The Chevron deference flowchart was the two-step decision tree federal courts followed from 1984 until 2024 when reviewing an agency’s interpretation of a statute it administered: first ask whether Congress spoke clearly, then, if not, defer to any reasonable agency reading. That flowchart no longer controls. On June 28, 2024, the Supreme Court overruled Chevron in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo and replaced the deferential steps with a single obligation: courts must exercise independent judgment to find the best reading of the statute.1Supreme Court of the United States. Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 If you learned the old flowchart in law school or relied on it in practice, the shape of the analysis has changed, and so has the answer to a lot of close cases.
The Old Chevron Flowchart, Step by Step
The framework announced by Justice John Paul Stevens in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. had two formal steps. Over time, courts and commentators added a threshold question in front of them, which became known as “Step Zero.”
Step Zero: Does Chevron Apply at All?
Step Zero came out of United States v. Mead Corp. (2001). Before a court reached the two-step analysis, it asked whether Congress had delegated authority to the agency to make rules carrying the force of law, and whether the agency had exercised that authority in issuing the interpretation being reviewed.2Yale Journal on Regulation. Everything You Always Wanted to Know About the Chevron Doctrine The typical yes-answer involved notice-and-comment rulemaking or formal adjudication. Interpretations issued through opinion letters, informal guidance, or other non-binding channels didn’t clear Step Zero and were reviewed under the weaker Skidmore standard.3The Regulatory Review. Did Step Zero Help Doom Chevron
Step Zero eventually absorbed other limits on deference, including the major questions doctrine, which withheld Chevron treatment for issues of vast economic or political significance.
Step One: Has Congress Spoken to the Precise Question?
If the case cleared Step Zero, the court asked whether Congress had directly addressed the precise question at issue. If the statute’s meaning was clear, that was the end. Both court and agency had to follow what Congress said, and no deference came into play.4National Constitution Center. Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.
Step Two: Is the Agency’s Reading Permissible?
Only if the statute was silent or ambiguous did the court move to Step Two. Here the question was narrow: is the agency’s interpretation based on a permissible construction of the statute? If yes, the agency won, even if the judges would have read the text differently on a blank slate.4National Constitution Center. Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. Ambiguity, in effect, was a win for the agency.
That was the flowchart. Threshold, clarity, reasonableness. Whenever those boxes lined up in the agency’s favor, courts were told not to substitute their own judgment.
Why the Flowchart Was Overruled
Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, consolidated with Relentless, Inc. v. Department of Commerce, ended Chevron. Chief Justice John Roberts wrote for the majority, joined by Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett. Justice Kagan dissented, joined by Justice Sotomayor and, in Relentless, by Justice Jackson, who did not sit on Loper Bright itself. Justices Thomas and Gorsuch filed separate concurrences.1Supreme Court of the United States. Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369
The majority’s reasoning rested on three points. First, the Administrative Procedure Act instructs reviewing courts to “decide all relevant questions of law” and “interpret statutory provisions.” The Court held that Chevron “defies the command of the APA” by telling courts to accept an agency’s reading instead of their own. Second, drawing on Marbury v. Madison and Article III, the Court said statutory interpretation is the “proper and peculiar province of the courts.” Third, the majority rejected the premise that statutory ambiguity is an implicit delegation of interpretive authority to the agency.1Supreme Court of the United States. Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369
The New Flowchart After Loper Bright
The post-Loper Bright analysis collapses the old two-step (plus Step Zero) into a streamlined sequence.5K&L Gates. The Post-Chevron Toolkit: A New Era for Regulatory Review
Find the Best Reading of the Statute
The court identifies the agency action, locates the statutory authority cited for it, and then uses traditional tools of statutory construction (plain meaning, context, structure, canons, legislative history) to determine the single best reading of the statute.6Cornell Law Institute. Chevron Deference There is no Step Two. A “permissible” agency reading no longer wins on its own.
Check for Express Delegation
Some statutes explicitly hand the agency discretion to define terms, fill gaps, or set standards. When Congress has done that clearly, the agency’s exercise of that discretion is reviewed for reasonableness under the arbitrary-and-capricious standard, not as a pure question of statutory meaning. Early data bear this out: agencies won 89% of the time when statutes expressly conferred discretion, compared with 19% when courts found the statutory language unambiguous against the agency’s position.7Center for Progressive Reform. Loper in Practice in the Lower Courts
Apply the Major Questions Doctrine Where It Fits
If the agency claims authority over an issue of vast economic or political significance, the major questions doctrine requires clear congressional authorization rather than a vague statutory hook. The doctrine’s roots go back to FDA v. Brown & Williamson (2000) and it took its strongest form in West Virginia v. EPA (2022), functioning as a “clear statement” rule.8Harvard Law School. What Critics Get Wrong and Right About the Supreme Court’s New Major Questions Doctrine Some scholars have questioned whether the doctrine still has a distinct role now that courts already exercise independent judgment on statutory meaning; others describe it as a substantive canon that tips close questions against agencies on transformative issues.9Yale Journal on Regulation. Looks Like We Don’t Need the Major Questions Doctrine Any More
Give the Agency Skidmore Weight
The surviving deference framework is Skidmore v. Swift & Co. (1944). A court may give weight to an agency’s interpretation based on “the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade.”10Congressional Research Service. Skidmore Deference After Loper Bright The critical difference from Chevron is that Skidmore treats agency views as persuasive authority rather than binding authority. The agency’s reasoning is worth reading, sometimes decisive, but never dispositive by fiat.11American Bar Association. End of Chevron Deference: What Does It Mean, What Comes Next
Review Policy Choices for Arbitrariness
Section 706(2)(A) of the APA, the “arbitrary and capricious” standard, was not affected by Loper Bright.12Cornell Law Institute. 5 U.S. Code § 706 – Scope of Review When an agency exercises discretion on policy or factual grounds, courts still ask whether the agency examined the relevant data, articulated a rational connection between the facts and its decision, and stayed within the scope of its delegated authority.13Administrative Conference of the United States. Judicial Review of Agency Action Courts may not substitute their own policy preferences for the agency’s, but they can strike down actions that rest on flawed reasoning, ignore important considerations, or lack a factual basis.
