The main disadvantages of a central bank digital currency are the loss of cash-like privacy, the technical ability for the issuer to control how and when you spend, risks to commercial banks and financial stability, concentrated cybersecurity exposure, and the exclusion of people who depend on physical cash. These concerns are serious enough that Executive Order 14178, signed on January 23, 2025, bars federal agencies from establishing, issuing, or promoting a CBDC in the United States.1Federal Register. Strengthening American Leadership in Digital Financial Technology
A CBDC Is Not Digital Cash
A CBDC is a direct liability of the central bank, not a commercial bank deposit and not a decentralized cryptocurrency.2Federal Reserve. Central Bank Digital Currency Frequently Asked Questions That structure puts the issuing government at the center of every payment. Physical cash moves between people without producing a central digital record. A CBDC, by design, does the opposite.
The Federal Reserve said as much in its January 2022 discussion paper, acknowledging that a CBDC “would differ materially from cash, which enables anonymous transactions,” and noting that a CBDC “could potentially be used at much greater scale and velocity than cash.”3Federal Reserve. Money and Payments: The U.S. Dollar in the Age of Digital Transformation Whatever architecture a government chooses, the result is a far richer dataset of individual economic behavior than cash has ever produced.
Privacy and the Surveillance Problem
The clearest disadvantage is surveillance. Where today’s financial data sits fragmented across thousands of banks and payment processors, a CBDC pulls payment information into one system the central bank can see. Every purchase, transfer, and deposit becomes part of a comprehensive record tied to you.
U.S. financial privacy law already has a well-known hole, and a CBDC would make it wider. Under the third-party doctrine from United States v. Miller (1976), the Supreme Court held that bank depositors have no “legitimate expectation of privacy” in financial records “voluntarily conveyed to banks and exposed to their employees in the ordinary course of business.” By sharing information with a third party, the reasoning goes, you assume the risk the third party will hand it to the government.
The Supreme Court narrowed that doctrine in Carpenter v. United States (2018), emphasizing “the deeply revealing nature” of cell-site location data and “the inescapable and automatic nature of its collection.”4Supreme Court of the United States. Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. 296 (2018) That language reads like a description of CBDC transaction data. But no court has extended Carpenter to financial records, and the Miller rule still governs banking data.
A CBDC sharpens the problem. With conventional accounts, the government still has to request records from a private institution, which can push back, delay, or challenge the request. With a CBDC held as a direct central bank liability, there is no third party to serve with a subpoena. The data sits inside the government’s own infrastructure, and under current precedent, you may have no Fourth Amendment claim to stop it from being searched.
Programmable Money and Spending Control
Privacy is not only about who sees your transactions. It also covers whether someone else can dictate what you are allowed to buy. A tokenized CBDC can carry spending logic in the currency itself, producing what researchers call “programmable money.”
In October 2020, the People’s Bank of China distributed digital yuan to 50,000 citizens in Shenzhen. Each person received roughly 200 yuan, about $30 at the time, but the money expired if not spent within six days and could only be used at roughly 3,400 designated merchants in a single district. Recipients could not transfer the funds to other people. The stated purpose was pandemic stimulus. The mechanism proved something broader: a national currency can be programmed with expiration dates and geographic restrictions on where it will function.
Programmability opens the door to several forms of financial control that go beyond traditional monetary policy:
- Spending restrictions limiting purchases to approved categories, specific merchants, or geographic zones.
- Expiring balances that lose value if not spent by a deadline, pressuring holders onto the government’s preferred timeline.
- Negative interest rates applied directly to digital balances. With physical cash, holders avoid negative rates by withdrawing bills; a purely digital currency removes that option.
- Instant asset freezing across the entire system with a single command, rather than through a court process and bank compliance.
Each capability can be framed as a useful policy tool. Expiring money stimulates spending in a recession. Programmable rules could fight fraud. The infrastructure that enables helpful interventions is the same infrastructure that enables coercive ones, and the distinction depends entirely on whoever holds the keys at any given moment.
Risks to Banks and Financial Stability
If you can hold money directly with the central bank, which cannot go bankrupt, the incentive to keep deposits at a commercial bank weakens. That is the disintermediation problem. Commercial banks fund lending with deposits; a large-scale shift of balances into CBDC accounts would shrink the capital available for mortgages, business loans, and consumer credit. Banks would respond by raising deposit rates or finding alternative funding, both of which push up borrowing costs.
FDIC deposit insurance currently covers up to $250,000 per depositor at each insured bank, and there is no equivalent for a CBDC because a central bank liability does not need insurance.5FDIC. Understanding Deposit Insurance The absence of insurance risk actually makes the CBDC account more attractive during stress, which accelerates deposit flight.
