Bans on Sharia law that name Islamic law explicitly cannot survive First Amendment review, and no state has one on the books. Roughly a dozen states have instead passed religion-neutral statutes restricting how courts may apply any foreign law or legal code. Those neutral laws are constitutional, but they largely duplicate tools American courts already used to reject foreign rulings that conflict with basic rights.
Oklahoma’s Named Ban and Why It Was Blocked
In November 2010, Oklahoma voters approved State Question 755 by about 70 percent. The amendment directed state courts to “not consider international law or Sharia Law” and defined Sharia as “Islamic law” based on “the Koran and the teaching of Mohammed.”1Justia. Awad v. Ziriax et al It never took effect.
Muneer Awad, executive director of the Council on American-Islamic Relations in Oklahoma, sued before certification. A federal district court issued a preliminary injunction, and the Tenth Circuit upheld it in Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111 (10th Cir. 2012). Applying the strict scrutiny framework from Larson v. Valente, the court required Oklahoma to justify a law that discriminated among religions with a compelling government interest, narrowly tailored.2Justia. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 The state could not identify a single Oklahoma case in which Sharia law had actually harmed a litigant. Without evidence of an actual problem, there was no compelling interest to justify a law that explicitly targeted one religion.3Justia. Awad v. Ziriax
Since Awad, no state has tried to pass a law that names Sharia, Islamic law, or any other specific religious tradition. The ruling settled that question.
Why the First Amendment Forecloses Religion-Specific Bans
Two clauses do the work. The Establishment Clause forbids the government from preferring one religion over another. The Free Exercise Clause protects the practice of any faith from government interference. A statute that names a religious tradition for restriction hits both.
Under Larson v. Valente, any law that creates a “denominational preference” is presumed suspect and reviewed under strict scrutiny, the most demanding test in constitutional law.2Justia. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 The government must prove the law serves a compelling interest and uses the least restrictive means available. Most laws that reach that test fail it.
The Supreme Court reinforced the principle in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, striking down ordinances aimed at Santeria animal sacrifice. Even a law that avoids naming a religion still triggers heightened scrutiny if its purpose is to burden practices because of their religious character.4Constitution Annotated. Amdt1.4.1 Overview of Free Exercise Clause A law that names Sharia cannot even claim the appearance of neutrality.
The Neutral-Language Statutes That Replaced Named Bans
After Oklahoma’s amendment fell, legislators in other states adopted a model bill titled “American Laws for American Courts,” drafted by the American Public Policy Alliance. The model never mentions religion. It targets any “foreign law, legal code, or system” that would violate constitutional protections if applied by a domestic court. Arizona, Kansas, Louisiana, and Tennessee are among the states that enacted versions of it.5Legal Information Institute. Laws that Discriminate Against Religious Practice
The statutes generally take one of three approaches. Some block any foreign law or judgment that would result in an actual violation of a party’s constitutional rights. Others direct courts to deny recognition of foreign proceedings that conflict with the state’s public policy. A few take a reciprocal approach, refusing enforcement of judgments from countries that don’t offer the same fundamental rights American constitutions guarantee.
Critics point to legislative histories showing that Sharia law was the animating concern behind many of these bills, even where the text is silent about religion. Whether that mismatch between stated purpose and actual purpose creates a constitutional weakness is unsettled. No neutral-language statute has been struck down on those grounds.
What Courts Could Already Do Without These Laws
American courts have refused foreign judgments that conflict with basic rights for well over a century. Three doctrines carry most of the weight.
Comity
The Supreme Court’s decision in Hilton v. Guyot (1895) defined comity as “the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive, or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to international duty and convenience and to the rights of its own citizens.”6Justia. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 Comity is discretionary. A judge who finds the foreign proceedings unfair or partial can refuse recognition. No American court is required to enforce a foreign judgment.
The Public Policy Exception
Even a foreign judgment that clears the basic fairness bar can be refused if the underlying law violates fundamental American principles: free speech, equal protection, religious freedom, or due process. A custody order issued without giving a parent any hearing would be rejected on this ground with or without a state anti-foreign-law statute.
The Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act
Most states have adopted a version of this uniform act. It requires refusal when the foreign court lacked jurisdiction or the foreign system fails to provide due process, and it permits refusal for fraud, conflict with public policy, or serious doubts about the rendering court’s integrity.7Transnational Litigation Blog. Uniform Foreign Country Money Judgments Recognition Act
Any foreign proceeding that denied a fair hearing, discriminated by gender or religion, or imposed a penalty at odds with constitutional protections was already blocked by one or more of these tools. Proponents of the newer statutes have not identified a case where those tools failed and a foreign law was applied in a way that violated an American’s rights.
Where the Laws Bite: Religious Contracts and Arbitration
The practical effect that reaches ordinary people is on private religious agreements, which millions of Americans voluntarily enter.
Religious Marriage Contracts
A mahr is a financial commitment the groom makes to the bride as part of an Islamic marriage. American courts have treated mahr agreements as enforceable secular contracts, applying the same standards used for prenuptial agreements. In Odatalla v. Odatalla, a New Jersey court held that a mahr agreement “is nothing more and nothing less than a simple contract between two consenting adults” and enforced it using neutral contract principles. Courts in New York, Maryland, Virginia, and California have followed the same approach, checking for voluntariness, definiteness, and consistency with public policy.
Jewish marriage contracts (ketubot) have long been enforced the same way. The concern with broadly written anti-foreign-law statutes is that a losing party could characterize a mahr or ketubah as an application of “foreign religious law” and ask a court to refuse enforcement on that basis. If a judge accepted that framing, one party could lose rights they negotiated in good faith.
Religious Arbitration
Jewish, Muslim, and Christian communities all use religious tribunals to resolve disputes. Their decisions are routinely enforced by secular courts under general arbitration law, treated like any private arbitration award as long as both parties consented and the proceedings were fair.
Anti-foreign-law statutes introduce a wrinkle. A losing party could argue that enforcing an award requires the court to apply a “foreign legal code” barred by state law. The Federal Arbitration Act likely preempts these state laws where interstate commerce is involved, but the question hasn’t been fully worked out in court. The risk is that a statute meant to protect rights becomes a tool for a party to escape a religious arbitration agreement they voluntarily signed.
What the Laws Actually Change
Not much, honestly. The statutes put into legislative language what was already established through case law, which can help litigants who lack the resources to argue comity doctrine from scratch. A clear statutory prohibition is easier to invoke than a common-law exception.
The costs show up at the margins. International business contracts with choice-of-law clauses referencing foreign legal systems can face new challenges. Foreign-born Americans seeking to enforce legitimate divorce decrees or property settlements from their home countries may run into extra procedural hurdles. And the religious contract questions above create real uncertainty for communities that have relied for generations on the enforceability of their agreements.
The constitutional line has not moved since 2012. A state may regulate how its courts interact with foreign legal systems. It may not single out one religion’s legal tradition for restriction. Every attempt to ban Sharia law by name has failed or been abandoned, and the neutral-language statutes that replaced those efforts largely restate protections that were already in place.