China’s Alternative to SWIFT: How CIPS Works and Why It Falls Short

China’s alternative to SWIFT is the Cross-Border Interbank Payment System, known as CIPS, a renminbi clearing network launched in October 2015 under the People’s Bank of China. It gives banks a way to move yuan across borders without routing through the dollar system, and after 2022 it grew quickly as sanctioned countries looked for ways out of Western financial infrastructure. It is not, however, a true replacement for SWIFT, and the comparison most headlines draw gets the mechanics wrong.

What CIPS Actually Is

CIPS is a wholesale payment system. It clears and settles cross-border transactions denominated in renminbi, combining real-time gross settlement for large individual payments with deferred net settlement for batches of smaller ones. It runs roughly five days a week around the clock, with extra hours layered on to cover global time zones.

The common framing of CIPS as “China’s SWIFT” is misleading. SWIFT doesn’t move money. It’s a messaging network that transmits standardized instructions between banks telling them to move money. The actual clearing happens elsewhere, in systems like CHIPS, the Clearing House Interbank Payments System that handles U.S. dollar transactions. CIPS is structurally the counterpart to CHIPS, not to SWIFT.

That distinction matters because CIPS still needs a messaging layer to communicate with counterparties worldwide, and for most of its existence it has leaned on SWIFT to provide it. Analysts have estimated that around 80 percent of CIPS transactions use SWIFT messaging. CIPS does have its own proprietary messaging capability, and direct participants can opt into it, but most non-Chinese banks have not installed the infrastructure needed to receive CIPS-native messages. The system built partly to escape Western financial plumbing still runs on it.

How Big It Is Compared to SWIFT

CIPS has grown fast. In 2024 it processed 175 trillion yuan (roughly $24 trillion) in cross-border payments, a 43 percent jump from the prior year. The 2025 figure rose to 180.2 trillion yuan ($26.4 trillion). By early 2026, average daily transaction values hit 920 billion yuan in March, nearly 50 percent above February, with a single-day record of 1.22 trillion yuan (about $178.5 billion).

Membership has expanded in parallel. As of mid-2026, CIPS counted 194 direct participants and 1,597 indirect participants across 124 countries and regions, with business operations touching more than 5,000 banking institutions in 190 countries. Asia dominates, with 131 direct and 1,165 indirect members, 564 of them from mainland China. Europe has 33 direct and 266 indirect participants.

Set that against the incumbents and the scale gap stays wide. SWIFT connects more than 11,500 financial institutions in over 200 countries. CHIPS has historically processed around $1.8 trillion a day on its own. The renminbi itself accounted for just 2.93 percent of global payments by value as of August 2025, ranking sixth among world currencies according to SWIFT’s tracking data. The dollar still features in 88 percent of global foreign exchange trades.

Why China Built It

The commercial reason is straightforward. Before CIPS, settling renminbi payments across borders meant routing through a patchwork of correspondent banks, which was slow and fragmented. As China’s trade grew, it needed cleaner plumbing.

The strategic reason is sharper. The United States and its allies have shown repeatedly that they will use the dollar system as a coercive tool. Iran was cut off from SWIFT under nuclear-related sanctions. After Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, Western nations froze roughly $300 billion in Russian central bank reserves and ejected major Russian banks from SWIFT. For Beijing, which holds enormous dollar reserves and depends on global trade, the message landed: any country relying wholly on Western infrastructure can be shut out of it. China’s finance ministry reportedly began developing risk scenarios in response.

Who Uses CIPS and What For

CIPS sits inside a broader effort to internationalize the renminbi. That effort also includes 31 offshore renminbi clearing banks across 27 countries, bilateral currency swap agreements with central banks in 29 countries totaling over 4 trillion yuan, and trade settlement arrangements that bypass the dollar.

The Belt and Road Initiative has been the main pipeline for early adoption, though uptake has been slower than Beijing hoped. As of 2017, renminbi usage in cross-border transactions across more than 50 Belt and Road economies remained below 5 percent. More recent agreements have been more explicit. In March 2023, China and Brazil announced they would settle bilateral trade in renminbi and Brazilian real rather than dollars, backed by making a Chinese-controlled Brazilian bank a direct CIPS participant. Argentina said in April 2023 it would pay for Chinese imports in yuan.

China’s total cross-border renminbi settlement reached 64.1 trillion yuan in 2024, up 22.5 percent year on year. About 60 percent of that was securities investment rather than trade, so financial flows are driving more of the growth than goods.

