts, but the construction manager joins the project during the design phase rather than after it.

During preconstruction, the CM acts as a consultant. They review the evolving design for constructability problems, develop cost estimates at each design milestone, advise on sequencing and logistics, and help the architect avoid details that will be expensive or impractical to build. Early involvement is the whole point of the method. The contractor’s field knowledge shapes the design before the drawings are finished, catching problems while they are still cheap to fix on paper.

The Guaranteed Maximum Price

As the design reaches a level where scope is reasonably defined, the CM shifts from advisor to builder by offering a guaranteed maximum price (GMP). The GMP is a contractual ceiling: the owner will not pay more than this amount for the construction, provided the scope stays the same. AIA Document A133 is the standard form governing this relationship, structured as a cost-plus-fee contract with the GMP cap layered on top.7AIA Contract Documents. A133 – Owner and Construction Manager as Constructor Agreement – Cost Plus Fee with a Guaranteed Maximum Price

The CM absorbs the risk of cost overruns within the agreed scope. If the project comes in under the GMP, savings typically revert to the owner or are split according to a shared-savings formula negotiated up front. That split is a powerful incentive: it gives the CM a financial reason to find efficiencies rather than spending up to the cap.

Contingency Within the GMP

Every GMP includes a contingency fund, and how it works matters more than most owners realize. The contractor’s contingency is a budget line within the GMP meant to cover risks like estimating errors, missed scope, material cost escalation, subcontractor defaults, and other costs that do not qualify as owner-directed change orders. This is separate from any owner contingency held outside the GMP for scope changes or discretionary upgrades.

A well-drafted contract spells out exactly what the CM can use contingency for, requires documentation before drawing on it, and says what happens to any unused balance. Poorly drafted clauses invite conflict. Owners sometimes try to tap the contractor’s contingency to fund their own scope changes, and contractors sometimes resist transparency about how the fund is being spent. Getting the contingency language right at contract execution prevents the most common CMAR disputes.

Management Contracting

Management contracting looks similar to CMAR at first glance, but the risk sits in a fundamentally different place. The owner appoints a management contractor early to coordinate and supervise the work, but the management contractor does not perform any of the physical construction. Instead, the building work is divided into trade packages, each awarded to a separate specialist contractor.

The critical distinction is that the management contractor does not guarantee the total project price. The individual trade contracts are between those specialist contractors and either the owner or the management contractor acting as the owner’s agent, depending on structure. The owner retains the price risk across all the packages. The management contractor’s obligation is to run the site, coordinate schedules, and keep the trade contractors working as a coherent team. In return, the management contractor earns a fee, typically calculated as a percentage of overall project costs or as a fixed lump sum.

This method gives the owner maximum control over who performs each piece of the work and allows construction to start on early packages while later ones are still being designed and tendered. It works well for owners with experienced project teams who want hands-on involvement. It works poorly for owners who lack that expertise, because the price risk never leaves the owner’s desk. If a trade package runs over budget or a specialist contractor defaults, the financial consequences fall on the owner.

Integrated Project Delivery

Integrated project delivery (IPD) is the most radical departure from conventional procurement. Instead of separate contracts between the owner, architect, and contractor, all three sign a single multi-party agreement. AIA Document C191 is the standard form, creating a collaborative framework where the parties jointly set cost and performance goals and are compensated on a cost-of-the-work basis with incentives tied to how well the project hits those goals.8AIA Contract Documents. C191 – Multi-Party Agreement – Integrated Project Delivery An alternative structure under AIA Document C195 goes further: the owner, architect, and contractor form a single-purpose limited liability company whose sole function is to deliver the project.

Shared Risk and Reward

The financial engine of IPD is a shared risk-and-reward pool. Each non-owner party’s profit and a portion of overhead go into a pool that is “at risk,” meaning those dollars are only fully paid out if the project meets its target cost and performance benchmarks. If the project exceeds the target cost, the pool shrinks and every participant earns less. If it comes in under budget or hits agreed performance metrics, the surplus is distributed among the parties. This structure gives the architect a financial incentive to design efficiently and the contractor an incentive to flag design problems early rather than profiting from change orders later.9AIA Contract Documents. Instructions – C191-2009, Standard Form Multi-Party Agreement for Integrated Project Delivery

Liability Waivers

Most IPD agreements include mutual waivers of liability between the core participants, meaning the architect, contractor, and owner agree not to sue each other for most errors or omissions during the project. This sounds risky in the abstract, but the logic is straightforward. If any party can be sued by the others, they will protect themselves first and collaborate second. The waivers remove that defensive posture and push everyone toward solving problems rather than documenting blame.

Day-to-day decisions flow through a project management team composed of representatives from each signatory. Major decisions about design direction, budget allocation, and schedule adjustments require consensus rather than unilateral owner directives. Many IPD projects also use a validation phase early in the process where the team confirms scope, establishes a target cost, and produces a detailed report. If the owner decides at that point that the project is not feasible, the non-owner parties receive reimbursement for costs incurred but no profit, and everyone walks away.

Payment Structures

The delivery method determines who is responsible for what. The payment structure determines how they get paid. These two choices are independent. A design-bid-build project might use a lump-sum contract or a unit-price contract, while a CMAR project almost always uses cost-plus with a GMP. Understanding the payment side is just as important as understanding the delivery side, because it controls how cost risk is allocated on a daily basis.