The distinction matters. Statutory meaning is now decided by judges. Discretionary policy calls made under a statute are still reviewed deferentially.
A Separate Branch: Auer Deference for Agency Regulations
Auer deference (also called Seminole Rock deference) concerns an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations rather than of a statute, and it survived Loper Bright, at least for now. In Kisor v. Wilkie (2019), the Court declined to overrule Auer but narrowed it substantially.14SCOTUSblog. Opinion Analysis: Justices Leave Agency Deference Doctrine in Place
Under Kisor, a court first exhausts traditional tools of interpretation to determine whether the regulation is genuinely ambiguous. Only if ambiguity persists does the court ask whether the agency’s reading is reasonable, whether it reflects the agency’s official and authoritative position, whether it implicates the agency’s substantive expertise, and whether it represents the agency’s fair and considered judgment rather than a convenient litigation stance.15Yale Journal on Regulation. What Kisor Means for the Future of Auer Deference If any hurdle fails, the court declines Auer deference and may fall back on Skidmore.
Most circuit courts continue to apply Auer as narrowed by Kisor.16Bloomberg Law. Auer/Kisor Deference: Review of Agencies’ Interpretations of Their Own Regulations Whether Loper Bright‘s logic ultimately dooms Auer as well is an open question, with one commentator describing the doctrine as sitting on “unstable ground.”17Yale Journal on Regulation. Auer After Loper Bright
What the Shift Looks Like in Practice
The end of Chevron has moved outcomes without collapsing agency authority. A study by the Center for Progressive Reform examining 91 lower-court cases in the 14 months after Loper Bright found agencies prevailing 57% of the time, down from win rates above 70% under Chevron and roughly in line with historical Skidmore-era rates of 50 to 60%.7Center for Progressive Reform. Loper in Practice in the Lower Courts A separate historical study of roughly 500,000 cases from 1875 to 2020 found no consistent link between the prevailing deference regime and agency win rates over the long run, suggesting doctrinal labels may matter less than judicial inclinations and institutional dynamics.18Washington University Law Review. Deference Realities: Judicial Deference and Litigation Outcomes in the Appellate Review Era
The Supreme Court reinforced the new approach in McLaughlin Chiropractic Associates, Inc. v. McKesson Corp. (June 2025), holding that district courts in enforcement proceedings are not bound by an agency’s prior statutory interpretation, even when a statute like the Hobbs Act channels pre-enforcement challenges to the courts of appeals.19Supreme Court of the United States. McLaughlin Chiropractic Associates, Inc. v. McKesson Corp., No. 23-1226 The Eighth Circuit’s decision in Missouri v. Trump illustrates the vocabulary courts are now using: even a longstanding, consistent agency reading gets “respect” rather than “deference,” and cannot “rewrite the statute’s text.”20U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. Missouri v. Trump, No. 24-2332
A Note on State Agencies
Chevron governed federal courts reviewing federal agency action; state courts have their own deference doctrines, and those doctrines vary widely. As of mid-2026, roughly 22 states still apply substantial deference, about seven recognize possible deference depending on context, and 15 states have eliminated judicial deference to agency interpretations entirely. The trend since Loper Bright has been toward less deference: Kentucky (S.B. 84, March 2025), Louisiana (H.B. 99, June 2025), and Missouri (S.B. 221, July 2025) all eliminated state-level deference by statute, while Kansas codified its 2013 judicial abandonment of deference in 2026. Florida remains the only state to have eliminated deference through a constitutional amendment, adopted in 2018.21Pacific Legal Foundation. State Deference Map If your question involves a state agency, the federal flowchart above tells you nothing; check your state.
Old Flowchart Versus New, at a Glance
Under Chevron, three boxes stood between a court and a merits decision: Step Zero (does the agency’s action qualify?), Step One (is the statute clear?), Step Two (is the agency’s reading permissible?). Ambiguity at Step One handed the case to the agency at Step Two whenever the reading was reasonable. Under Loper Bright, the boxes are gone. The court finds the best reading of the statute using ordinary interpretive tools, honors any discretion Congress expressly delegated, applies the major questions doctrine where it fits, gives the agency’s view whatever persuasive weight it earns under Skidmore, and reviews discretionary choices under the arbitrary-and-capricious standard. Ambiguity is now the judge’s problem to solve, not the agency’s win.