The most contested use of CIPS is by countries under Western sanctions. A November 2025 report by the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission concluded that China has built financial networks, including CIPS and direct renminbi clearing, that are “mostly insulated from the broader global financial system” and let Russia, Iran, and North Korea transact outside the dollar system.

Russia moved heavily toward renminbi settlement after its SWIFT exclusion. Yuan-ruble trade volume jumped from 2.2 billion yuan in February 2022 to 201 billion yuan by the end of that year. Russia had already begun accepting renminbi for oil and coal exports to China through CIPS as early as April 2020, according to CSIS reporting. Where SWIFT access was cut, Russian banks fell back on secure phone lines and encrypted messages to coordinate with Chinese counterparts.

Moscow has pushed to link its domestic messaging system, SPFS, directly to CIPS. As of late 2025, China had refused. The reason, per the USCC report, is that Beijing wants to avoid secondary U.S. sanctions. In November 2024, the U.S. Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control warned that any foreign financial institution joining SPFS could face designation, with no grandfather clause for existing members.

Iran uses workarounds built around CIPS rather than a direct SPFS link. In one arrangement, Chinese purchasers of Iranian crude pay a Chinese financial institution called Chuxin, which then funds Chinese contractors doing infrastructure work inside Iran. An estimated $8.4 billion moved through that channel in 2024, according to the USCC. China buys roughly 90 percent of Iran’s crude exports, a $46.7 billion relationship in 2024.

CIPS volumes have also tracked geopolitical crises closely. During U.S. military strikes against Iran in March 2026, CIPS transaction volumes spiked, as did the share price of CNPC Capital, the majority owner of the U.S.-sanctioned Bank of Kunlun. When Washington announced a ceasefire on April 7, 2026, both the volumes and the share price fell.

Why CIPS Can’t Replace SWIFT Yet

Several structural problems limit how far CIPS can go.

The first is the renminbi itself. China maintains strict capital controls, manages the exchange rate, and restricts the free movement of money across its borders. A real reserve currency has to be freely convertible and backed by deep, liquid capital markets where holders can park surpluses. The United States offers that through its Treasury market. China does not.

The second is network composition. Most CIPS direct participants are overseas branches of Chinese institutions, which limits the network effects that make SWIFT indispensable. SWIFT has a half-century head start on the relationships and technical plumbing that connect the world’s banks.

The third is the SWIFT dependency already noted. If Western nations ever cut SWIFT off from CIPS, the system would have to run entirely on its own messaging protocol, which most non-Chinese banks aren’t equipped to use. CIPS exists partly as insurance against being cut off, yet depends on the thing it’s insuring against.

The fourth is trust. Reserve currencies require predictability, clear legal protections, and limits on government discretion. China’s record of abrupt regulatory shifts and capital controls makes banks and governments cautious about holding large renminbi balances no matter what rails are available.

What’s Coming Next

China is building additional layers alongside CIPS. The digital yuan, or e-CNY, is primarily a domestic retail tool, but the People’s Bank of China has said it is “technically ready for cross-border use” and plans pilot programs with other central banks. A new platform called the Cross-border e-CNY Transfer Services, or CBETS, sits under PBoC management and is designed specifically for cross-border digital yuan settlement. It runs alongside CIPS rather than replacing it.

The highest-profile cross-border project is mBridge, a wholesale central bank digital currency platform originally coordinated by the Bank for International Settlements with China, Thailand, the United Arab Emirates, Hong Kong, and, since 2024, Saudi Arabia. It reached minimum viable product stage in mid-2024. In October 2024, the BIS withdrew and handed the project to the participating central banks; BIS General Manager Agustín Carstens announced the decision days after fresh concerns surfaced that the platform could be used to evade sanctions. Saudi participation has drawn particular attention given the longstanding petrodollar arrangement, with Saudi officials signaling openness to a “petroyuan” for oil settlements, though practical barriers, including the difficulty of recycling surplus renminbi, remain substantial.

CIPS is not going to displace the dollar or SWIFT in the near term. It no longer needs to in order to matter. By offering a working alternative for renminbi transactions, it gives China and its trading partners insulation from Western financial pressure that didn’t exist a decade ago, and for countries already under sanctions, even a partial alternative can be the difference between isolation and continued operation. The direction of travel is slow fragmentation, with the dollar system becoming one option among several rather than the only one, and how fast that moves will depend less on CIPS’s technical reach than on how often Western governments reach for financial sanctions and how many countries decide the exposure isn’t worth it.