Lump Sum

A lump-sum contract sets a single fixed price for the entire scope. The contractor agrees to deliver the completed project for that amount regardless of what actual costs turn out to be. If costs come in under the lump sum, the contractor keeps the difference. If costs exceed it, they absorb the loss. This structure requires a fully developed design before the price is set, because the contractor needs to know exactly what they are building to price it accurately. Any scope change requires a formal change order with a negotiated price adjustment.

Lump-sum contracts are the simplest to administer and give the owner the most cost certainty at the outset. They pair naturally with design-bid-build. The downside is inflexibility. If the owner wants to modify the design mid-construction, change orders can be expensive and contentious, because the contractor has little incentive to keep change-order pricing lean.

Cost-Plus-Fee

Under a cost-plus-fee arrangement, the owner reimburses the contractor’s actual costs for labor, materials, equipment, and subcontractors, then pays an additional fee for overhead and profit. The fee can be a fixed dollar amount or a percentage of costs. A cost-plus-fixed-fee structure sets the fee at contract signing so it does not increase even if costs rise, giving the contractor at least a minimal incentive to control spending.10Acquisition.GOV. Part 16 – Types of Contracts

Cost-plus contracts work best when the scope is not fully defined at the time of contracting, such as renovations where hidden conditions are likely, or fast-track projects where construction starts before design is complete. The trade-off is that the owner takes on most of the cost risk. Without a GMP cap or other ceiling, costs can escalate with no contractual limit. Owners who use cost-plus without strong auditing and cost-control oversight often end up paying more than they expected.

Unit Price

A unit-price contract sets a fixed price per unit of work, such as per cubic yard of concrete, per linear foot of pipe, or per ton of asphalt, rather than a single lump sum. The owner pays based on actual quantities installed, measured and verified during construction. This structure dominates heavy civil and infrastructure work like roads, bridges, and utility systems, where total quantities are difficult to predict precisely before construction begins.

The advantage is flexibility. If soil conditions require more excavation than estimated, the contract accommodates the additional quantity automatically at the agreed rate. The risk is that final quantities can vary significantly from estimates, making total project cost less predictable than a lump sum. Owners typically manage this by setting estimated quantities in the bid documents and establishing thresholds beyond which unit prices can be renegotiated.

Guaranteed Maximum Price

A GMP contract is essentially a cost-plus arrangement with a ceiling. The owner reimburses actual costs and pays a fee, but the total cannot exceed the guaranteed maximum. Any overruns beyond the GMP are the contractor’s responsibility, and savings below the GMP are shared or returned to the owner. This hybrid is the standard payment structure for CMAR projects, giving the owner cost protection while preserving the transparency of open-book accounting.

Retainage

Across all delivery methods and payment structures, retainage is a near-universal feature of construction payment. The owner or general contractor withholds a percentage of each progress payment, typically 5% to 10%, as a financial cushion against incomplete or defective work. The retained funds accumulate over the life of the project and are released after substantial completion, final inspection, or another contractually defined milestone.

Retainage gives the paying party leverage to ensure the contractor finishes punch-list items and corrects defects rather than walking away from the last few percent of the work. The flip side is that it ties up a significant amount of the contractor’s cash flow for the duration of the project, which smaller firms feel disproportionately. Many contracts reduce retainage to a lower percentage once the project reaches 50% completion. A growing number of state legislatures have capped retainage or imposed prompt-release timelines to protect subcontractors, though the specifics vary widely.

How to Choose a Method

No single method is best for every project. The Federal Highway Administration’s Project Delivery Selection Matrix identifies four factors that most often drive the decision:11Federal Highway Administration. Project Delivery Selection Matrix Instructions and Forms

  • Complexity and innovation. Projects with unusual technical challenges or non-standard designs benefit from early contractor input. CMAR and progressive design-build let the builder shape the design before it is locked in. Design-bid-build leaves the contractor out of that conversation entirely.
  • Schedule. Design-bid-build is the slowest because nothing overlaps. Design-build and CMAR allow construction to begin before design is fully complete. IPD can compress timelines further by aligning all parties from the start.
  • Cost certainty. Lump-sum design-bid-build gives the owner a hard number before construction starts. CMAR’s GMP provides a ceiling with some flexibility. Cost-plus and management contracting leave total cost open until the work is done.
  • Level of design at procurement. If you have detailed drawings ready, design-bid-build works. If the design is preliminary or still evolving, design-build or CMAR accommodates that ambiguity.

Risk tolerance is the thread running through all four factors. Design-bid-build pushes design risk to the owner and construction risk to the contractor, with a bright line between them. Design-build shifts both to the design-builder. CMAR splits design risk with the owner while capping construction cost risk at the GMP. IPD pools risk among all parties. Management contracting leaves nearly all financial risk with the owner. An owner who understands where the risk sits under each method, and whether the organization has the capacity to manage whatever risk it retains, will make a better procurement decision than one who picks a method because it worked on the last project.

A Note on Public Projects

Everything above applies fully to private construction, where an owner can select any delivery method, negotiate with preferred firms, and structure contracts however the parties agree. Public construction operates under a different set of rules. Federal, state, and local governments generally must award construction contracts through competitive processes, and design-build and CMAR often require specific legislative authorization because they deviate from the traditional lowest-bid model. Federal agencies can use two-phase design-build selection under FAR Subpart 36.3, and many states have passed enabling legislation for alternative delivery methods, but availability is not universal. Some jurisdictions still restrict public owners to design-bid-build for most or all project types. If you are procuring on behalf of a public entity, confirm which methods your enabling statutes actually permit before building a selection process around one of them.