Article 11 of the Treaty of Tripoli is the 1796 treaty clause in which the United States declared that “the government of the United States of America is not in any sense founded on the Christian Religion,” that it holds no hostility toward Islam, and that religion may never be used as a pretext for conflict between the two countries. The Senate approved the English text in 1797, and President John Adams signed it. Whether the clause proves the Founders intended a secular republic, or was diplomatic language aimed at a Muslim government, is a separate question, and one the historical record does not fully settle.
The Full Text and What It Does
The English version reads: “As the government of the United States of America is not in any sense founded on the Christian Religion, as it has in itself no character of enmity against the laws, religion or tranquility of Musselmen, and as the said States never have entered into any war or act of hostility against any Mehomitan nation, it is declared by the parties that no pretext arising from religious opinions shall ever produce an interruption of the harmony existing between the two countries.”1Government Publishing Office. Treaty of Peace and Friendship Between the United States of America, and the Bey and Subjects of Tripoli, of Barbary
The clause does three things in one sentence. It disclaims any religious foundation for the American government. It states that the United States bears no hostility toward Islam or Muslim-majority nations. And it forecloses religion as a justification for future conflict between the parties. The language was written for a diplomatic audience in Tripoli, meant to reassure the Pasha that American motivations were commercial rather than religious.
Why the Treaty Existed
After the Revolution, American merchant ships in the Mediterranean lost the protection of the British Navy. The Barbary States — Tripoli, Algiers, Tunis, and Morocco — demanded tribute in exchange for safe passage, and without a navy of its own the young republic saw its sailors captured and its cargo seized. The 1796 treaty was one of several agreements the United States negotiated with Barbary powers during this period.
David Humphreys, appointed Commissioner Plenipotentiary by President Washington in 1795, oversaw the broader diplomatic effort. Humphreys delegated the negotiations to Joel Barlow and Joseph Donaldson Jr., who served as joint agents. Richard O’Brien, a former captive in Algiers who had spent a decade as an unofficial American representative in North Africa, helped deliver payments and finalize terms.2Avalon Project. The Barbary Treaties 1786-1816 – Treaty of Peace and Friendship, Signed at Tripoli November 4, 1796 The price of peace included an upfront payment of 40,000 Spanish dollars along with watches, rings, cloth, and naval supplies, with the treaty stipulating that no periodic tribute would ever be required — a promise that would not hold.
How It Became American Law
The treaty was signed at Tripoli on November 4, 1796, and certified at Algiers on January 3, 1797, over Joel Barlow’s signature and seal. President Adams submitted it to the Senate on May 29, 1797. On June 7, the Senate voted to give its advice and consent, with 23 senators voting in favor and 9 not voting.2Avalon Project. The Barbary Treaties 1786-1816 – Treaty of Peace and Friendship, Signed at Tripoli November 4, 1796 The United States ratified the treaty on June 10, 1797, and Adams proclaimed it the same day.
Under the Supremacy Clause, ratified treaties stand as the supreme law of the land, binding on all states and enforceable in court.3Congress.gov. Article VI Clause 2 Supremacy Clause For the years it was in force, the Treaty of Tripoli carried the same weight as federal statute.
Who Wrote Article 11
Nobody knows for certain who authored the language, and historians have debated the question without reaching consensus. Joel Barlow is the most commonly suggested author, in part because he handled the English translation and in part because his personal views align with the provision’s spirit. Barlow was a friend of Thomas Jefferson and a vocal advocate for separating church and state. In 1791 he published a book attacking established churches and praising the United States for thriving without one. Mordecai M. Noah, a later U.S. consul to Tunis, blamed Barlow directly for inserting his “private prejudices” into the treaty.
The attribution is not settled, though. Richard O’Brien, who understood the diplomatic dynamics of the region firsthand, is another candidate. Some scholars have speculated that officials in Tripoli may have requested the provision themselves, wanting written assurance that the United States would never use Christianity as a pretext for hostility. Historian Robert Allison has argued that assigning a treaty clause to any single author oversimplifies how these agreements were negotiated.
The Arabic Text Problem
The strangest thing about Article 11 is that it does not appear in the Arabic version of the treaty. Hunter Miller, a State Department official who compiled a comprehensive edition of early American treaties in 1931, examined the original Arabic manuscript and found no equivalent to Article 11’s language about Christianity. In its place the Arabic text contains a letter from the Dey of Algiers to the Pasha of Tripoli, focused on administrative matters and recognition of the American representative.4The Avalon Project. The Barbary Treaties 1786-1816 – Treaty with Tripoli 1796 – Hunter Millers Notes
Miller put it bluntly. The Arabic text between Articles 10 and 12 is “in form a letter, crude and flamboyant and withal quite unimportant,” and how it came to be treated as Article 11 in Barlow’s English translation “is a mystery and seemingly must remain so.” The Tripolitanian signatories likely never agreed to the specific language about the Christian religion. They signed an Arabic document that said something entirely different in that spot.
That gap complicates the diplomatic story but not the legal one. The Senate reviewed and voted on the English text. President Adams signed the English text. The English version is what passed through the constitutional ratification process, and the English version is what carried force under U.S. law.
What Happened to the Provision
Despite the treaty’s promise that no further tribute would be required, the Pasha of Tripoli grew dissatisfied within a few years and declared war on the United States in May 1801.5Office of the Historian. Barbary Wars The First Barbary War ended with a replacement treaty signed at Tripoli on June 4, 1805, and ratified by the United States on April 17, 1806. That agreement dealt with prisoner exchanges, a $60,000 ransom, military withdrawal, and maritime commerce.6The Avalon Project. Treaty of Peace and Amity, Signed at Tripoli It did not repeat the language of Article 11. The secular declaration appeared once in American treaty law and was never carried into any subsequent agreement with a Barbary state.
How Article 11 Is Used Today
The treaty expired over two centuries ago, but Article 11 is still cited in arguments about religion and American government. Advocates for strict church-state separation point to it as evidence that the founding generation understood the United States to be a secular republic. If the Senate approved a document declaring the government “not in any sense founded on the Christian Religion,” and a devout president signed it without objection, the argument runs, the Founders did not consider America a Christian nation.
Critics push back on several fronts. The Senate vote was not unanimous in the strict sense; 23 senators voted yes and 9 did not vote, which is not the same as universal agreement. The language, they argue, was diplomatic boilerplate aimed at reassuring a Muslim government, not a philosophical statement about American identity. The Arabic discrepancy weakens the clause further, since the other party never actually agreed to those words. And the provision was dropped when the treaty was renegotiated in 1805.
One boundary matters for anyone weighing the clause in constitutional argument: no court has relied on Article 11 as binding precedent in an Establishment Clause case. Its value in that debate is historical and rhetorical, not doctrinal. As a direct statement of how the early American government described itself to a foreign power, though, it remains one of the clearest lines in the record.