Speed makes this worse. During a panic, depositors today face branches, wire delays, and withdrawal limits. A CBDC lets people shift an entire balance to the central bank in seconds, compressing what used to be a slow bank run into one that unfolds in minutes. More than half of central banks exploring CBDCs are considering per-person holding limits to manage the risk, and the Bank of England has tested limits ranging from £5,000 to £20,000 for individuals.6Bank of England. Holding Limits for Sterling Denominated Systemic Stablecoins and a Digital Pound Holding limits are themselves a form of control: the government decides how much of the safest money you are allowed to keep.
Cybersecurity and Consumer Protection Gaps
Centralizing a nation’s payment infrastructure into one system creates an obvious target. A successful attack on a CBDC ledger could corrupt transaction records, steal funds at scale, or shut the system down. The consequences would be different in kind from a breach at a single bank, because the entire monetary system would run on the same infrastructure. State-sponsored attackers already probe financial networks and would have every incentive to probe a CBDC’s.
There is also the offline problem. Cash works without electricity, internet, or functioning cell towers. A CBDC does not. The Bank for International Settlements has flagged offline payment capability as a priority for central banks studying CBDCs, but experimental work shows that privacy-enhancing techniques introduce “additional latency” and “raise reliability concerns” in real-time offline settings.7Bank for International Settlements. Project Polaris: CBDC System Design and Interoperability A widespread outage, a natural disaster, or an internet failure could leave people unable to buy food or fuel — a systemic risk that does not exist with physical currency.
Consumer protection is unsettled. Regulation E, which governs electronic fund transfers and shields consumers from unauthorized transactions, does not clearly cover CBDCs. The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau proposed extending Regulation E to digital assets in 2024, then withdrew the proposal in May 2025 without further action. If someone drains a CBDC wallet through a hack or unauthorized access, the liability framework that protects conventional bank accounts may not apply.
Exclusion of People Who Rely on Cash
Roughly 4.5% of U.S. households are unbanked, and a larger share depends on cash day to day. Elderly people, residents of rural areas with unreliable internet, and low-income communities face real barriers to using any all-digital payment system. A CBDC that displaces or marginalizes cash forces these groups to acquire smartphones, maintain internet access, and build digital literacy just to participate in the basic economy.
Nigeria’s eNaira, launched in October 2021, shows how this plays out. As of late 2022, fewer than 0.5% of Nigeria’s population had used the eNaira, and only about 0.8% of bank accounts were linked to it. At least 30 million Nigerians lacked internet access. Younger, connected users treated the eNaira as redundant with existing bank apps; cash-dependent populations could not reach it at all. Trust was the dominant barrier, with many citizens unwilling to give the government direct visibility into their transactions.
Offline functionality is often proposed as a fix. The Bank for International Settlements has said that “the ability to pay when offline continues to be a priority for many central banks.”8Bank for International Settlements. Offline Payments with CBDC But extended offline use makes transactions inherently untraceable, which conflicts with anti-money-laundering rules. Central banks have proposed transaction and balance caps to manage the tension, which means offline CBDC would operate as a restricted, second-class form of money next to the online version.
Where U.S. Law Stands Now
The privacy and control concerns have produced concrete federal action. Executive Order 14178 prohibits federal agencies from taking “any action to establish, issue, or promote CBDCs within the jurisdiction of the United States or abroad” and orders the immediate termination of any ongoing CBDC development.1Federal Register. Strengthening American Leadership in Digital Financial Technology The order identifies CBDCs as threats to “the stability of the financial system, individual privacy, and the sovereignty of the United States.”
Congress is working to lock that prohibition into statute. The Anti-CBDC Surveillance State Act (H.R. 1919) passed the House in July 2025 on a 219–210 vote.9Congress.gov. H.R.1919 – 119th Congress: Anti-CBDC Surveillance State Act The bill would amend the Federal Reserve Act to prohibit the Fed from offering digital currency directly to individuals, maintaining accounts for individuals, or issuing a CBDC indirectly through financial intermediaries. It also bars the Board of Governors from testing, studying, developing, or implementing a CBDC. The bill carves out an exception for any “dollar-denominated currency that is open, permissionless, and private, and fully preserves the privacy protections of United States coins and physical currency.”
An executive order can be reversed by a future president, which is why the statutory ban matters. The Federal Reserve stated in 2022 that it “does not intend to proceed with issuance of a CBDC without clear support from the executive branch and from Congress, ideally in the form of a specific authorizing law.” For now, both branches have signaled opposition, and a U.S. CBDC is off the table.