CAATSA Sanctions on Turkey: S-400, F-35, and 2026 Status

The CAATSA sanctions on Turkey are U.S. penalties imposed on December 14, 2020, against Turkey’s Presidency of Defense Industries (SSB) for buying Russia’s S-400 missile defense system. They were the first sanctions ever levied against a NATO ally under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act, and as of mid-2026 they remain in place while Ankara and Washington negotiate a resolution tied to the future of the missiles and Turkey’s possible return to the F-35 fighter program.

Why the Sanctions Were Imposed

Turkey signed a roughly $2.5 billion contract in December 2017 to buy four S-400 batteries from Russia, after twice rejecting U.S. offers of the Raytheon Patriot system because Washington would not share sensitive missile technology.¹² The first components arrived at Murted Air Base near Ankara on July 12, 2019.³

CAATSA, enacted in August 2017, requires sanctions against anyone who knowingly engages in a “significant transaction” with an entity operating on behalf of Russia’s defense or intelligence sectors. Russia’s main arms exporter, Rosoboronexport, is on the State Department’s list of covered entities.⁴ Congress then removed any presidential wiggle room for Turkey specifically. Section 1241 of the Fiscal Year 2021 National Defense Authorization Act declared Turkey’s S-400 purchase a significant transaction by law, required the president to impose at least five CAATSA sanctions within 30 days, and set the conditions for lifting them: Turkey must no longer possess the S-400, no Russian personnel may operate or maintain the system on Turkish territory, and Ankara must guarantee it will not reacquire the system.⁵

What the Sanctions Actually Do

The measures target the SSB, Turkey’s defense procurement agency, which was placed on the Treasury Department’s Non-SDN Menu-Based Sanctions List.⁶ Five specific penalties apply:

U.S. agencies cannot issue licenses to export or re-export goods or technology to the SSB.
U.S. financial institutions cannot lend the SSB more than $10 million in any 12-month period.
The Export-Import Bank cannot provide guarantees, insurance, or credit for exports to the SSB.
The United States must vote against loans benefiting the SSB at international financial institutions.
Full blocking sanctions and visa bans apply to four SSB officials: President Ismail Demir, Vice President Faruk Yigit, Air Defense and Space Department Head Serhat Gencoglu, and Regional Air Defense Systems Program Manager Mustafa Alper Deniz.

The four individuals were added to the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons (SDN) List. Any property they hold within U.S. jurisdiction is frozen, they cannot conduct financial transactions subject to U.S. jurisdiction, and their U.S. visas were revoked. Under the SDN “50 percent rule,” any entity majority-owned by one or more of them is also blocked.⁷

The State Department framed the sanctions as designed to impose costs on Russia rather than to weaken Turkey’s military, and said they do not extend to SSB subsidiaries or affiliates.⁸

The F-35 Removal Is a Separate Penalty

The CAATSA sanctions are not the only U.S. response to the S-400. Within a week of the first missile delivery in July 2019, the Pentagon formally removed Turkey from the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program, arguing that the S-400’s radar could serve as a Russian intelligence platform capable of identifying vulnerabilities in the F-35’s stealth technology.⁹

Turkey had planned to buy 100 F-35s, and Turkish companies were producing 937 parts for the aircraft.¹⁰ The Pentagon estimated the cost of unwinding Turkish industrial participation at $500 to $600 million, and projected roughly $9 billion in lost F-35 contracts for the Turkish economy over the life of the program. Four F-35 jets already built for Turkey stayed in the United States.⁹

A separate law governs any return. Section 1245 of the Fiscal Year 2020 NDAA prohibits transferring F-35s to Turkey unless the secretaries of defense and state certify to Congress that Turkey no longer possesses the S-400 or associated equipment, has credibly committed not to acquire such systems again, and has not taken other compromising Russian defense hardware since July 2019. No such certification had been submitted as of September 2025.¹¹ So even a full lifting of CAATSA sanctions would not, by itself, restore Turkey to the F-35 program.

How the Sanctions Have Affected Turkey’s Defense Sector

Though narrowly aimed at the SSB, the sanctions reach further than the agency itself. The export license ban blocks not just new arms sales but also spare parts for U.S.-origin equipment already in Turkey’s inventory, including F-16 fighters, E-7T Peace Eagle early warning aircraft, and KC-135 tankers.¹²

The ban also affects Turkish defense exports that contain U.S. components. Roughly 35% of Turkish defense exports include American subsystems, which means license denials can also stop sales to third countries. Casualties have included a T129 helicopter deal with Pakistan and Boeing CH-47 Chinook upgrade contracts. In response, Turkey has sought non-Western substitutes, causing delays in projects like the Altay main battle tank, held up by engine and transmission sourcing problems, and the TCG Istanbul frigate, whose U.S.-made missile launchers were swapped for domestic alternatives.¹²

Where Things Stand in 2026

The sanctions are still in force. The second Trump administration has taken a warmer tone: U.S. Ambassador to Turkey Thomas Barrack said at the Antalya Diplomacy Forum in April 2026 that he expects the S-400 issue to be “solved soon” and added, “From my boss’s point of view, acceptance into an F-35 programme is fine.”¹³¹⁴¹⁵¹⁶

The S-400 Disposal Question

The legal barrier is what to do with the missiles. Turkey’s S-400 batteries have never been activated, remain in storage, and were excluded from Turkey’s new “Steel Dome” integrated air defense network unveiled in August 2025.¹⁷¹⁸¹⁹ The alternative is dismantling the systems and moving them to a Turkish military facility outside the country. Both options may require Russian consent under the original purchase contract.²⁰

A third proposal, keeping the systems inactive under U.S. monitoring for a renewable period, would not satisfy the statutory requirement that Turkey cease possession, so it would need explicit congressional approval.

Congressional Resistance

Even a deal between Ankara and the White House will not be enough on its own. Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Jim Risch confirmed as of July 2025 that he has placed an indefinite hold on F-35 sales to Turkey.¹⁴ In the House, a group led by Representative Dina Titus has prepared a Joint Resolution of Disapproval to block any administrative move to readmit Turkey to the F-35 program, citing the absence of public evidence that Turkey has disposed of the S-400. Vice President JD Vance has acknowledged that any F-35 sale to Turkey would require congressional approval and compliance with existing law.²¹

Turkey’s near-term diplomatic target is the NATO leaders’ summit scheduled for July 7–8, 2026, in Ankara, which President Trump is expected to attend. Ankara hopes to announce a sanctions resolution on the sidelines.²⁰ The United States recently approved a $700 million sale of GE F110 engines for Turkey’s domestic KAAN fighter program, which some read as a sign of thawing defense ties and others as a concession that should have waited for a real S-400 settlement.²¹

1
CSIS. Coup-Proofing: Making Sense of Turkey’s S-400 Decision
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DW. Turkey Receives First S-400 Missile Delivery From Russia
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U.S. News. Turkey, US Will Find Way of Removing CAATSA Sanctions Very Soon
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Daily Sabah. Turkiye Eyes Lifting US CAATSA Sanctions Before Midterms
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PBS NewsHour. Erdogan Unveils Turkey’s New Steel Dome Integrated Air Defense System
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